

**A LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS OF LATINO  
POLITICAL ASSIMILATION**

By

Gia Elise Barboza

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to  
Michigan State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

2007

UMI Number: 3264134

Copyright 2007 by  
Barboza, Gia Elise

All rights reserved.

### INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

**UMI**<sup>®</sup>

---

UMI Microform 3264134

Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.

All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company  
300 North Zeeb Road  
P.O. Box 1346  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

## ABSTRACT

# A LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS OF LATINO POLITICAL ASSIMILATION

By

Gia Elise Barboza

Latino/Hispanic Americans as a broad category and Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cubans in particular, are one of the newest and fastest growing ethnic populations that are undergoing the political incorporation process. This dissertation provides an empirical analysis of Latino political incorporation into the United States polity. It is a response to scholars and policymakers who have asserted that immigrants threaten the national unity of this country and contribute little, if anything, to American political culture. To critically examine the multiple levels of political incorporation among Latino immigrants, this research uses data from the 2002 Kaiser/Pew Survey of Latinos and the 2004 Kaiser/Pew Latino Survey: Political and Civic Incorporation. One goal of this dissertation is to comprehensively evaluate the predictions of three competing theories derived from the sociological literature on immigrant assimilation as they are applied to patterns of Latino political participation. More specifically,

I contribute to the current literature on Latino political participation by examining three generations of Cuban, Mexican and Puerto Rican immigrants and by evaluating whether the predictions of these competing models hold to empirical scrutiny. Overall, the degree to which context of reception, acculturation and group-based resource variables explain the variance in political behavior differs by national origin and generational status and is contingent on the type of resource under consideration. A latent class analysis revealed two typologies of Latino political participation, namely individuals who are highly responsive to the electoral system and those who are highly unresponsive. A second goal of this dissertation is to explore the contours of American national identity among Latino subgroups in the United States. A latent class analysis revealed an interpretable solution of Latino national identity into three classes that can be loosely characterized as ethnocultural Americanism, multiculturalism and modified multiculturalism. The simultaneous latent structure of national identity among Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans further revealed homogeneity across each national origin subgroup, indicating a substantially similar structure between them. A multinomial latent class regression was also performed on several covariates related to immigration status and group identity. The analysis revealed that context of reception and group consciousness significantly predicts membership in each class. A major finding of this dissertation is that Latinos show overwhelming support for the contours of ethnocultural Americanism as evidenced by the large prevalence of this class. Overall, I found a high level of support for American values among Latinos and high levels of electoral participation – an indication that Latinos are assimilating both politically and culturally, despite popular belief to the contrary.

© 2007

Gia Elise Barboza

All Rights Reserved

This dissertation is dedicated to three individuals who struggled to make this possible but who were taken from me too soon, my beloved mother, Othelia Roberta Salerno, my beloved grandmother, Susan Salerno, and my beloved friend Kimberly Rosario Perez.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation would not be possible without the loving support of many people. First and foremost is my wonderful, loving and supportive husband, I'khala, who has always believed in me and encouraged me to succeed, even in the face of tremendous adversity. All of whatever I do in my life, my accomplishments and achievements, my struggles and failures, are done so that my five children, A'ssunta, Maia, Romello, Sunflower-Mei and Oji, can have a better life than I had. They are instrumental in my ability to finish this dissertation, despite the fact that *so many people blame them as being an obstacle to success rather than a facilitator of it.*

During my tenure at Michigan State University, I have met many wonderful people, all of whom must be mentioned here because without them it would have been impossible to finish this dissertation. A special thank you for the emotional guidance, financial support and general encouragement of Dr. Yevonne Smith of the Graduate School. Dr. Smith, you have encouraged me to move beyond and move past so many times when I was on the verge of giving up. You have never once let me down. You have always been there for me in any way I needed you to be, and you are a very instrumental part, and in many ways the sole reason, that I am able to complete this degree. Another incredibly supportive person has been Dr. Karen Klomprens.

Thank you for being so student oriented, fair and balanced and open to alternatives. The Graduate School has done everything possible to make this happen, and I will never forget that.

Words cannot even begin to express the gratitude I have for my dissertation advisor, Dr. Kenneth Williams. As I learned the hard way, very few individuals have the ability to guide students in a professional, decent and respectful manner while simultaneously imparting to them key ingredients of their future success. Ken, thank you so much for not giving up on me and the topic I was interested in pursuing. My very future has depended so heavily on your guidance and support, and your genuineness is something that I will never forget despite all the difficult times I have encountered. I would also like to express special gratitude to Dr. Ada Finifter and Dr. Reginald Sheehan for their helpful comments on the dissertation. Undoubtedly, I am grateful to have been privileged with such a wonderful, supportive dissertation committee with some of the best scholars in this field.

The “heart of gold” of my good friend Dr. David Imig is something I am truly blessed to have had the privilege to be blessed with for the past eight years. The many discussions we have had has helped me begin to develop as a scholar and a person. There are very few individuals in life that have compassion, gratitude and respect for all persons as do you, and knowing that such a scholar is close by and always accessible has been a huge motivational factor for me never giving up. Likewise, Dr. Fransisco Villarruel has been such a good friend to me and always a positive influence. Thank you both very much.

When I think about my best friend Rohan Williams, tears well up in my eyes. You

have been and will always be so giving and you never ask for anything. Lord knows, I have taken so much from you. You have always been there for myself and my family and have become part of my family in the process. I truly love you like a brother and could not have made it through this without you. All of the incidents, however much they seemed comical and absurd, were never really funny but rather sabotaging to both of us. This, my friend, is the price we pay for being intuitive individuals who care and who want to make a difference and did not merely pursue higher education as a means to an end. To my other close friend, Steven Korzeneiwski, my deepest gratitude. We are so much alike, and I am so grateful that you were there to reinforce my values and beliefs during the last stages of this dissertation. We will always be close friends, even if we are apart.

Kim, I never got a chance to thank you. You came to the political science department for a reason and it was not to complete a degree, it was to bless my life with yours. You left a huge imprint on my heart, and as I write this I still cannot help crying and wondering why you were taken from this planet so drastically too soon. I know you were with me as I struggled to get through this. Thank you.

A huge part of my life for the past couple of years has involved statistics and the individuals who I have idolized and have given me something to strive for. First is Dr. Jeffrey Wooldridge who has been hugely influential in motivating me to pursue statistics because of his wonderful and what turns out to be a rare ability to teach it and to make it extremely interesting. I am so blessed with the exceptional opportunity to have had the absolute pleasure to converse with him on several occasions and to have him be a part of this dissertation. Thank you for never saying no. As for my

good friend Dr. James Stapleton I have truly cherished your friendship and your encouragement to pursue statistics. You have made the past few years so enjoyable regardless of whatever else was happening in my life.

I would like to express appreciation for the especially insightful comments of Dr. Karen Kauffman of the University of Maryland whose comments at last year's Southern Political Science Association truly guided me and helped me to reorganize this thesis.

There are many more individuals that deserve my complete gratitude for always being supportive and positive and believing in me. These people are Dr. Larry Shiamberg, Dr. James Oehmke, Dr. Robert Griffore, Dr. Teresa Mastin, Rajesh Lal and Robin Weatherill.

My "sisters" Arwa Mohamed and Violet Rahme have been a huge part of my life for the past two years. Arwa, thank you for always reading my papers and providing insightful critique and comments. You both are truly the best friends a person can ever have.

Last but not least are the two people who were most influential in my life, my mother "farta" and my grandmother, "grannie." Nobody can understand, as can we, how devastated I have been since I lost you both and how much it has taken to get me to this point from the deepest, darkest moments in my life that occurred after you left me. Your struggles, as a single parent, as an immigrant, as individuals who made tremendous sacrifices for your children, have not left this planet totally in vein. And, while in the general scheme of things this dissertation does not matter a huge deal, it does give at least five people a chance in life that we never had. I love you

and thank you.

By the way, I would like to thank everybody who tried their best to *not* make this possible. I am truly honored to have received so much attention from people in the department who wanted to destroy me and my family – thank you. What you do not understand is that I am going to succeed with or without you. I pity you. You know who you are.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>List of Tables</b>		<b>xiv</b>
<b>List of Figures</b>		<b>xv</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>		<b>1</b>
1.1 The Demographics of Immigration . . . . .		1
1.1.1 The Importance of Latino Political Incorporation to American Politics . . . . .		6
1.2 Main Argument and Research Questions . . . . .		9
1.2.1 Main Argument . . . . .		13
1.2.2 Summary of Research Questions and Major Findings . . . . .		16
1.2.3 Organization of the Dissertation . . . . .		19
<b>2 Newcomers in the American Polity: Theoretical Models of Inter- group Relations Between Immigrants and Americans</b>		<b>22</b>
2.1 Introduction . . . . .		22
2.2 Early Models of Incorporation: Classical or “Straightline” Assimilation Theory . . . . .		23
2.3 The Ethnic Competition Perspective on Immigrant Assimilation . . . . .		28
2.3.1 Extensions to the Ethnic Disadvantage Perspective of Immi- grant Assimilation . . . . .		31
<b>3 Theoretical Perspectives on Identity Development</b>		<b>35</b>
3.1 Group Interest and Identity Politics . . . . .		35
3.2 Group Identity and Consciousness as a Political Group Resource . . . . .		42
3.3 The Process of Identification . . . . .		51
3.4 Ethnic Identity and Acculturation Theory . . . . .		53
3.5 Social Identity Theory . . . . .		56
<b>4 Data, Research Methodology and Hypotheses</b>		<b>59</b>
4.1 Data . . . . .		59
4.1.1 The 2002 National Survey of Latinos in America . . . . .		59
4.1.2 The 2004 National Survey of Latinos: Politics and Civic Life . . . . .		61
4.2 Components of the Straightline Model of Assimilation . . . . .		61

4.2.1	Cultural Indicators of Assimilation . . . . .	62
4.2.2	Operational Definitions, Exogenous Predictors and Research Hypotheses . . . . .	63
4.3	The Ethnic Disadvantage Model of Assimilation . . . . .	81
4.4	The Multiple Pathways of Assimilation . . . . .	88
4.5	The Components of Political Assimilation: The Dependent Variables . . . . .	88
4.5.1	Extending the Assimilation Framework to Political Outcomes . . . . .	88
4.5.2	Electoral Activity . . . . .	92
4.5.3	Nonelectoral Participation . . . . .	93
4.5.4	Citizenship . . . . .	94
4.5.5	Political Culture and American National Identity . . . . .	94
4.5.6	Control Variables . . . . .	98
4.6	An Empirical Model of Political Incorporation . . . . .	99
4.7	Statistical Methodology . . . . .	103
4.7.1	Binary, Ordinal and Multinomial Logistic Regression . . . . .	103
4.7.2	Ordinal Logit Models: Proportional Odds Models . . . . .	108
4.7.3	Path Analysis and Structural Equation Modeling . . . . .	114
4.7.4	Latent Class and Logistic Latent Class Analysis . . . . .	115
4.7.5	Poisson and Negative Binomial Regression . . . . .	120
<b>5</b>	<b>The Meaning of Americanism and National Attachment from an Immigrants Perspective . . . . .</b>	<b>122</b>
5.1	Overview . . . . .	122
5.2	Review of Research . . . . .	123
5.2.1	American National and Political Identity . . . . .	129
5.3	Social Identity Theory, Symbolic Politics and Group Attachment . . . . .	134
5.3.1	Hypotheses . . . . .	135
5.4	Results . . . . .	136
5.4.1	Ethnocultural Americanism (Class I) . . . . .	150
5.4.2	Multiculturalism (Class II) . . . . .	151
5.4.3	American Liberalism (Class I) . . . . .	156
5.4.4	Governmental Paternalism (Class II) . . . . .	156
5.5	How Does Acceptance of American Liberalism change with Acculturation, Exposure and Context of Reception in US Society . . . . .	158
5.5.1	A Multinomial Logistic Latent Class Analysis of Americanism . . . . .	159
5.6	The Nature of Ethnic Identity Choices Among Immigrant Populations . . . . .	165
5.7	The Distribution of Identity Choices Among Latino Immigrants . . . . .	165
5.7.1	A Multinomial Logistic Model of Identity Among Latino Immigrants . . . . .	169
5.8	Conclusion: The Integration of Identity . . . . .	183

<b>6</b>	<b>A Test of the Straightline, Ethnic Disadvantage and Segmented Assimilation Theories</b>	<b>189</b>
6.1	Introduction . . . . .	189
6.2	Review of Research . . . . .	191
6.3	Assimilation as a multidimensional concept . . . . .	200
6.4	Results . . . . .	201
6.5	Group-Based Resources and Latino Political Participation . . . . .	220
6.5.1	Bivariate Relationships Among Group-Based Resources and Political Participation . . . . .	222
6.6	A typology of Latino voting behavior . . . . .	242
6.7	A negative binomial model of Latino citizenship acquisition . . . . .	253
6.7.1	Results . . . . .	256
6.8	Summary and Conclusions . . . . .	268
<b>7</b>	<b>Group Solidarity, Pan-Ethnic Identity and Acculturation: A Resource Model of Latino Nonelectoral Political Participation</b>	<b>273</b>
7.1	Introduction . . . . .	273
7.2	Data and Method . . . . .	275
7.3	Results . . . . .	278
7.3.1	Sustaining Participation Beyond A Single Act . . . . .	283
7.3.2	A Continuation Ratio Logistic Model of Nonelectoral Participation Among Latinos . . . . .	284
7.3.3	A Latent Class Analysis of Latino Empowerment . . . . .	295
7.4	Summary and Conclusions . . . . .	302
<b>8</b>	<b>Summary and Conclusion</b>	<b>303</b>
8.1	Policy Implications . . . . .	311
	<b>Appendices</b>	<b>313</b>
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>317</b>

## List of Tables

1.1	US Residents Born Abroad by Origin and Citizenship Status, US Estimates, 1990 - 2000 . . . . .	3
4.1	Hypothesized Effects of Explanatory Variables on Political Participation	87

## List of Figures

5.1	Components of American Liberalism . . . . .	157
5.2	Distribution of American Liberalism with Covariates . . . . .	163
5.3	Mode of Identification By Age . . . . .	174
5.4	Predicted Probability of Identification given Perceptions of Group-based discrimination Among First Generation Latinos (Foreign Born)	176
6.1	Predicted Probability of Voting in US Elections and Ties to Mexico by Identification (Mexicans Only) . . . . .	214
6.2	Predicted Probability of Voting in Mexican Elections and US Acculturation . . . . .	219
6.3	Latent Class Model of Latino Voting . . . . .	243
6.4	Gamma Parameter Estimates for Latent Class Membership (Voting) .	248
6.5	Rho Parameter Estimates of Electoral Participation . . . . .	249
6.6	Negative Binomial and Poisson Predicted Probabilities vs. Observed Proportion for Model Fit . . . . .	257
6.7	Negative Binomial Predicted Probabilities Based on Estimated Means	258

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

In this dissertation, I address two broadly construed questions that have not been adequately addressed in the literature. The first set of questions concerns the extent to which existing theories of assimilation explain the political incorporation of Latino immigrants (de la Garza, 2004). A separate but related set of questions pertains to the role that group solidarity, group consciousness and discrimination plays in facilitating or prohibiting political incorporation.

### 1.1 The Demographics of Immigration

Immigrants leave their country of origin for many reasons, some because of adverse economic conditions, and others in order to escape political or religious persecution or simply to fulfill the American dream. Following the liberalization of restrictive and discriminatory immigration laws in the 1960s, immigration totals in the US have increased during the last decades. Since then, immigrants have continued to arrive

in the United States at an increasing rate, truly making this country a “nation of immigrants” (Wong, 2000). During the period spanning 1991 - 1998 the average annual number of immigrants admitted to the United States was approximately 700,000 (Bean and Stevens, 2003). As can be seen from Table 1.1, the overwhelming majority of immigrants arriving in the U.S. today come from either Mexico or Asia (61%) rather than Europe (12%), in contrast to the mass migration of the early 1900s where most migrants were of European descent (Wong, 2000).

Origin	Naturalized Citizens	% Naturalized	Non-citizen	% Non-Citizen	Total Foreign-Born	% Foreign-Born
Europe	291,456	17%	1,324,326	12%	1,615,782	12%
Asia	702,062	40	2,830,948	25	3,533,010	27
Africa	64,811	4	434,116	4	498,927	4
Oceania	9,650	.55	68,777	.60	78,427	.60
Mexico	309,176	18	4,134,425	36	4,443,601	34
Caribbean	171,185	10	827,510	7	998,695	8
Central America	80,220	5	781,253	7	861,473	7
South America	109,061	6	793,079	7	902,140	7
Canada	21,733	1	224,420	2	246,153	2
Total	1,759,354	100%	11,418,854	100%	13,178,208	100%

Table 1.1. US Residents Born Abroad by Origin and Citizenship Status, US Estimates, 1990 - 2000

A particularly salient aspect of this population change besides the overall level of immigration is the changing face of immigration (Schildkraut, 2003). In 1970, only 5% of the population was Hispanic; by 1990, Latinos comprised 9% of the United States population <sup>1</sup>. The Census Bureau estimates that as of March 2004, approximately 40 million Latinos reside in the United States, 12% of whom are foreign born<sup>2</sup>. Population projections suggest that Latinos will comprise roughly 25% of the total American population by 2050 and that Latinos will be a majority in a number of states (US Census Bureau, Population Projection Division, March, 2004). The increase in sheer numerical strength is coupled with significant regional disparity, as Hispanics are concentrated in the Western and Southern regions of the United States, particularly in heavily populated states such as Texas and California (Highton and Burris, 2002).

Driven largely by waves of these “new” immigrants, the Latino population has soared since 1990, reaching parity with African Americans as the largest “minority” group. Not only are contemporary immigrants growing in number, they and their children are becoming a larger segment of the American political system. Rising levels of immigration coupled with an image of these newcomers as “non-white” has had major consequences for American politics. As a result, scholars and policymakers alike have increasingly turned their attention to Latino political incorporation. For example, mobilizing the Hispanic population to ensure their political participation has recently played a central role in election campaigns. In the 2000 election, Republicans

---

<sup>1</sup><http://www.jsri.msu.edu/latinospec/>

<sup>2</sup>US Census, November 2004 Voters Supplement

employed several devices that were meant to entice Hispanic voters to abandon their Democratic partisan affiliation and also to mobilize the Hispanic vote (New York Times, 2000). Using data from the 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES), Kenski and Tisinger (2006) examined the extent to which Bush and the Republicans made gains among Hispanic Americans. They found that while Bush improved his support among Hispanics, Hispanic party identification in 2004 was comparable to identification in 2000. The four states with large Latino populations, California, New York, Florida, and Texas, are crucial in deciding future presidential races, and a couple of dozen congressional districts could determine which party controls the House of Representatives. According to Henry Cisneros, president of Univision and a former secretary of housing and urban development

In every election from now into the future, Latinos will have a decisive say, because of the concentration of Latinos in important states.

Clearly, then, attention to immigrant incorporation into the US political system is a critical ingredient to understanding future developments in American politics.

The research presented here focuses on the political participation and assimilation of Latino immigrants in the United States who are of Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban origin. Since immigrants from Latin America comprise over 50% of the foreign born population (Wong, 2000), particular emphasis is placed on the foreign-born/native-born dichotomy. As can be seen by Table 1.2, approximately 33% of Latino citizens are foreign born. Comparisons between native and foreign born populations are conducive to understanding how differences in assimilation trajectories,

including the degree to which Latinos have common goals, expectations and perceptions of identity, affect degrees of political incorporation.

Table 1.2: Birthplace By Ethnicity

	<u>Foreign born</u>	<u>Native born</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hispanic	33%	67	100%
Non-Hispanic	4%	96	100%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS), Voting Supplement (2004).

### **1.1.1 The Importance of Latino Political Incorporation to American Politics**

Some scholars and policymakers alike believe that immigration is subversive of the American “way” and on that basis are opposed to it. In general, the reason given to justify this opposition is that immigrants are a threat to the political cohesion of this nation (de la Garza, 2004). The most prominent scholar to use this logic of justification is Huntington (1996, 1997, 2000), who claims that Latinos are relatively noncommittal with respect to the “national interest” and that immigration threatens American “cultural integrity, national identity and perhaps its very future as a country” (Huntington, 2004). According to Huntington, “this [new] wave of immigration is ... profoundly different from any before it and therefore more dangerous to American identity” (2004, p. 34). He continues that “[m]any Mexican immigrants and their offspring simply do not appear to identify primarily with the United States” (p. 40). The response among the Latino community to Huntington and others with similar viewpoints has been overwhelming. In fact, a June 2006 symposium entitled “Immigration and National Identity,” that appeared in the “Perspectives on Politics” is

comprised of four articles which consider different aspects of the social and political incorporation of Latino immigrants in the U.S. In the introductory article, Segura (2006, p. 278) claims that

[d]ebates about immigration and national identity cut to the core of our national self-image as a nation of immigrants, and invariably includes allusions to the past - real and idealized - as a way of understanding and coping with social and demographic changes today.

The first article, entitled “Culture Clash? Contesting Notions of American Identity and the Effects of Latin American Immigration,” examined immigration and national identity in the context of American political development (Segura and Fraga, 2006). The second article, “Mexican Americans and the American Dream” addressed claims that “Mexicans are on their way to forming a separate nation within the U.S (Alba, 2006, p. 289).” Alba argues that

In the Mexican-American case, the cross-sectional comparison of generations is misleading, as we will see below, in part because different generations originate in different periods of Mexican immigration and settlement and in part because the institutional discrimination of the pre-civil rights era thwarted mobility and interfered with past intergenerational advance.

The third article, “Cuban Emigres and the American Dream,” discusses the Cuban immigrant experience and the claim that “Latin Americans are eroding our country’s core Anglo-Protestant values.” Finally, the fourth article, “Mexican Immigrant Political and Economic Incorporation,” investigated the empirical basis of the claim

that American identity and culture is being undermined by a “trend toward cultural bifurcation” driven largely by Latino immigration.

While these series of articles were written specifically to address Huntington’s theories of Latino political and social incorporation, with limited exception proponents from neither camp have provided empirical evidence to support their positions. Only recently have scholars opined that these theoretical claims must be rigorously tested (see e.g. Staton, Jackson and Canache, 2005). Scholars must respond to these claims systematically and intelligibly before this type of armchair speculation begins to reinforce an ideology of resentment and prejudice towards individuals who in many circumstances have every right to be here. Furthermore, what characterizes a national identity and to what degree do immigrants adopt American values? Assuming this identity is comprised of acceptance of democratic processes (Cisneros, 2004) then it is possible to engage in a scholarly analysis that systematically tests Huntington’s theories.

Apart from speculation regarding the impact that immigrants have or will have on this country, developing greater knowledge of the nature and processes that characterizes Latino political incorporation is important for other reasons as well. First, despite the fact that Latinos represent the largest minority group in the United States and that immigration is the primary factor driving population growth, little is known about how they relate to the political system (Bedolla, 2003). Second, given the growing numbers of Latinos, the future of American politics depends crucially on their incorporation into the U.S. political system (Wong, 2000). Most importantly, political empowerment and adequate representation will enhance Latinos quality of

life in the United States. If the rhetoric of equality is to have any bite, Latinos must be adequately represented and given an active voice in United States politics.

## 1.2 Main Argument and Research Questions

Ethnic identity refers to the component of the self that includes both a knowledge and evaluation of one's membership in an ethnocultural group (Tajfel, 1981). Ethnocultural identity considers a person's ethnicity as well as the extent to which he or she actually identifies with and practices the lifestyle of that group. In groups undergoing acculturation, there can be considerable variation in the extent of ethnocultural identity with a particular cultural tradition. Assimilationist thought argues that the process of ethnocultural identification plays a central role in determining one's level of acculturation. Understanding the extent to which Latinos identify with their ethnocultural heritage, then, is a crucial component of understanding the degree to which they are assimilated, which in turn is important in understanding their political attitudes and behaviors.

The experience of newly arrived immigrants provides a unique lens with which to view the interplay between the emergence of ethnocultural identity and the political, economic and social institutions that redefine and transform those identities. Scholarly focus on the role of ethnic identity on the political incorporation of Latinos is desperately needed yet "political scientists have generally not analyzed how issues of language and identity formation affect political attitudes (Bedolla, 2003, p. 265)." In a recent article, Citrin et al. (2003) stated that, in addition to the variables normally

used by political scientists, “the role of ethnic identity [in facilitating political assimilation] - *particularly as it surfaced among ... Latinos* - needs further exploration” (p. 22). I argue that models applicable to Latino immigrants must include psychological variables designed to measure ethnic and national identity because to some, they signify national integrity and commitment to American political values (Sears, et. al, 2003).

Since immigrants must decide the degree to which they are willing to assimilate into American society, it seems reasonable to assume that issues surrounding ethnocultural identification have considerable influence for Latino political orientations. Some researchers have suggested that the political incorporation of Latinos depends on the particular mode of assimilation into the American polity, which in turn is related to membership in specific interpersonal networks and the ability to use group identity to gain access to political resources (Torres, 2001). But what role does ethnic identity play in facilitating Latino political incorporation? Does political incorporation depend more heavily on certain kinds of identities as opposed to others? Does heightened ethnic consciousness motivate Latinos to be more or less likely to adopt American political ideals and/or be politically active? In addition, how does being conscious of ethnic identity compare across racial and ethnic categories?

The traditional model of assimilation based on the experiences of European immigrants posits that the values and beliefs of newly arrived immigrants will eventually converge to that of the dominant culture (Marquez, 2004), eventually leading to the wholesale adoption of an American identity. However this “linear trend of incorporation” (Marquez, 2004, p. 4) may not fully capture the dynamics of Latino incor-

poration because for them the fluidity that characterizes ethnic identity is influenced by, among other things, levels of discrimination, governmental policies, educational achievement and family composition (Portes and Rumbaut, 2000). More recent theories of assimilation argue that as immigrants assimilate they should be more likely to describe themselves in panethnic terms and be politically motivated by Latino-specific causes and issues. By insisting that Latino subgroups are distinct, however, Latino scholars have failed to acknowledge the possibility of a shared Latino political identity, and therefore the role of panethnicity is not well developed in the literature on Latino political incorporation (Claassen, 2003). Is the recent rise in panethnic self-identification reflective of a new Latino political identity (de la Garza, 2004)? Similarly, does the increase in usage parallel the assimilation process such that as immigrants are socialized into American culture they are more likely to identify in panethnic terms? Political scientists studying African American political behavior have shown that black consciousness contributes to the combination of political efficacy and political mistrust. Does the same hold true among Latinos? A priori, there is reason to believe that that Latino immigrants are more conscious of their ethnic identity than are native born populations, if for no other reason than because the inability to speak English forces some Latinos to confront their ethnic identity on a daily basis.

Clearly, issues of identity are at the crux of both these perspectives and the question of whether there is a shared Latino identity versus a unique identity based on national origin has not been explored in the political science literature and hence remains unanswered. In this dissertation, I address these questions by assessing the role

that identity plays in promoting political affiliations, including the importance placed on political participation, and political attitudes and values. An important goal of the dissertation is to sort out these competing hypotheses to gain deeper insight into Latino political behavior.

To further contextualize the importance of personal resources and psychological orientations, I focus on how the broader social and institutional environment shapes the political behavior and attitudes that promote political incorporation (Marschall, 2004). While social context clearly plays an important role in determining an individual's involvement in politics, existing research has not been clear about how social networks and other contextual factors affect the level of political incorporation among Latinos. In particular, the context of reception should shed light on why some immigrants have successfully assimilated into the US polity while others have not. Latino immigrants who are defined as outsiders to mainstream society by natives are viewed as inferior and this can create or reinforce discrimination (Castles and Miller, 1998). It may be that, for some Latino subgroups, the context of reception, which is revealed in the opinions and attitudes of natives, particularly whites, promotes group consciousness. Importantly, according to some assimilation theories (Portes, 1984), it is the *perception* of discrimination and about one's relative position in the social hierarchy that matters the most. Do positive perceptions about life in the United States relative to one's country of origin lead to an outright acceptance of American political values and attitudes? Alternatively, does the awareness of institutional barriers in the host country awaken one's sense of group consciousness and motivate political behavior?

### 1.2.1 Main Argument

Differences in how immigrants become involved in the political system can be attributed to the context of reception and transformations in the way individuals come to view themselves as contact with American culture increases. Although Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans have distinct cultural and historical experiences they have had similar experiences upon coming to the United States. For Mexican-origin populations, the long history of economic, legal, and educational discrimination has left them disproportionately overrepresented in lower socioeconomic positions in American society (Agguire, 2001). Agguire (2001), for example, argues that negative beliefs about Mexican Americans – that they are prone to criminality, are lazy, un-American, and gang oriented, for example – have legitimized discrimination against them. The distinct cultural characteristics of Puerto Ricans have similarly tended to reinforce an ideology of prejudice and resentment. Because the island of Puerto Rico has been a US colony since the late 1800s, the cultural differences between Puerto Ricans and whites are less critical than perceived biological differences (Agguire, 2001). Americans hold many negative stereotypes about Puerto Ricans. They are viewed as a drain on the welfare system and social services, and are considered lazy, submissive and immoral (Wagenheim, 1973; Lopez, 1973; Diaz-Cotto, 1996; Agguire, 2001). American perceptions of Cubans when they first began arriving to the United States, however, were quite different due to their anti-Castro and anticommunist sentiment. Cubans were viewed more as allies in a common cause than as territorial minority groups (Agguire, 2001). As Cubans began to assimilate into the US, they were in-

creasingly seen as industrious, intelligent and law-abiding. The Mariel boatlift<sup>3</sup> in 1980, however, dramatically changed the perception of Cubans and hostility towards them has escalated, creating latent white and manifest African American resentment towards them. Exemplary of this treatment is the approval in 1980 in Dade County of an English-only ordinance that reversed the policy of official bilingualism established in 1973<sup>4</sup>. Clearly, initial positive perceptions of Cubans has given way to more negative beliefs based on their language and cultural roots and their success in transforming south Florida into a Latin American “haven.” Given these and other historical circumstances, my argument is that the context of discrimination is in large part responsible for an awakened group consciousness and the politicization of ethnic identity.

An important component of ethnic identity is one’s relationship to their home country and the extent to which immigrants become re-socialized into the American polity. In their discussion of Australian migrants, (Finifter and Finifter, 1989, p. 629) eloquently summarize this learning process:

In sum, substantial new political learning, based on migrants’ current social experiences, does take place. However, it is quite clear that this

---

<sup>3</sup>The Mariel boatlift refers to the mass movement of Cubans who departed from Cuba’s Mariel Harbor to the United States between April 15 and October 31, 1980. The “wave” of Cuban immigrants who came during this period are widely known to be very different than previous waves of Cuban immigrants. In contrast to their predecessors, immigrants who arrived in 1980 were considered to be “misfits” by the Cuban government, because, for example, they were either sexual deviants or criminals.

<sup>4</sup>This ordinance prohibited any county expenditure for the purpose of utilizing any language other than English, or promoting any culture other than that of the United States.

new learning takes place most readily among those predisposed by prior attitudes and behavior to continue their participant patterns. Prior socialization provides the seed for new learning, but the current environment provides the culture in which it is nurtured.

Clearly, the permanency of intercultural contact matters as well for political incorporation because if an individual is not “psychologically committed” to residing in the United States, he or she will not be motivated to become a citizen, acquire partisan affiliation or otherwise participate in politics (Finifter and Finifter, 1989). An additional question is whether Latino political attitudes more reflective of American attitudes or are they more representative of the values and interests of their country of origin? Relatedly, are immigrants who are politically active in their home country more or less active in the United States, and if so what factors explain these differences? Is it possible, as Jones-Correa (1998) suggests, for immigrants, particularly non-citizens, to participate in American politics, even as they remain “officially” outside the polity as non-citizens? Finifter and Finifter (1989) argue that partisanship and overall ideology are important factors in helping migrants adapt to new environments, and that new political learning is generally dependent on previously established political attitudes. According to classical assimilation theory, the frequency of the contact between the host country’s institutions and Latino immigrants should provide sufficient exposure to result in their acceptance of American political norms (Citrin, 2003). Succinctly put, differences in assimilation trajectories create distinct political identities that are 1) derivative of the socio-political environment;

and 2) depend on the perception of shared political goals and expectations.

### 1.2.2 Summary of Research Questions and Major Findings

The agents of socialization, their content and how they structure Latino political identity are important to understanding whether the traditional “indicators” of incorporation will be forthcoming and to understand why the path to Latino political incorporation has looked so different from that of other groups. Two predominant theories of immigrant acculturation are considered here. The first is classical or straightline assimilation theory. The second is the ethnic disadvantage model of assimilation and its close cousin segmented assimilation theory.

The main difference between these theories lies with the importance of group consciousness and ethnicity in motivating individual political behavior. Group consciousness is a well-developed literature in political science as it pertains to blacks but not as it pertains to Latinos and certainly not Latino *immigrants*. Crucial to the notion of a Latino group consciousness, is the idea that the political system should be responsive to Latino commonality.

Panethnicity derives from membership in a Latino/Hispanic group. Because of substantial differences among subgroups of Latinos, this notion has been hotly contested by Latino scholars, who argue that they are too distinct to be thought of as a single ethnic group. Recently, this is beginning to change, and some are acknowledging that panethnic identity is situation specific but could indeed arise in some instances. Certainly, the presence of discrimination is one of these circumstances

(Portes, 1984; Portes and Zhou, 1993). The recent demonstrations in Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles and other cities reflect a fear among Latinos that restrictive immigration laws will be implemented, and this has motivated political activity. The demonstrations also suggest that Latinos feel they are “in this together,” so to speak. Identity plays a role in this because Latinos have no identification with the constructs Hispanic or Latino before coming to the US; they are much more prone to identify as members of their country of origin. One contribution to existing theories of political assimilation is made by showing that the processes that compel Latinos to identify with the American polity are best viewed within the lens of social identity theory.

Using quantitative research methods involving analysis of survey data, I find that at the individual level, acculturation is a very powerful predictor of Latino political behavior, especially among immigrant populations. That is, one of the most important determinants of political participation among immigrants today relates to their socioeconomic status and level of acculturation into American society. In addition, politicization of identity appears to result from exposure to American culture and identification as an American seems to be a natural progression among contemporary immigrants from Latin America. I also find that group based resources explain the variance in political behavior over and above traditional resources based on socioeconomic status alone. More specifically, to some extent, perceptions of group consciousness, identity and discrimination all play an important role in explaining variation in political participation among Mexican, Cuban and Puerto Rican immigrants. For example, I find that Cubans who identify as “American” are significantly more likely to participate in electoral politics, but Puerto Ricans are motivated more

by their level of income, education and economic attachment. Additionally, identifying in panethnic terms tends to suppress voting behavior among Cubans much more so than any other group. Perhaps the most consistent and widespread finding in this dissertation is the role of discrimination in motivating political activity. Perceived discrimination was found to be a significant predictor across all types of political activities presented here, and with limited exceptions tended to hold true across subgroups of Latinos as well. For example, perceptions of group based discrimination diminish responses favorable to ethnocultural Americanism and lessen the probability of identifying as an American versus as a member of one's country of origin or as a member of a panethnic group. Somewhat paradoxically, discrimination is positively related to some types of electoral activity, as I discuss further in Chapter 6.

A comparison of Mexican, Cuban and Puerto Rican immigrants allows for the assessment of the interrelationship between identity and political attitudes and behavior. Therefore, I pay particular attention to how well these models compare across Latino racial and ethnic categories. Very few studies have explored the heterogeneity of Latinos by studying the variation in Latino political participation by subgroup (Martinez, 2005). This is surprising given vast differences in demographic profiles and settlement patterns among Cubans, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. Even when ethnic differences have been accounted for, full comparisons have generally been omitted.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup>The general method of comparison that has been used by others is to allow for different intercepts for Mexicans, Cubans and Puerto Ricans, with one omitted category (usually non-Hispanic white or "other Latino"). Each group is then compared with the baseline for a total of two comparisons; however this approach excludes all possible  $\binom{3}{2} = 3$  comparisons. Alternatively, models oftentimes include three ethnic "dummies" with the baseline being all other Latinos. This, however, also negates full

By comparing subgroups of Latinos instead of analyzing them as a common group, I am able to identify differences in assimilation trajectories and to assess the role that group based resources play in motivating political behavior.

### 1.2.3 Organization of the Dissertation

The next two chapters present several theoretical models of immigrant acculturation, focusing specifically on classical assimilation theories by Gordon (1964) and Fuchs (1990), and later revisions of these theories such as the ethnic disadvantage and segmented assimilation perspectives. The theories represent the most recent advancement of assimilation theory proposed by sociologists. The common thread among them is that assimilation has generally not occurred among Latino immigrants, even in the third generation. In contrast to classical assimilation theories, proponents of these latter models argue that patterns of assimilation do not necessarily follow a straight line, but rather for some immigrants assimilation depends on the mode of reception into the host country. In addition, while color-based racism and religious persecution may exist, discrimination based on *race* may not occur in an immigrant's home country – it is largely a US phenomenon – and therefore immigrant awareness of discrimination based on their racial distinctiveness alone takes time. This type of discrimination may cause an additional assimilatory path among immigrants that essentially parallels that of the minority underclass in the US. The expectations derived from these theories are presented in Chapter 4, along with the methods and comparison between Mexicans, Cubans and Puerto Ricans and muddles any substantive interpretation. Whenever possible, I have avoided these types of analyses.

data used in this analysis. In addition to traditional methods employed by political scientists to analyze attitudes and behaviors, I use latent class analysis, structural equation modeling and other innovative methodological techniques in order to examine Latinos' latent propensity to be politically engaged in the American polity. As described further in Chapter 4, latent variable and simultaneous latent structure models incorporate measurement error making their use particularly warranted and preferable over logistic regression models. An additional benefit is that these models allow me to statistically test for homogeneity across subgroups. Chapter 5 sets the stage for the dissertation by arguing that ethnicity is multidimensional and that in particular contextual determinants are responsible for the wholesale transformation of ethnic identity. This chapter also explores the meaning of Americanism and national identity from an immigrants own perspective. The results of this chapter suggest that Latinos accept ethnocultural Americanism and have strong attachments to the American polity as evidenced by their preference towards American identification over time. I turn to electoral participation including voting, registering to vote and naturalization in Chapter 6. The commonalities and distinctions between Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban immigrants are examined. In addition to showing how socioeconomic status and time related processes, such as length of residence and language skills affect immigrants' participation in electoral politics, I show how group based resources such as panethnicity, the perception of linked fate, shared political goals and discrimination (i.e., the components of ethnicity discussed in Chapter 3) impact it as well. Because a large portion of immigrants are non-citizens, nonelectoral participation is an important indicator of political incorporation. Therefore, chapter

7 analyzes nonelectoral forms of participation including contacting an elected official, contributing money and protesting behavior. I address an important question that to this date has remained unexamined by students of Latino politics, namely “What factors sustain political participation among immigrant groups after its inception?” Another question addressed in this chapter is the role that being conscious of one’s ethnicity plays in motivating nonelectoral participation. As is further discussed in this chapter, a latent class analysis shows that participation clusters along three dimensions, one group of individuals that will participate irrespective of feelings of ethnic empowerment, a second group that feels highly empowered but does not participate, and a final group that is highly empowered and highly participatory. This chapter discusses the implications of these findings. Finally, Chapter 8 discusses the policy implications of this study and provides directions for future research.

## **Chapter 2**

# **Newcomers in the American Polity: Theoretical Models of Intergroup Relations Between Immigrants and Americans**

### **2.1 Introduction**

Due to increasing levels of immigration from Latin America, Latino communities in the United States are undergoing a constant state of flux (Kaufman, 2003; DeSipio, 1996). The acculturation process that foreign born Latinos go through is central to understanding the nature and extent of their interaction with the American political system. Accordingly, I discuss the three predominating theories' predictions of the

likely outcome of Latino political acculturation<sup>1</sup> below.

## 2.2 Early Models of Incorporation: Classical or “Straightline” Assimilation Theory

The conceptual framework of assimilation theory as a model of immigrant experiences with American culture was first proposed by Park and Burgess (1924) and expanded upon by Warner and Srole (1945) and Gordon (1964). Park and Burgess (1924, p. 735) viewed assimilation as

a process of interpretation and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them into a common cultural life.

Park proposed a multistage model to account for the processes that lead to immigrant assimilation into American society. Park’s (1916) assimilation theory was couched in a larger ecological framework for analyzing urban areas which emphasized that living patterns in urban areas are produced by competition for scarce resources such as land, housing and jobs. As populations migrate to urban areas, they accelerate the level of competition for resources with current occupants. The first stage, which Park termed the *competitive* phase, was viewed as an outgrowth of this con-

---

<sup>1</sup>Acculturation is thought to occur when groups of individuals having different cultures come into proximate contact with one another resulting in a transformation of either group (Umaña-Taylor, 2003)

tact among diverse ethnic groups. In this phase, ethnic populations competed over resources, such as jobs, living space and political representation. Park believed that intergroup competition sets in motion accommodation and eventually assimilation. The *accommodation* stage was characterized by change and adaptation to a new environment. During this phase, relations between immigrant groups and natives stabilize, even if immigrants are forced to occupy low socioeconomic positions in society. Despite the fact that ethnic stratification impedes the pace of assimilation, he believed that all immigrants, even those of lower socioeconomic status, could eventually enter the last stage and become fully assimilated. The *assimilatory* phase, then, was characterized by the wholesale transformation of ethnic culture.

Building upon this notion of linear progression, Warner and Srole (1945) developed the idea of “straightline assimilation,” which proposed that the foreign-born and their offspring must acculturate and seek acceptance among native-born Americans as a prerequisite for social, economic and political advancement. As the name implies, straightline assimilation theory views the process of assimilation as “linear” and irreversible. Exemplary of the sequential nature of the assimilation process, straightline theory posits that political incorporation follows structural assimilation, which in turn is achievable only after an immigrant has been successful in culturally assimilating. By irreversible, proponents of the theory meant that once assimilation occurred, it was permanent. These researchers believed that assimilation was inevitable because the forces of social mobility and egalitarianism act together to dissolve distinctions between ethnic groups. Part of the assimilation process, according to Warner and Srole, was that immigrants would unlearn their cultural traits and become re-socialized into

the American way of life.

Gordon (1964) extended the work of Parks and Burgess (1924) and Warner and Srole (1945), to more explicitly delineate the role of the host society and culture to which the migrant group must adapt. Gordon was one of the first scholars to suggest that in order to become fully assimilated into American society, minority groups must navigate through a series of stages that he believed occurred in progression. He identified seven assimilation dimensions, including cultural, structural, marital, identificational, attitudinal receptional, behavior receptional, and civic assimilation. According to Gordon, cultural assimilation occurred when the values, beliefs, ideology, language and other symbols of the dominant culture were adopted by migrants. Structural assimilation occurred when migrant ethnic groups inhabit primary groups existing in the predominant culture via educational and economic mobility (Martinez, 2005). Structural assimilation was a key phase in the assimilation process because once it occurred other types of assimilation were guaranteed to follow. Gordon viewed structural assimilation as being difficult to achieve because it required increasing levels of contact with dominant groups. In addition, once immigrants were able to achieve economic and educational mobility, they were expected to be virtually indistinguishable from the dominant group(s) in society. The next assimilatory phases, identificational and marital assimilation, were viewed as dependent on the level of cultural and structural assimilation that immigrant groups were able to achieve. Marital assimilation was defined as high rates of intermarriage between

immigrants and the dominant group<sup>2</sup>. On the other hand, identificational assimilation was believed to have occurred when individuals no longer viewed themselves as members of their own ethnic group, their personal identities having become imbued with participation and success in mainstream institutions. The lack of prejudicial attitudes and stereotyping on the part of the dominant group demarcated the beginning of the next phase, namely attitudinal receptional assimilation. Closely related was what Gordon described as behavioral receptional assimilation, or the absence of intentional discrimination by dominant groups against subordinate groups. Only after traversing these stages of assimilation could immigrants be expected to participate fully in the United States political system. This last stage, which Gordon termed civic assimilation, was characterized by the reduction of conflict between immigrants and dominant groups with respect to their political attitudes and behaviors. A defining characteristic of this model is that over time, immigrants were presumed to possess enough resources to overcome structural barriers that tend to prohibit full participation in American life.

The process of ethnic identification is an important component of classical assimilation theories. The “ethnic enclosure” model, derived from the work of Gordon (1964), describes how immigrants come to shed their ethnic identity in favor of Americanization. According to this model, an immigrant’s ethnic identity is derivative of the shared cultural heritage brought to the host society and is maintained as long as they remain physically and socially isolated from outsiders (Hwang and Murdock, 1991).

---

<sup>2</sup>In this dissertation, I was unable to assess the degree to which marital assimilation affects Latino political incorporation because none of the datasets included a variable measuring intermarriage. It is certainly a fruitful area for future research.

As immigrants begin to assimilate into the larger society, meaning they learn the host's language, achieve higher socioeconomic standing and interact more frequently with natives, ethnic identity begins to erode. The ethnic enclosure thesis maintains that lack of opportunities for intergroup contacts and socioeconomic advancement sustains ethnic identity whereas structural integration results in the relinquishment of ethnic identity in favor of assimilation. Clearly, the transformation of ethnocultural identity is the catalyst that motivates immigrants to assimilate. Overall, this model assumes that assimilation culminates in a fully "Americanized" immigrant who identifies with American political attitudes and adopts American political behaviors.

The theoretical insights of classical assimilation were based on pre-1965 European immigrants who are much less diverse and not at all similar to America's new immigrants. For example, pre-1965 immigrants earned slightly more than natives but post-1965 immigrants earn, on average, 16% less than natives (Brimelow, 1995). In addition, post-1965 immigrants have darker skin color which makes assimilation more difficult. On this basis, sociologist Portes (1984) suggested that scholars re-evaluate the applicability of straightline assimilation theory as it applies to post-1965 immigrants. Noting that the assimilation trajectories of these immigrants have generally not been linear, scholars of late have proposed modifications to this model (Alba and Nee, 1997; Gans, 1992; Portes and Bach, 1985; Portes, 1984; Portes, Parker and Cobas, 1980). Consequently, two particularly salient models have emerged to explain modes of immigrant assimilation, the ethnic competition model and the segmented assimilation model.

## 2.3 The Ethnic Competition Perspective on Immigrant Assimilation

In reaction to the “melting pot” assumption of classical assimilation theories, scholars began to emphasize the process of maintaining “patterns of ethnicity” (Portes, 1984). Opponents of classical assimilation theories maintain that ethnic groups preserve their unique cultural characteristics as a way of providing support and guidance in coping with the consequences of discrimination (Aguirre and Turner, 2001). Researchers began to realize that ethnic groups not only selectively retain their cultural characteristics, but they often construct and create new ways of adjusting to discrimination (Aguirre, 2003). Consequently, proponents of the ethnic disadvantage model have recently placed increasing emphasis on the role of ethnicity in understanding the behavior of ethnic groups. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that some assimilation into dominant society is inevitable. Scholars Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan (1970), for example, were among the first to emphasize that partially assimilated immigrants continue to reveal residential, behavioral, organizational, and cultural patterns that mark their distinct ethnic identity.

The ethnic disadvantage perspective that derives from Glazer and Moynihan (1970), Greeley (1971) and more recently Portes and his collaborators (Portes 1984; Portes and Bach, 1985; Portes, Parker and Cobas, 1980) was an attempt to address the limitations of classical assimilation theory. As noted by Portes in 1984, immigrants and their descendants have generally not “melted” into the mainstream which suggests that immigrants may prefer to remain distinct. In particular, proponents of

this model note that structural assimilation has not followed cultural assimilation as a matter of course, even in the absence of discriminatory and institutional barriers (Portes, 1984). He argued that socioeconomic opportunities for the first generation are evaluated relative to those in their country of origin, and as a result second and third generation immigrants are more likely to believe that assimilation is more difficult and will take longer than they previously believed. This realization, in part, is responsible for the reconstitution of ethnic culture (Portes and Bach, 1985).

A key question is not only *why* immigrants choose to retain their own cultures but by what process does this occur? The answer is provided from newly revised theories of ethnic competition. In contrast to Park's conceptualization of ethnic competition, recent theories stress that competition for resources often escalates conflict between ethnic subpopulations, forcing subordinate ethnic groups into segregated housing and limiting economic opportunities. This process reinforces the distinctiveness of one's ethnic group and makes the group a likely target of discrimination. The ethnic competition perspective suggests that competition with other groups heightens awareness of racial and ethnic differences which form the basis for participation and mobilization. These theories emphasize the relative size of the ethnic subpopulations, their patterns of migration, their movement into various social niches, and their competition with other ethnic groups for economic and social status.

The ethnic disadvantage perspective views ethnic identity as a dormant political consciousness aroused among minorities as they confront prejudice and discrimination from the dominant society. These scholars assert that because racial discrimination in their home country is virtually nonexistent, immigrants' sense of ethnic awareness

is derivative of structural barriers in the host society rather than being residual of adverse conditions in their country of origin. This perspective entails the expectation that awareness of discriminatory conditions develops over time as minorities' knowledge of the customs and practices of the host country increase and as interaction with natives becomes more frequent. Portes, Parker and Cobas prediction was that "the greater the level of cultural preparedness and the higher the relative socioeconomic standing of immigrants in the U.S., the greater the perception and experiences of discrimination and the more critical their overall assessment of the host society (Portes, Parker and Cobas, 1980, p. 205)." In sum, the ethnic competition thesis asserts that greater intergroup contact intensifies minorities' sense of ethnic identity that is requisite for political action. The main theoretical insight is that greater familiarity and economic success allows immigrants to gain a realistic understanding of inequality and discrimination against them as they compete against natives for resources (Aguirre et al., 1989).

Proponents of ethnic disadvantage place ethnic resilience, defined by Portes (1984) as the racial and cultural differences and the solidarity on which they are based, as a central feature in the experience of most immigrant groups. The persistence and salience of ethnic perceptions is an important component in his definition of ethnic resilience. As a result, ethnic identification, ethnic consciousness and solidarity have become major research topics in the last two decades (Olzak, 1983; Alba and Chamlin, 1983; Portes et al., 1980; Portes, 1984). The notion of "group interests" is central to the conceptualization of the ethnic disadvantage perspective of intergroup relations. The re-emergence of ethnic identity stemming from discriminatory conditions implies

that Latinos have unique politically relevant characteristics and/or special interests to which a representative could or should respond (Sapiro, 1981).

### **2.3.1 Extensions to the Ethnic Disadvantage Perspective of Immigrant Assimilation**

Current research has been fairly contentious with respect to the pathways of assimilation among post-1965 immigrants (Xie and Greenman, 2001). While many researchers have argued that the changing face of immigration has set these “new” immigrant groups apart from their European counterparts, others have been more optimistic about the prospect of their gradual assimilation into the American mainstream. Recently, a compromise between these two competing viewpoints has emerged as the predominant theoretical paradigm, coined by Portes and Zhou (1993) as the theory of segmented assimilation.

Their segmented assimilation model of immigrant assimilation is an outgrowth of work on second generation immigrants that found that racial discrimination and a restructuring economy created distinct paths of assimilation for newer, nonwhite immigrant populations and tended to decouple acculturation and economic mobility. Segmented assimilation theory extended the work of Gans (1992), who outlined several distinct trajectories that second generation immigrants can follow. These trajectories are a consequence of stratification and inequality in American social institutions. Consequently, it is difficult for many immigrant groups to assimilate into certain “segments” of society. In one of the most well cited exemplars of segmented

assimilation, Portes and Zhou (1993) wrote

Instead of a relatively uniform mainstream whose mores and prejudices dictate a common path of integration, we observe today several distinct forms of adaptation. One of them replicates the time honored portrayal of growing acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle-class; a second leads straight in the opposite direction to permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass; still a third associates rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community's values and tight solidarity (1993, p. 82).

In discussing post-1965 immigrants, Portes and Zhou (1993) noted that the process of assimilation oscillates between smooth acceptance and confrontation depending on the context of reception into American society. Their theory was a response to the growing recognition among scholars that assimilation into American society was not occurring even among third generation immigrants. Portes and Zhou (1993) suggested that earlier assimilation theories are not invalidated by the apparently uneven patterns of assimilation among immigrants; rather, for some, the process of assimilation is better characterized as "bumpy" as opposed to "straightline". Examining the experiences of more recent and diverse (post-1965) immigrant groups, Portes and Zhou (1993) argued that members of different immigrant groups may follow different paths and participate in different segments of society, rather than moving toward the same kind of participation in American culture. They suspected that there are multiple pathways to incorporation that depend on national origin, socio-economic status,

the context of reception in the United States, and family resources, both social and financial. In particular, they argued that poor outcomes are a function of contextual factors such as racial discrimination, urban subcultures, and labor market opportunities, and that these factors are obstacles to complete social, academic, and economic assimilation. These various factors influence the social context that is primarily responsible for determining the mode of assimilation. The question for them was, "into what sector of American society a particular immigrant group assimilates?" (Portes and Zhou, 1983, p. 82). In their attempt to answer this question, they proposed three trajectories of immigrant assimilation. The first was that of the straightline model proposed many years before. The second closely paralleled the earlier ethnic disadvantage model and but was renamed selective assimilation. The third trajectory was called segmented assimilation<sup>3</sup>.

The main theoretical contribution of segmented assimilation was the recognition that some immigrants acculturate into a minority underclass as opposed to the mainstream. Accordingly, the context of reception that an immigrant finds upon arrival in this country is crucial to understanding his or her mode of incorporation. The modes of incorporation depend on the perceptions of immigrants regarding the context in which they are received as welcoming, indifferent or hostile as well as community characteristics such as size and diversification of the occupational structure. The communities that receive present day immigrants may discourage school participation, which harms an immigrant's chance at upward mobility. This places immigrants

---

<sup>3</sup>Confusingly, segmented assimilation is the name of the overall theory and also a name of a particular mode of incorporation.

at risk of acculturating into an oppositional culture found among those in their surroundings. If immigrants assimilate too fully into the surrounding environment, they may experience dissonant acculturation and lose access to the cultural resources of the ethnic community. Under these circumstances, the segmented assimilation framework asserts that maintaining the culture of origin has a protective effect (Xie and Greenman, 2001).

As noted by Citrin et al. (2003), immigrants who cannot assimilate to traditional mainstream culture will contribute to the development of a minority underclass and will begin to view themselves in racialized terms. According to these researchers, stagnant or “downward mobility” will result even as fellow immigrants are able to follow the straight line model towards assimilation into mainstream society. Overall, at least three factors appear necessary for the segmented model of socioeconomic success but continued ethnic group attachment: 1) high volume of migration from a given area; 2) sustained flows of large numbers over time; and 3) ethnic residential concentration<sup>4</sup>. By emphasizing downward mobility into an American underclass, the segmented assimilation model assumes low levels of community resources as well as a highly racialized population (Miles, 1989) with structural barriers curbing the life chances of groups differentiated from the majority on the basis of cultural differences<sup>5</sup>.

---

<sup>4</sup>In this dissertation, I am only able to test the aspect of this model that pertains to ethnic residential concentration.

<sup>5</sup>It is interesting to note that all three assimilation theories contain assumptions that are questionable. For example, the straightline model assumes that convergence towards Anglos is desirable for immigrant populations. On the other hand, the segmented model assumes that interacting with African Americans leads to “stagnation” and “downward assimilation.”

## Chapter 3

# Theoretical Perspectives on Identity Development

### 3.1 Group Interest and Identity Politics

Two questions arise when discussing Latino group interests. The first is whether the category of “Latino” even exists (Dominguez, 1994) and the second is whether, if it does, Latinos share common attitudes and values? The heterogeneity of Latino subgroups has resulted in the failure of political scientists to incorporate traditional pluralist models in theorizing about Latino political behavior (de la Garza, 2004). These scholars have argued that distinct identity groups such as Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans occupy objectively different positions in racialized socio-political hierarchies, have appreciably different life experiences and life chances, and therefore develop unique political attitudes and interests. Apart from diverse historical circumstances, they point to the fact that Mexicans and Cubans more than Puerto Ricans

have made the United States a permanent home, Mexicans have the highest proportion born in the United States and the highest level of bilingualism and that Cubans have more readily adapted to American life (Calderon, 1992). In addition, the term Latino does not apply to a group with common biological descent and not all Latinos even speak the same language (Fox, 1996). On this basis, scholars have insisted that Latino subgroups are too heterogeneous to be analyzed in terms of membership in a panethnic group. They argue that group heterogeneity precludes the possibility of identifying public policies that promote the interests of Latinos as a panethnic group.

Nevertheless, repeated contact with American institutions has resulted in commonalities that compel Latinos to unite for collective action purposes (Calderon, 1992) despite significant differences. Of late, students of Latino politics have begun to take note and are beginning to pay attention to the possibility of shared political identities. Claassen (2003), for example, argued that the most effective way of studying Latinos is to undifferentiate them in order to understand the issues that are important to them as a group. Only then will we see their inclusion in democratic processes - in effect, the category of "Latino" does exist and has meaning.

The increasing tendency to believe that minority or ethnic groups possess substantive interests that ought to be represented (Thernstrom, 1989) coupled with the fact that Mexicans, Cubans and Puerto Ricans have been the target of substantial discriminatory practices, will fundamentally change the way scholars theorize about Latino politics. The utility of a pluralistic framework (de la Garza, 2004) to characterize Latino political life is contingent on the highly contested assumption that Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans share particular social, economic, or political

problems that do not closely match those of other groups and also that they share a particular viewpoint on solutions to political problems (Sapiro, 1981, p. 703). This panethnic identity, which arose from external forces, such as the media, U.S. Census Bureau, and politicians, rather than from an internal sense of intergroup cohesion (Moore and Pachon, 1985; Munoz, 1999), may be responsible for the tendency of some groups to unite around what is perceived to be a common cause. For example, community leaders in Chicago have popularized the term Latino to represent the collective concerns of the Spanish-speaking population in response “to common structural conditions in the areas of education, politics and economics” (Padilla, 1985, p. 40). According to Padilla (1985), Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago have a history of collective mobilization based on a common Latino panethnic identity.

Table 3.1 Self-Identification of the Hispanic population in the United States, 1990 and 2000

Identification	Number		Change, 1990-2000		Percent Distribution	
	1990	2000	Number	% Change	1990	2000
Mexican	13,495,938	20,640,711	7,144,773	53	60	59
Puerto Rican	2,727,754	3,406,178	678,424	25	12	10
Cuban	1,043,932	1,241,685	197,753	19	5	4
Other Hispanic	5,086,435	10,017,244	4,930,809	97	23	28
Total	22,345,059	35,305,818	12,951,759	58	100	100

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 Summary Tape File and 2000 Summary File 1,  
Guzman and McConnel (2002)

The question of whether a common political and cultural collectivity exists among Latinos is perhaps better answered by Latinos themselves. As can be seen from Tables 3.1 and 3.2, a large proportion of the US population reported 'other Hispanic' origins in the 2000 decennial census (Guzman and McConnell, 2002). The table demonstrates that more than 10 million individuals who self-identify as Hispanic did not choose the Mexican, Puerto Rican or Cuban categories. Furthermore, of all Latinos who chose the 'other Spanish/Latino/Hispanic' category 40% wrote in the term Hispanic and an additional 19% wrote in the term 'Spanish' or 'Latino' (Guzman and McConnell, 2002). Attempting to explain this phenomenon, Guzman and McConnell (2002) argued that Latino self-identification may have changed over the decade spanning 1990-2000. As further evidence, they point to differences in 2000 versus 1990, when the first large scale Latino political survey was conducted by de la Garza and his associates. The Latino National Political Survey ("LNPS") found that Latinos preferred to identify with their country of origin over opting for a panethnic identity. By 2000, however, this has changed, and more Latinos preferred to categorize themselves in panethnic terms. Guzman and McConnell suggest that this preference is further supported by the fact that 91% of the respondents who chose the 'other' category did not identify with a particular country, preferring instead to write in the terms 'Hispanic', 'Spanish', 'Latino', or checking the box for 'other Hispanic' without entering a more specific response. Clearly, as evidenced by those who filled in that they would prefer a panethnic identity on a survey question, panethnic identification is a particularly salient form of identification among some Latino groups. It reflects a growing trend among Latinos to believe that they have a common interest and that

they are in fact a political community, albeit an imagined one (Anderson, 1997).

Table 3.2. Breakdown of “All other Hispanic” response by type, 2000

	2000	
	Number	Percent
All other Hispanic or Latino	6,111,665	61
Checkbox only, other Hispanic	1,733,274	17
Write-in Spanish	686,004	7
Write-in Hispanic	1,454,529	25
Write-in Latino	450,769	5
Not elsewhere classified	787,089	8
Total	10,017,244	100

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 Summary Tape File  
and 2000 Summary File 1, Guzman and McConnel (2002)

Latino panethnicity presumes the existence of a unified and distinctive Latino community that has resulted from the context of and contact with American institutions. Evidence that the rise in panethnicity is derivative of contact with American institutions was provided by Jones-Correa and Leal (1996). Their analysis of data taken from the LNPS found that characteristics usually associated with assimilation, such as English proficiency, lack of support for bilingual education, higher level of education and longer generational history in the United States, are highly correlated with the adoption of a panethnic identity. Of particular interest is their finding that the rise of panethnic identity has accompanied a decline in ethnic attachments. The question is whether the tendency to identify in panethnic terms is a result of assimilation and if so is it inevitable or is it a result of ethnic resilience and disadvantage? In total, the evidence seems to be that the emergence of panethnic identity quite possibly arises from a common language, an awareness of similarities between Latino subgroups, a low standard of living, and a common desire to eliminate the inequalities imposed on

the Spanish-speaking by the larger society – only later developing into a newly formed Latino political consciousness that is situation-specific and strengthened as a result of contact with American institutions. In any event, Latino panethnicity provides us with an alternative orientation to understanding differences in political attitudes and behaviors among and between Latinos that is better conceptualized by emphasizing Latinos' common interests and homogeneity. In order to understand high levels of Latino political incorporation or conversely low levels of political alienation, scholars should focus less on intergroup distinctions in favor of similarities across groups that arise from their socialization into the American polity (de la Garza, 2004).

A more careful examination of these arguments, however, reveals that they may be based on a false dichotomy. It is possible to analyze Latino subgroups separately while simultaneously analyzing the extent to which their political interests revolve around multiethnic lines. In addition, by separating Cubans, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans it is possible to focus on the range of differences and similarities with respect to the degree to which they have internalized a common culture among Latino groups, and to understand and provide explanations for both. The existence of common group interests *need not* presume that these identity groups are economically or socially homogenous or politically monolithic.

## 3.2 Group Identity and Consciousness as a Political Group Resource

Participation in United States politics has long been established as a function of resources, engagement and recruitment or mobilization (Verba et al., 1995). Among historically disenfranchised minority groups, such as Latinos, group-based resources – resources that are collective in nature to the minority group (e.g., self-identification as panethnic and the belief that Latinos share a common culture or common “linked fate”) – may also play a critical role in mobilizing political participation (Assensoh and Assensoh, 2001; Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Chong and Rogers, 2003; Harris, 1994; Miller et al., 1981; Shingles, 1981; Tate, 1993; Wong et al., 2005). Political scientists have offered three justifications for the existence of identifiable and distinctive group interests: 1) the notion of “linked fates”; 2) the prevalence of group consciousness sustained through indigenous socio-political institutions; and 3) the process of political socialization. Because the ethnic disadvantage model presumes the existence of a distinct group interest, these justifications are further elaborated on below.

### Group Based Resources and Political Participation

Dawson’s book *Behind the Mule* was one of the first manuscripts to develop a theory of African American group interest that was grounded in the concept of linked fates: “the relationship between a Black person’s sense of his or her own interests and the same person’s sense of the interests of the racial group is the key to the apparent

political homogeneity of African Americans” (Dawson, 1994, p. 46). Dawson (1994) and others (Gurin et al., 1989; Tate, 1994; Herring et al., 1999) have noted that, among African Americans, linked fate stems from a long history of discrimination and segregation in the United States. The development of “objective” interests is legitimized via differences between African Americans and other groups such as whites. “A new wave of empirical research conclusively demonstrates that where one can live, for whom one is likely to vote, whether one is likely to encounter discrimination based on stereotypes when entering the labor market, and whether one’s culture and intelligence are considered inferior were still structured by race in the 1990s” (Dawson, 2001, p. 42).

Scholars have consistently found that life chances are tied to ethnic group membership. For example, in their study of a national sample of blacks in the United States, Hughes and Hertel (1990) found that 1) light skin color is associated with higher socioeconomic status; 2) dark skin color is related to higher levels of black consciousness and a stronger black identity; and 3) that the effect of skin color on socioeconomic status changed relatively little in the period spanning 1950 - 1980. The authors concluded that “the association between skin color and life chances appears to be an aspect of black life in America that persists in spite of many social, political, and cultural changes that have affected black Americans in the present century” (p. 1110). Therefore, because one’s life chances are inexorably linked to one’s racial or ethnic group membership, members of a particular racial or ethnic group come to understand that group members have a common linked fate.

Murguia’s study of phenotypes among Mexicans provides further support that

life's chances depend on race or ethnicity. In his article Phenotype and Schooling, Murguia shows how individuals who are Mexican, dark and Indian- looking are treated differently than lighter skin Mexicans and that this differential treatment is reproduced in the educational system. They concluded that after controlling for variables known to affect education, darker and Indian looking phenotypes had a significant negative effect on educational attainment for those of Mexican origin. While these findings were not articulated in terms of a political context, it is not much of a stretch to image that the discrepancy between darker and lighter skin individuals is also reinforced by the political system. For example, the policies that were meant to benefit members of minority groups are likely to have gone largely to the lightest skinned members of that group. In addition, a substantial literature has documented that education is an important resource for political action and engagement (Almond and Verba, 1963; Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Conway, 1991; Jennings, van Deth, et al. 1989; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1971).

The majority of research on the role of group-based resources was based on studies of African Americans (Calhoun-Brown, 1996; Harris, 1994; Jackson, 1987; Miller et al., 1981; Olsen, 1970; Shingles, 1981; Tate, 1991; Verba and Nie, 1972; Wong, 2000). These studies have revealed that African Americans tend to believe that their personal welfare is heavily influenced by what happens to the entire racial group. Consequently, they tend to evaluate policies, political parties, and candidates in terms of their impact on group interests (Dawson 1994, 57; Gillmor 1993). Some recent studies have questioned the relationship between group-based resources and political participation and empowerment (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990) while others have found that

different forms of group-related resources, especially linked fate and group consciousness, matter for distinct types of participation. For example, Wong (2003) found that the concept of “linked fates” did not exhibit a strong relationship to registration or voting but did matter for participation *beyond* voting. The notion of linked fates is also applicable to Latinos as demonstrated by the fact that Mexican Americans are democrats because of the tendency on the part of republicans to demonize Mexican immigrants in the 1990s (Baldassare, 2000). According to Dawson, “the fact that two African Americans can believe that their fate is linked to that of the race does not mean that they agree on how best to advance their own and racial interests” (Dawson, 2001, p. 11). In similar fashion, Latino interests are not necessarily monolithic or politically unified.

### **Group Consciousness and Group Interests**

Ethnic awareness is defined as the perception by members of a minority group of the social distance separating them from the dominant group and the existence of discrimination based on racial or cultural differences (Miller et al., 1981; Portes, 1984). The opposite of ethnic awareness is a sense of equality and the belief that one can freely mingle with anyone in society (Portes, 1984). This belief is said to characterize immigrants who are fully assimilated into mainstream society. Awareness of social distance and of negative stereotypes has been said to be a decisive factor affecting the behavior of minority-group members (Nagel and Olzak, 1982). Portes and Zhou (1984), in fact, argued that the Latinos who are aware of discrimination and who sense the relative deprivation that accompanies it, are more likely to develop

a strong sense of ethnic awareness. Clearly Portes' (1984) conceptualization of ethnic awareness is a synonym for "group consciousness," a term political scientists use to describe similar perceptions among minority groups. As I discuss further below, the potential for group consciousness to develop among Latinos is more likely than ever, as evidenced by the increase in panethnic identification along with the corresponding rise in Latinos' perception of discrimination against them. Latinos are distinct from other minority groups, for example, African Americans, because Latinos' collective identity, assuming for the moment it exists, is not self-imposed and hence remains precarious.

In political science, group consciousness has been defined as identification with a political group. Verba and Nie (1972) and Olsen (1970) have shown that blacks tend to participate at rates higher than whites once socioeconomic status is controlled. Olsen (1970), in particular, focused on blacks who identified themselves as members of an ethnic minority versus those who did not. The sense of commonality and collectivity among blacks led Olsen to propose the "ethnic community" thesis to account for high rates of political participation among blacks in his sample. The ethnic community thesis posited that the black community serves as the referent group for "ethnic identifiers" and membership in such an activist community was responsible for increasing levels of black participation. Since then, many studies of African American political behavior have established the role of group consciousness on African American participation (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Dawson, 1994; Gurin, et al., 1989; Guterbock and London, 1983; Jackson, 1987; Shingles, 1981). Despite economic and social cleavages in the African American community, African American

political behavior has been largely homogenous because individual self-interest stems from group interests (Bobo et al., 1991; Dawson, 1994; Kaufman, 2000).

Individuals who identify with one group over another manifest a conscious awareness of objective membership in that group as well as a psychological attachment to that group (Conover, 1984). Social or economic circumstances alone are not enough to foster an overall sense of belonging, the individual must also perceive that the group to which he belongs lacks access to resources when compared to other groups (Miller, 1981; Stokes, 2003). Miller et al., (1981) first drew the distinction between identification with a group and politicized group consciousness. According to the authors, group identification connotes a perceived self-location within a particular social stratum, along with a psychological feeling of belonging to that stratum. Group consciousness, on the other hand, involves identification with a group as well as a political awareness or ideology regarding the group's relative position in society and a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing that group's interest. Group consciousness implies an awareness of "shared status as an unjustly deprived and oppressed group" (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990, p. 377) and a strong sense of panethnic community (Dawson, 1994; Singles, 1981; Verba and Nie, 1972; Wong et al., 2005).

Miller et al., (1981) criticized Olsen and Verba and Nie for attempting to directly associate group identification and group consciousness. According to the authors, there is no theoretical reason "to expect a simple direct relationship between group identification and political participation (Miller et al., 1981, p. 495)." While this is arguably true among groups such as African Americans, it may not be true with respect to immigrants. The processes that immigrants undergo may very well be

reflective of a politicized identity even in the absence of perceived or actual injustice. When an immigrant self-identifies as an American, for example, this is evidence that his or her identity has undergone a radical transformation. Immigrants are unlikely to have claimed an American identity before arrival in the United States. Quite possibly, feeling proud to be an American goes hand in hand with this newly formed identity. Political participation would be one manifestation of that identity that may or may not have anything to do with a feeling of relative deprivation, in fact, the opposite may be true. Nevertheless, because it is possible for an individual with no ethnic group identity to develop one after a consciousness raising experience, scholars have continued to define group consciousness as an individual's awareness of the group's status relative to other groups and an overall commitment to further those interests (Antunes and Gaitz, 1975; Gurin et al., 1980; Jackman and Jackman, 1973; Miller et al., 1981; Wilcox and Gomez, 1990; Stokes, 2003; Wong et al., 2005).

Contrary to the tenets of the standard socioeconomic model of voting, which explains racial differences in political behavior on the basis of blacks' educational, occupational and economic achievement, Bobo and Gilliam (1990) concluded, as have others before them, that when socioeconomic status is controlled, blacks actually participated at higher rates than whites. This led them to explain participation in terms of resources based on group membership. By doing so, they emphasized the importance of context to representation and empowerment in the development of black political consciousness. For example, in *Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment*, Bobo and Gilliam (1990), address the factors that motivate political activity among African Americans. They found that in high empowerment areas,

operationalized as those areas possessing a black mayor, a greater degree of trust and efficacy existed among blacks, which they deemed to be causally related to higher levels of political participation. They reasoned that descriptive representation increased the participation rate of blacks because the degree of sociodemographic similarity created a "macro-level cue" that fundamentally changed how blacks perceive the costs and benefits associated with voting. In other words, there was a net gain to voting in high empowerment areas. An unintended consequence of black representation was a transformation in the nature of black-white differences because black empowerment tended to suppress white political participation in those areas as well.

The potential benefit of group-based resources on political participation has been extended to Latinos as well on the assumption that Latinos perceive that access to both material and group resources and to opportunities are strongly linked to panethnic group identity. Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner (1991) provide evidence that Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans can be considered a community that shares identifiable substantive interests. In an examination of Latino partisanship, they concluded that groups that experience discrimination and perceive unequal opportunities are more likely to identify as Democrats, given the Democratic party's image of being more supportive of policies that favor disadvantaged groups. De la Garza et al. (1992) provide evidence to the contrary. For example, a 1989 survey analyzed by de la Garza and his associates reported that Latinos had very few experiences with discrimination (LNPS, 1989). In fact, evidence from the 1990s paints a relatively conflicted view of discrimination among Latinos. In 1990, only 39% of Mexican Americans claimed to have personally experienced discrimination (de la Garza et al., 1992; de la Garza,

2004). In contrast, nearly two-thirds of Puerto Ricans reported having been the victim of discrimination. On the other hand, the 2000 Knight Ridder/San Jose Mercury News reported that only 18% of Latinos had experienced discrimination in the 5 years prior to the survey. In Chicago, only 6% of Latinos mentioned discrimination as a local concern. These low percentages led de la Garza to speculate that “discrimination ... does not appear to be so pervasive as to motivate Hispanic citizens to band together and vote in pursuit of a common electoral agenda, as Latino advocates expect” (de la Garza, 2004, p. 98).

Several important clarifications/distinctions are warranted. First, in Portes and Zhou’s original theoretical formulation of ethnic disadvantage, they emphasized the *perception* of discrimination in the reconstitution of ethnic awareness and solidarity. Compare the results of the 2004 National Survey of Latinos: Politics and Civic Life. In this survey, only 26.6% of Mexicans, 1% of Puerto Ricans, and 36% of Cubans reported that race relations were *as good* in the United States as they are in their country of origin. In addition, when asked whether the respondent believed that discrimination against Latinos in general is a “major” or “minor” problem or not a problem at all, the overwhelming majority of Latinos responded affirmatively (i.e., that it was a major or minor problem; 82.2% of Mexicans, 87.4% of Puerto Ricans, and 73.7% of Cubans). This is true despite the fact that Latinos on the whole reported fairly low levels of direct or personal discrimination (41.5% of Mexicans, 42.8% of Puerto Ricans and 18.7% of Cubans). This lends support to the possibility that the conflicted findings of the 1990s were due to an increasing awareness of discriminatory conditions among immigrants in the decade spanning 1990-2000. An examination

of the relative context in which immigrant assimilation is occurring, as well as the *perception* of discrimination in the US, may indeed reveal that Latinos are motivated to unite in the pursuit of common interests via the American political system. The evidence since the late 1990s points to the fact that when Latinos are distinguished from other groups on the basis of observable characteristics or along lines of power or class, they respond panethnically (Calderon, 1994). Indeed, a thorough examination of these issues is one of the theoretical contributions of this dissertation.

### **3.3 The Process of Identification**

In 2001, Leonie Huddy (p. 128) made the following claim

Despite the recent emergence of identity politics around the world, researchers of political behavior have been slow to incorporate the concept of identity into their empirical studies. This seems odd, given that demands for group respect and recognition are at the heart of new social movements ... that argue for the rights of diverse ethnic and racial groups.

She continues that “it is extremely important ... to understand why some individuals in a given social and political context adopt a group identity, whereas others in identical circumstances do not.”

The social-psychological literature on identity formation provides a useful theoretical framework in which to understand how group consciousness emerges via the identification process. Tajfel (1981) defined ethnic identity as an aspect of a person’s

self concept that derives from his or her knowledge of membership in social groups together with value or emotional significance attached to that membership. Rotheram and Phinney (1987) defined ethnic identity as one's sense of belonging to a group, and a part of one's thinking and perceptions as well as feelings that are part of being a member of that group.

Ethnic identity is an important component of overall identity formation. Ethnic identity is a psychological construct reflecting identification with, and membership in, an ethnic group (Cuellar, et al., 1997). Ethnic identity includes self-identification (Rumbaut, 1994), feelings of belongingness and commitment to a group, a sense of shared values, and attitudes towards one's own ethnic group (Phinney, 2001). Existing research on identity development suggests that reformulations of one's identity can occur at any point in the lifecycle (Umaña-Taylor, 2002). Ethnic identity is dynamic and changes in response to contextual factors including socialization experiences in the family, the ethnic community, and the larger setting (Phinney, 2001). Therefore, identity formation involves the integration of a number of relational contexts (Josselson, 1994). Among these and of central importance is embeddedness where individuals construct their identity in relation to others including their ethnic group. In recognition, Markstrom-Adams (1992) suggested that ethnic group membership is one of the social contextual environments that influences identity formation.

Among newcomers to American society, in particular, ethnicity is especially salient because immigrants are faced with the difficult task of ethnic re-identification, forced to identify with a less powerful group, and confront several negative stereotypes associated with that group (Rotheram and Phinney, 1987; Spencer and Bornbusch, 1990).

The theoretical perspectives that have been proposed by social psychologists to explain the development of ethnic identity and self-esteem among Latinos are discussed below<sup>1</sup>.

### 3.4 Ethnic Identity and Acculturation Theory

One theoretical approach that has proven useful in structuring the study of ethnic identity is based on levels of acculturation. The acculturation theory of ethnic identity argues that ethnic identity changes as a function of acculturation processes and influences. The focus has been on interactions between members of different cultures and on the coexistence of minority groups in two cultures (Bautista del Demanico et al., 1994). Ethnic identity becomes salient as part of the acculturation process that takes place when immigrants come to a new society (Phinney et al., 2001). The distinction between the constructs of ethnic identity and acculturation is often unclear (Liebkind, 2001; Phinney, 1990; Phinney, 1998). Nevertheless, Cuellar (1997) found that ethnic identity formation and acculturation, while related, are separate processes. Acculturation is a broader construct that encompasses a wide range of behaviors, attitudes and values that change when two or more different cultures come into contact with one another (Phinney et al., 2001). Ethnic identity formation is that aspect of acculturation that focuses on the subjective sense of belonging to a group or culture (Phinney, 1990).

---

<sup>1</sup>These theories have been developed and applied specifically with reference to Latino adolescents, but the process of negotiating identity and identity formation is similar among adolescents and newly immigrant populations

Classical assimilation theories view acculturation as a linear process of change requiring the relinquishment of one's culture of origin and assimilation into a new culture. On the other hand, the ethnic disadvantage and segmented assimilation models are best understood as two-dimensional. Somewhat ironically, psychologists studying acculturation have also tended to view the processes related to ethnic identification as a two-dimensional process (Berry, 1990; LaFromboise, et al., 1993; Nguyen et al., 1999). These models are based largely on the work of Berry (1990, 1997) who argued that two dominant aspects of acculturation, preservation of one's heritage culture and adaptation to the host society, are conceptually distinct and vary independently. Berry suggested the following two questions as a means of identifying strategies used by immigrants in dealing with acculturation: Is it considered to be of value to maintain one's cultural heritage? Is it considered to be of value to develop relationships with the larger society? The combination of yes/no responses define the four types of acculturation strategies. Integration is defined by positive answers to both questions while marginalization is defined by negative answers to both questions. A positive response to the former and negative response to the latter defines separation and the reverse defines assimilation. This model is useful in that it highlights the fact that acculturation can proceed in diverse ways and that it is not necessary for immigrants to give up their culture of origin in order to adapt to a new society (Phinney et al., 2001). It also allows for the possibility and reality of multiculturalism. Additionally, it acknowledges that there may be alternative pathways to incorporation in contrast to earlier theories that viewed immigrant acculturation as resulting in either assimilation or marginalization.

Of particular interest to the current research endeavor is the extent to which immigrants adopt the values of the mainstream culture while at the same time maintaining the values of their own ethnic group. Several researchers have found that identifying with one's ethnic group is the healthiest form of ethnic identity. Researchers working within this framework have grouped individuals into categories based on their inclination to adopt mainstream values or maintain the values of their country of origin. For example, Bautista de Domanico et al., (1994) found that biculturals had significantly higher levels of self-esteem than monoculturals and concluded that a bicultural identity is related to greater flexibility which facilitates adaptation. In addition, they speculated that individuals with bicultural identities can relate to both cultures and feel less alienated from either. Other studies, however, report different results. Rotheram-Borus et al., (1996), for example, found that strong ethnic identifiers scored significantly higher than individuals in the other two groups. Similarly, Cuellar et al. (1997) studied ethnic identity in specific acculturated subgroups of a Mexican origin population. They found that ethnic identity scores were highest among first generation Mexicans, less acculturated subjects, and traditional acculturative types. They further found that higher levels of acculturation were associated with diminished feelings of affirmation and belonging and lower feelings of ethnic identity achievement. More specifically, 'High Biculturals' were found to obtain higher scores in ethnic identity than 'Low Biculturals' and 'High Biculturals' were found to be oriented more toward others than those who were classified as 'Traditional' or 'Assimilated.' Phinney and Devich-Navarro's (1997) research with Mexican American adolescents in the United States showed that ethnic identity, but not American

identity, was a predictor of self-esteem. These relationships are influenced by the particular setting and immigrants' perceptions of their place in that setting (Phinney, 2001). For example, Birman et al., (2002) found that immigrants who adopted a national identity manifested higher levels of school integration than those who adopted an ethnic identity. As explanation for these findings, the authors offered that "being American-oriented is advantageous in contexts that demand acculturation to the American culture, that is school and American peers" (Birman et al., 2002, p. 599). A few studies in political science have found that having strong ties to one's ethnic or national origin group is not an impediment to feeling proud to be an American (Citrin et al., 2002; de la Garza et al., 1996). When pressures for assimilation are strong, opting for an American identity may make it easier for immigrants to adjust to the surrounding environment (Phinney, 2001).

### **3.5 Social Identity Theory**

In Berry's theoretical framework, acculturation strategies that immigrants adopt moderate the adaptational outcomes of acculturation. Additional factors also influence the acculturation process including age, gender, cultural distance from host society, experiences of discrimination, social support (Phinney, 2001) and contextual factors such as size of the ethnic population and attitudes of the host society (Berry, 1990).

Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986) provides a framework for understanding how ethnic identity and psychological well-being changes as a result

of contextual relations in the host society. This theory posits that individuals' self-concepts derive from knowing that they are members of particular social groups. It implies that a strong link exists between group identification and self-concept. People strive to achieve or maintain a positive social identity which tends to boost their self esteem (Phinney, 2001). Maintaining a positive identity derives from favorable comparisons between one's ingroup and relevant outgroups. Even when individuals attempt to maintain a positive social identity, preconceived notions regarding the social groups to which they belong can overwhelm their choice of group membership. For this reason, researchers have focused on the perceptions that the dominant society has of ethnic groups and on how these perceptions influence an individual's decision to identify with one group over another.

Researchers espousing social identity theory have tended to focus on self-identification. Individuals who internalize unfavorable opinions of their ingroup in relation to the outgroup may seek to leave that group or find ways of achieving more positive distinctiveness. This is why the context of reception is crucial: newcomers to American society are often viewed in derogatory terms, and this is reinforced in American culture and in the media. In the face of devaluation of their ingroup, immigrants may adopt a variety of self-preservation methods. The various methods depend on whether or not devaluation is attributed internally or to external circumstances (Liebkind, 2001).

My theoretical contribution to political science in general, and the subfield of ethnic politics in particular, is that the process of immigrant re-socialization (Finifter and Finifter, 1989) regarding ethnic identity fundamentally shifts the content and

meaning that immigrants attach to their own ethnic identity. The meaning of one's ethnic identity has consequences for the political incorporation of Latino immigrants. These immigrants arrive in the US and are influenced by the context in which they are received. Immigrant reception lies on a continuum from friendly and open to hostile and oppressive (Portes, 1984). The trajectories of immigrant assimilation are in turn influenced and moderated to a large extent by this context. As Huddy (2001, p. 130) so appropriately stated, "American identity does not mean the same thing to all Americans. And it is the meaning of American identity, not its existence, that determines its political consequences. Yet social identity researchers have tended to ignore this subjective aspect of identities, paying considerable attention to the existence of simple group boundaries while ignoring their internal meaning." Social identity and acculturation theory provide the causal mechanisms by which immigrants attach meaning and value to their ethnic identities. The various theories of immigrant assimilation outlined above serve to contextualize the processes of acculturation and identification. Taken together, students of Latino politics who use this perspective stand to gain a more accurate and realistic understanding of how immigrants relate to the American political system and adopt the political attitudes and behaviors we observe empirically. As I discussed in the previous chapter, immigrant attitudes and behaviors provide a first step in articulating a theory of immigrant incorporation.

# Chapter 4

## Data, Research Methodology and Hypotheses

This chapter discusses three predominant modes of thought as to the likely outcome of Latino acculturation: the straightline model, the ethnic disadvantage model and the segmented assimilation model. By generating hypotheses based on these three theories, the intent is to focus on the processes that facilitate political assimilation.

### 4.1 Data

Data for this study comes from the several sources listed below.

#### 4.1.1 The 2002 National Survey of Latinos in America

The *2002 National Survey of Latinos in America* was conducted by telephone between April and June, 2002 among a nationally representative sample of adults selected at

random who were 18 years and older. The survey was administered by *The Washington Post*/Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University<sup>1</sup>. In order to represent the opinions of Latinos living in the United States, interviews were conducted with a statistically representative sample that could be examined nationally, in target regions of high Latino concentration, and by country of origin. A highly stratified, disproportionate random digit dialing sampling design of the 48 contiguous United States was employed. One benefit of using this particular survey pertains to its inclusion of an oversampling of Latinos. This oversampling resulted in 2,929 observations on Latinos (1,284 were non-Latinos), 1744 of which were United States citizens.

The survey examined how members of the Latino community identify themselves as well as their (1) views of the United States; (2) experiences with discrimination; (3) linguistic preferences; and (4) economic and financial situations. Because of its broad scope, these data allowed for the possibility of making conclusions about political attitudes and behaviors that are far reaching rather than state specific (Baretto and Munoz, 2003). In the analysis based on this data, results were weighted to reflect the actual distribution of respondents throughout the United States.

---

<sup>1</sup>I would like to thank the Pew/Kaiser Foundation for their generosity in allowing me the use of these data.

### **4.1.2 The 2004 National Survey of Latinos: Politics and Civic Life**

Additional data utilized in this dissertation are drawn from the Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation *2004 National Survey of Latinos: Politics and Civic Engagement*. This survey was conducted between April 21 and June 9, 2004 among a nationally representative sample of 2,288 Latinos adults, aged 18 or older, who were randomly selected for inclusion in the survey. The survey included 1,166 registered voters. Respondents' views on a wide range of political issues and concerns, immigration, identity, assimilation, context of reception in the host country, experiences with discrimination and contact with one's country of origin were examined. The survey allowed for comparisons of characteristics, attitudes and civic participation both among Latino subgroups and among registered voters, those who are eligible to vote but have not registered and those Latinos who are not U.S. citizens. The sample design employed was similar to the 2002 National Survey and again, the subsequent analysis weighted the data to reflect the actual distribution of respondents throughout the United States.

## **4.2 Components of the Straightline Model of Assimilation**

In order to address the competing hypotheses pertaining to the straightline and ethnic disadvantage models of immigrant assimilation, two classes of independent variables

were introduced into the analysis. The first class considered variables related to assimilation while the second class considered variables related to group-based resources.

#### **4.2.1 Cultural Indicators of Assimilation**

The classical perspective views assimilation as a process in which social, psychological, cultural and economic assimilation, whether occurring simultaneously or in phases, eventually leads to the abandonment of old cultural practices and political loyalties. According to classic assimilationist thought, ethnic perceptions among immigrant groups decline as assimilation into American society increases. Proponents of the classical assimilation perspective such as Gordon (1964) and Fuchs (1990) suggest that in the long run Latinos are likely to become less “minority” centered in their political orientations (Kaufman, 2003). Accordingly structural assimilation, decreasing perceptions of discrimination, lack of contact with dominant groups, and social isolation will result in Latino political attitudes and behaviors that are increasingly similar to Anglos. It is worth noting that, in what follows, the assimilationist political culture is assumed to be the norm for the “prototypical American” (Citrin et al., 2003). In accordance with Citrin et al. (2003), participation in American politics and the adoption of American attitudes and values are taken as evidence of political assimilation.

## 4.2.2 Operational Definitions, Exogenous Predictors and Research Hypotheses

The measures of assimilation used in this dissertation are categorized under five separate headings corresponding to demographic factors as well as cultural, structural, attitudinal/behavioral and identificational assimilation.

### Operationalizing Cultural Assimilation

Cultural assimilation is a multidimensional construct that includes behavioral and cognitive components. Adopting US cultural habits and believing in its core fundamental values while simultaneously rejecting other countries' values can be considered separate but related dimensions of cultural assimilation (Huntington, 2004). Linguistic preference and language skills are common ways to gauge the extent to which immigrants have adopted US cultural characteristics. Several studies (Pearson and Citrin, 2002; Citrin, Reingold and Green, 1990) have shown that white Americans overwhelmingly believe that speaking English is very important for being a "true American." Knowledge of English has consistently been identified as a factor that facilitates the assimilation process (Warner and Srole, 1945; Simpson and Yinger, 1972; Portes, 1984). Linguistic preference is also an indicator of political assimilation because language mediates political responsiveness (Baretto, 2004) and as such is an important predictor of political attitudes and behavior. Language has also been shown to facilitate political communication because of its tendency to appeal to potential voters and to be an expression of a politicized ethnic identity (Johnson, 2003).

For example, in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, George W. Bush spoke Spanish on the cable network television station Univision for the purpose of appealing to Latino voters – and it seemed to work since a large portion of Hispanics voted for him (30% in 2000 and 40% in 2004). If fluency in a nation's language influences a person's ability and opportunities for immersion into the nation's political culture, then those who are more proficient in the dominant language should be more likely to be politically assimilated.

Language acquisition is a necessary but not sufficient condition of cultural assimilation. Beyond tangible indicators such as the development of linguistic proficiency, a person's attitudes may also reflect the extent to which they are adapted to American culture. Some studies have found substantial differences between native- and foreign born immigrants' attitudes towards the appropriate gender roles for men and women (Phinney, 2002); therefore, gender role attitudes provide a good measure of Latino cultural assimilation. Attitudes towards appropriate gendered behaviors are likely to vary as a function of immigrants' contact with, or involvement in, US culture. For example, gender roles in traditional Hispanic cultures are clearly defined with authority typically given to males (Gowan and Trevino, 1998; Mayo and Resnick, 1996; Soto and Shaver, 1982). In traditional Hispanic families, males hold dominant positions and are expected to assume responsibility for the family. In addition, males are granted more freedom from an early age while females are encouraged to be submissive (Mayo and Resnick, 1996) and responsible for housework and childcare. In contrast, studies have shown that among Americans, attitudes towards women's roles in society have become increasingly egalitarian since the late 1970s and that the majority of indi-

viduals favor woman's dual status as a homemaker and professional. For example, Zou and Tang (2000) found that both men and women held egalitarian views towards women's roles as mother, worker and provider. In addition, the importance placed on the family unit itself has been found to decrease with time spent in the United States. Barboza and Williams (2004) found that the primacy that Latinos place on family bonds as opposed to non-familial relationships declines with residency status (Unpublished manuscript). Clearly, immigrants who come to America are exposed to societal norms about family life and their attitudes towards it change over time (Phinney, 2002). Therefore, lack of traditional attitudes about the proper roles for men and women gauge the extent to which immigrants have internalized and adapted to American cultural norms. Classical theories would suggest that individuals who adopt egalitarian views are more culturally assimilated and are likely to be more politically assimilated as well.

The permanency of cultural ties to the United States is reflective of the psychological commitment to become a full fledged member of the American polity, which includes becoming a citizen, adopting a partisan affiliation or otherwise participating in politics (Finifter and Finifter, 1989). An additional measure of cultural assimilation is therefore reflected in the importance immigrants place on creating strong ties to the United States while simultaneously decreasing ties to their country of origin.

Finifter and Finifter (1989) found that among Australian migrants, partisanship and overall ideology are important factors in helping migrants adapt to new environments, and that new political learning is generally dependent on previously established political attitudes. The propensity to be involved and committed to home

country politics may indicate an immigrant's propensity to be engaged and active in the Australian polity. In environments where there are strong pressures to assimilate, for example, the new political environment may unconsciously exert an influence on the adoption of new political attitudes and behaviors (Finifter and Finifter, 1989). Consequently, newly acquired attitudes and behaviors might parallel those in the host country. On the other hand, old patterns that influence the development of new political attitudes and behaviors may persist. The process of translation which speaks to this phenomenon is thought to occur when individuals who are highly active in the politics of their home country consciously or unconsciously seek out opportunities to participate in Australian politics (Finifter and Finifter, 1989).

The maintenance of cultural practices may seem to interfere with the process of adaptation to the environment. Some researchers have speculated that advances in technology, increased economic and political ties between the United States and an immigrants' home country, and outreach efforts by home countries to their diasporas, have enabled immigrants to forge and sustain transnational links to a greater degree than ever before (Pantoja, 2005). While these ties have traditionally been viewed as impediments to political incorporation (Dwyer, 1991; Torres-Saillant, 1989), more recent studies have argued that transnational participation may co-exist and even promote participation in US politics (Levitt, 2000; Graham, 1997; Hernandez and Jacobs, 2001). Quantitative studies have been inconclusive as to the effects of transnational networks on immigrant political incorporation, however. Jones-Correa (2001) found that Latin American immigrants from countries offering dual nationality had a higher propensity to naturalize while Yang (1994) found that it had a prohibitive effect. With

respect to political participation, DeSipio (2006) observed that certain measures of transnationalism are positively associated with an immigrant's desire to remain in the United States, participate in civic organizations, and naturalize. Finally, Pantoja (2005) analyzed the relationship between transnational ties and immigrant political incorporation among Dominicans residing in Washington Height, New York. He found that individuals who are active in the politics of the Dominican Republic and have most of their families there are less likely to pursue US citizenship. On the other hand, belonging to an association concerned with the events in the Dominican Republic and participation in the politics of the Dominican Republic exert a positive and powerful influence on US political participation. Still other researchers have found that the adaptation to US culture and strong ties to one's country of origin vary independently (Keefe and Padilla, 1987; Kitano and Daniels, 1988; Hutchinson, 1988).

The straightline assimilation theory would predict that the assimilation process will parallel a decline in attachments to an immigrant's country of origin. The expectation is that decreasing contact with one's country of origin should result in the relinquishment of that country's values and customs in favor of the host polity. Conversely, frequent contact with the host country's institutions should provide sufficient exposure to result in acceptance of American political norms (Citrin 2003). If classical assimilation theories provide an accurate depiction of Latino acculturation, the following research hypothesis should be supported by the data:

#### **The cultural assimilation hypothesis**

$H_1^1$ : Latino immigrants who are culturally assimilated will be more active participants in American politics and will show higher levels of attachment to the American polity than those who are not culturally assimilated.

**Operationalizing Culture** In this dissertation, cultural assimilation as measured by linguistic skill is operationalized as English dominance. The 2002 national Latino Survey asked respondents how well they could read a newspaper and carry on a conversation in English and Spanish, respectively. Two measures of linguistic competence (English, Bilingual or Spanish) were derived from these variables. First, two indicator variables were used to assess the differential impact of bilingualism ( $d = 1$ ) or English dominance ( $d = 1$ ) on the one hand and Spanish dominance ( $d = 0$ ) on the other. A scale based on these questions was constructed with scores ranging from -3 (fluent in Spanish but not English) to 3 (fluent in English but not Spanish). Those who scored 0 were considered equally proficient in both languages (i.e., they are bilingual).

The measures of ethnic ties or attachment to home country cultures that are used in this dissertation include being a citizen<sup>2</sup>, voting, and sending money or planning to move back to one's country of origin. The 2002 National Survey asked respondents who were born outside of the US or in Puerto Rico whether (1) they are a legal citizen of their country of origin; (2) they have voted in their country of origin since

---

<sup>2</sup>Puerto Ricans are US citizens by birth. The Cuban Constitution provides that Cuban citizenship is lost by becoming a citizen of a foreign country and dual citizenship is precluded, Constitution of the Republic of Cuba, 1992, Article 32. Additionally, the United States has bilateral agreements with a number of countries, among them Cuba, that effectively preclude the possibility of dual citizenship.

moving to the US; (3) they regularly send money to someone in their home country; or whether (4) they plan to someday move back to their home country. Responses to these questions were summed to form a scale that indicates the intensity of home country ties. The scale ranges from 4 to 8 with increasing values indicative of fewer ties to one's home country.

The degree to which the respondent subscribes to the US as a "melting pot" is a measure of how psychologically committed he or she is to fundamental American values. Both national surveys, in two separate questions, asked respondents whether they believe that Latino subgroups should change in order to blend into the larger society ( $d = 0$ ), as in the idea of a "melting pot", and how important it is for Latino subgroups to maintain their distinct culture ( $d = 1$ ). The dummy variable captures the differential effect between an immigrants' view that the US comprises "one culture" to which they belong, or many different cultures to which they are only one cultural group of many residing in the United States.

### **Identificational Assimilation**

It is widely agreed that a primary outcome in the assimilation process is the tendency to identify oneself as an American rather than a member of one's country of origin. Huntington (2004, p. 239) argued that the extent to which immigrants identify with the United States as a country is an important indicator of their willingness to assimilate. Similarly, Gordon (1964) believed that identificational assimilation was a prerequisite to political assimilation. If these scholars are correct, then we should expect that immigrants who self-identify as an American are more politically

assimilated than individuals who self-identify in terms of either a panethnic or ethnic group.

### The identificational assimilation hypothesis

$H_1^2$ : Latino immigrants who adopt an American identification will be more active in American politics and will show higher levels of attachment to the American polity than those who do not.

Two attitudes that provide direct measures of American identity are self-identification as American and identification of the United States as the individual's "true homeland." The 2002 survey asked respondents whether they self-identify in national, national origin or panethnic terms. Respondents who said yes to one of these terms were then asked the following question: "You have said that you describe yourself as an American, a Latino/Hispanic, and as a (Respondent's/Parent's country of origin). In general, which of the terms that you use to describe yourself is the term you use first? Second? Third?" A respondent's preference for identification with their own ethnic or panethnic group or as an American was indicated by their response to this question. Responses were recoded into dummy variables using the following coding scheme:  $d = 1$  if American,  $d = 0$  otherwise;  $d = 1$  if from respondent's country of origin,  $d = 0$  otherwise<sup>3</sup>. The reference category is Latino/Hispanic unless otherwise noted. Additionally, respondents were asked what country they consider to be their "true homeland." Responses were coded  $d = 1$  if respondent considered

---

<sup>3</sup>If this variable was a *dependent* variable, it was left in its original form as 1 = country of origin; 2 = Latino/Hispanic; and 3 = American.

their country of origin to be their true homeland and  $d = 0$  if they considered the United States to be their true homeland.

### **Structural Assimilation**

Structural assimilation occurs when different cultural groups come into contact in institutional settings (Aguirre et al., 1989). Institutional barriers include factors that preclude access to education and prevent occupational mobility. Education is a powerful assimilative force for two reasons: first, educated immigrants are generally more accepted in society; second, education facilitates overcoming linguistic and cultural barriers which prevent access to societal institutions (Portes, 1984). As Alba and Chamlin (1983) noted, “education is assumed widely to bear an important relation to assimilation ... in that it introduces the individual to an ethnically widening circle of classmates as he or she proceeds higher in the educational system” (p. 242). In this dissertation, high income and education levels are taken as evidence of an immigrant’s success in becoming structurally assimilated. Classical assimilation theory predicts that structural assimilation is positively correlated with political assimilation.

### **The Structural Barrier Hypothesis**

$H_1^3$ : Latino immigrants who have higher levels of education, income and economic attachment are more likely to participate in politics and will show higher levels of attachment to the American polity than those who do not.

## The Structural Assimilation/Ethnic Competition Hypothesis

$H_1^4$ : Latinos who live in highly concentrated Latino areas with large foreign born populations will be less likely to participate in politics and will show higher levels of attachment to the American polity than those who do not.

Overall, the models include several measures of structural assimilation. All three data sets asked respondents to provide information about their income and educational status. Four contextual measures of structural assimilation were also included: (1) percentage of native born persons in a neighborhood; (2) percentage of co-ethnics in a neighborhood; (3) percentage of citizens in a neighborhood; and (4) ratio of income to poverty in a neighborhood. These percentages were computed from the 2000 U.S. Census at the level of census tract and appended to the 2002 National Survey of Latinos<sup>4</sup>. Besides these percentages as continuous measures, categorical versions of them were included in some models in order to focus on individuals who are not living in highly concentrated immigrant/coethnic areas (Greenman and Xie, 2000). When a dummy variable was created out of these measures, the cutpoints were set at the group specific means. For example, if a dummy variable was included, the mean of the variable was first calculated and a dummy variable was created that equals 1 for all values above the mean and 0 for all values of the variable below the mean. The mean was calculated only for respondents who were eligible for inclusion in the analysis.

---

<sup>4</sup>The other data sets used in this dissertation did not have the appropriate geocodes that are necessary to append the variables.

## **Attitudinal/Behavioral Receptional Assimilation and Context of Reception**

The straightline and ethnic disadvantage perspectives have very different predictions as to the likely outcome of unfavorable reception, including discrimination, on predicting political attitudes and behaviors. Gordon (1964), for example, argued that assimilation would proceed only in the absence of discriminatory conditions in the host country. More recently, researchers continuing in the tradition of classical assimilation theory have argued that in the long-run, racial distinctiveness will not be a major barrier to incorporation (Alba and Nee, 1997, 2003; Perlman and Waldinger, 1997) because racial boundaries have proven to be fluid (Xie and Greenman, 2000). Alba and Nee (2003) further argue that today's immigrants have benefited from the civil rights movement which has effectively increased the cost of discrimination. The implication is that as overt discriminatory acts decrease barriers to incorporation are minimized.

Portes (1989) very explicitly considered a context of reception characterized by prejudice in the host society as a dimension along which contemporary immigrant experiences vary (Portes, 1989). "The stance of host governments, employers, the surrounding native population and the characteristics of the pre-existing native community, if any, are important aspects of the situation confronting new immigrants" (1989, p. 618). The awareness of discrimination, according to Portes, is primarily responsible for the reconstitution of ethnic culture. According to Cuellar et al. (1995), "significant ... barriers (personal or otherwise) based on animosity and hatred toward

the new culture” are responsible for an immigrant’s desire to retain values of the original culture.

Several studies have demonstrated that experience with discrimination fosters naturalization and civic engagement among Latinos (DeSipio, 2003; Schkinderkruat, 2004, Wrinkle et al., 1996). Dawson (1994) and Uhlaner (1991) offered as explanations that experiences with discrimination serve to enhance ethnic consciousness, which is a critical resource for ethnic/racial political engagement. Lee and Ramakrishnan (2002) found a positive relationship between having an ethnic name, perceiving that discrimination among Latinos is a problem and having a heightened sense of ethnic identity and certain forms of political participation. Discrimination may foster a sense of vulnerability leading immigrants to seek access to the political system in order to enhance their legal rights and social standing (Pantoja, 2005), both of which can reduce overt acts of discrimination.

Discrimination against one’s own ethnic group as opposed to personal discrimination may play an important role in facilitating political assimilation among certain groups of Latino immigrants. Nevertheless, no study to date has considered the role that group versus individual discrimination plays in the political assimilation of Latino subgroups. There exist, however, two studies that investigated whether perceptions of group level discrimination have more of an impact on political engagement than individual-level discrimination among Latinos generally (DeSipio, 2002; Schildkraut, 2004). DeSipio (2002), for example, found that the perception of individual-level discrimination increases the likelihood of engaging in nonelectoral forms of political activity while the perception of discrimination against one’s national origin group

had no impact. In contrast, Schildkraut (2004) found that perceptions of discrimination against one's self promote behavioral and attitudinal alienation from political processes, specifically electoral participation and registration, that can be counteracted when an immigrant identifies with his or her country of origin.

The analyses that follow include both group-based and individual level measures of discrimination. To operationalize group-based discrimination, respondents in 2002 were asked three questions designed to measure whether they believed Latinos as a group have been discriminated against: "In general, do you think discrimination against Latinos is a major problem, a minor problem, or not a problem in (a) schools; (b) the workplace; or (c) in preventing Latinos in general from succeeding in America? Answers to these questions were combined to form a scale ranging from 3 (respondent believes all three types of discrimination to be a major problem) to 9 (respondent believes that none of these types are a problem). As a measure of individual based discrimination, these same respondents were asked how often, in their day-to-day life, the following things happen to them because of their race or ethnic background: (a) they are treated with less respect than other people; (b) they receive poor service compared to others at restaurants or stores; or (c) they are called names or insulted. Possible responses included "Very often," "Fairly often," "Once in a while" or "Never." A scale was created from these responses that ranges from 3 (if all three things happened very often) to 12 (if none of these things ever happened). Increasing values correspond to more frequent acts of discrimination while decreasing values indicate more favorable contexts<sup>5</sup>. An additional measure of personal discrimination,

---

<sup>5</sup>In some cases throughout this dissertation, this variable was reverse coded. I

included in both national surveys, included responses to the following question: “In the past 5 years, have you or a family member experienced discrimination?” (Yes =  $d = 1$ , No =  $d = 0$ ). Both the 2002 and 2004 survey asked respondents to answer the following question: “In general, do you think discrimination against Latinos is a major problem, minor problem, or not a problem in preventing Latinos in general from succeeding in America?” In both cases, responses “major problem” were coded 1 and response “minor problem” and “not a problem” were coded  $d = 0$ .

Besides discrimination, an additional measure of the context of reception is given by respondents’ perception of the relative conditions of life in the United States versus their country of origin. Both national surveys included measures designed to assess the extent to which immigrants believe that conditions in the US are poor relative to their home countries. Respondents were asked “Overall would you say that (a) Treatment of the poor is better in the United States, better in country you/your parents/ancestors came from/Puerto Rico, or about the same?; (b) The moral values of the society is better in the United States, better in country you/your parents/ancestors came from/Puerto Rico, or about the same? (c) The strength of family ties is better in the United States, better in country you/your parents/ancestors came from/Puerto Rico, or about the same? of (d) Opportunity to get ahead is better in the United States, better in country you/your parents/ancestors came from/Puerto Rico, or about the same?” Possible responses included “Better in the United States,” “Better in the country you came from,” or “the same.” Individual responses were have made every attempt to indicate when this is the case. For examples of each case, see Appendix B and C.

recoded -1 for “Better in the country you came from,” 0 for “the same,” and 1 for “Better in the United States” and then summed to create an index. The indexed values ranged from -4 to 4 with - 4 indicating that all four conditions were better in respondent’s home country, 0 indicating that respondent believed that there was no difference in either of the conditions, and 4 indicating that all four conditions were better in the United States.

If context of reception affects the course of Latino political assimilation, then the following hypotheses should be supported by the data:

#### **The Behavioral Receptional Assimilation Hypothesis**

$H_1^5$ : Latinos who have not experienced discrimination or who do not perceive discrimination to be a major problem are more likely to participate in politics and will show higher levels of attachment to the American polity than those who have.

#### **The Context of Reception/Life is “Better in the US” Hypothesis**

$H_1^6$ : Latinos who have had favorable contexts of reception and believe that life is better in the US are more likely to participate in politics and will show higher levels of attachment to the American polity than those who have not.

## **Ethnic Residential Concentration**

Those who live in states or metropolitan areas with high concentrations of co-ethnics are more likely to have contacts with or exposure to ethnic media and community organizations. Having higher concentrations of co-ethnics therefore lowers the per-capita cost of ethnic mobilization by interest groups, party organizations and candidate organizations (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001). At the same time, previous studies have shown that areas of high ethnic concentration can be areas of lower mobilization and participation. This may be due to the effect of other social contextual factors associated with higher Latino populations such as larger proportion of foreign born, higher residential poverty and greater proportions of non-citizens (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001).

There are multiple competing strands of thought as to the likely outcome of residential concentration on the likelihood of political assimilation. One strand of the ethnic disadvantage model holds that as immigrants desegregate out of their own neighborhoods and ethnic enclaves in favor of those dominated by the majority group, they begin to compete directly with natives. The entry of minorities into mainstream occupations and other roles heightens ethnic awareness (Portes, 1984). Therefore, ethnicity remains less salient among immigrants who live in areas characterized by high ethnic populations. They are therefore less likely to become politically assimilated. Both the classical assimilation model and the ethnic competition strand of the ethnic disadvantage model predict the following political outcomes regarding Latino acculturation in these contexts:

## **The Ethnic Competition Hypothesis**

$H_1^7$ : Latinos who live in highly concentrated Latino neighborhoods or in neighborhoods characterized by large foreign born populations will be less likely to participate in politics and will show lower levels of attachment to the American polity than those who do not.

## **Generational Status and Years Lived in the US**

In previous studies of Latino political behavior, exposure to US culture has been found to be an important indicator of political assimilation, especially among foreign born Latinos. In their study of political participation in California, Uhlaner et al. (1989) noted that voting among immigrants is influenced, in part, by their length of stay in the United States. In their study of Latino electoral participation, Highton and Burris (2002) similarly found that nativity has a powerful effect on turnout but only when considered in conjunction with how long foreign born citizens have lived in the United States. Finally, in a well-cited study, Wong (2000) found a strong relationship between the number of years an immigrant has lived in the United States and the acquisition of partisanship. She concluded that a process of reinforcement through exposure to the political system underlies the development of political attitudes across diverse immigrant groups.

Here, as elsewhere, exposure to US culture is operationalized by generational status and years lived in the United States. If classical assimilation theory is accurate, the expectation is that longer residence in the United States will lead to greater political assimilation among first generation immigrants. Theoretically, immigrants

who have lived here longer are more fluent in English and have greater contact with, and commitment to, American political institutions.

The straightline assimilation model assumes that first generation immigrants will be less politically incorporated than second generation immigrants, who in turn will be less politically incorporated than their first generation counterparts. Similarly, from an intra-generational perspective, this same model presumes that immigrants will become more politically incorporated over time. The ethnic and segmented assimilation perspectives also predict a positive relationship between years lived in the United States and political behavior.

Classical theories of assimilation considered it to be a unilinear process whereby the economic and social conditions of individuals and ethnic groups improve over each succeeding generation. Consequently, for each subgroup of Latinos, the expectation is that first generation immigrants will be the least likely to vote because of linguistic and cultural barriers that make it difficult to access political information. First generation immigrants are also more likely to have strong ties to their home country. According to the straightline model, we should expect the following hypotheses to be supported by the data:

### **The Generation Hypothesis**

$H_1^8$ : Third generation immigrants will be more likely to participate in politics and will show higher levels of attachment to the American polity than second generation immigrants who in turn will be more likely to participate than first generation immigrants.

## The Exposure Hypothesis

$H_1^9$ : Latino immigrants living in the United States the longest will be more likely to participate in politics and will show higher levels of attachment to the American polity than those who have lived in the United States for shorter periods.

All three primary data sets had measures of both generational status and years lived in the United States. Generational status was recoded to reflect consistency with current literature. Individuals born outside the United States were deemed “First Generation” immigrants. Puerto Ricans born in Puerto Rico were recoded as foreign born and therefore considered to be in this category. Individuals who were born in the United States but who had at least one foreign born parent were coded as “Second Generation” immigrants. Those born in the United States whose parents were also born in the United States were coded as “Third Generation” immigrants. The measure of generational status used here is binary and equal to unity if the immigrant is in generation  $i = 1, 2, 3$  and zero otherwise. Years lived in the US is a continuous measure ranging from less than 1 year to 81 years.

## 4.3 The Ethnic Disadvantage Model of Assimilation

Both segmented assimilation and ethnic disadvantage theories present opposing viewpoints that suggest Latino political acculturation is derivative of (1) a greater sense

of affinity for ethnic-based issues; (2) more robust panethnic identification; and (3) heightened ethnic group consciousness (Greenley, 1971; Glazer and Moynihan, 1963; Portes, Parker and Cobas, 1980; Portes, 1984; Portes and Bach, 1985; Portes and Rumbaut, 1990; Jones-Correa and Leal, 1996; Kaufman, 2000) that are requisite for their political mobilization. These theoretical perspectives argue that an immigrants' increasing awareness of social inequalities and discrimination results in stronger ethnic identification and unification. If these later perspectives accurately portray how Latinos adapt to the US political system, ethnic resilience should be an important factor explaining the development of immigrant political attitudes and behaviors.

By reversing the sign of the coefficient pertaining to a hypothesis of straightline assimilation we have the coefficient that serves to test a hypothesis of ethnic disadvantage (Portes, 1984). Both homeward political concerns and resilient ethnicity are factors that prevent total assimilation. According to Portes and Rumbaut (1996), "when immigrant communities finally turn to domestic issues and the vote, they tend to mobilize along national rather than class lines" (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996, p. 125). In fact, the major distinction between classical assimilation theory and the ethnic disadvantage perspective of immigrant assimilation pertains to the role that ethnicity and in particular cultural retention plays in promoting the adoption of American political attitudes and behaviors. If the latter is valid then we should expect, for example, cultural retention, ethnic or panethnic identification and bilingualism to be positively related to political participation in the US. This leads to the following hypothesis regarding the ethnic disadvantage view of Latino acculturation:

## **The Ethnic Resilience hypothesis**

$H_1^{10}$ : Latino immigrants who retain the cultural values and attitudes of their country of origin will be more active participants in American politics and will show higher levels of attachment to the American polity than those who do not.

Portes and Rumbaut (2001) studied the phenomenon of “reactive ethnicity” as a theoretical model for understanding reactions to inimical conditions in host societies. For example, they found that reactive formation processes provided a basis for collective solidarity and political mobilization among ethnic groups to protect those groups’ interests in response to California’s Proposition 187<sup>6</sup>. As an explanation they offered that reactive ethnicity is beneficial when group cohesion and mobilization to confront a threat are needed, and is first and foremost a response to societal racism, either against the individual or against the ethnic group. Finally, it is most intense among immigrants with low socio-economic status and contributes heavily to the hardening of oppositional attitudes. If Portes and Rumbaut (2001) are correct in their assessment of reactive formation processes, we should expect that individuals who identify with either their panethnic or ethnic origin group (i.e., have reactive ethnic identities) are more highly politically assimilated. The following research hypothesis should be supported by the data:

### **The reactive ethnicity hypothesis**

---

<sup>6</sup>California Proposition 187 was a 1994 ballot initiative designed to deny illegal immigrants social services, health care, and public education that was passed by California voters but subsequently overturned by a federal court

$H_1^{11}$ : Latinos who adopt reactive ethnic identities are more likely to participate in politics and will show higher levels of attachment to the American polity than those who do not.

Reactive ethnicity was operationalized as identification with one's ethnic or panethnic group (see section on Identificational Assimilation above).

### **Group-Based Resources**

According to social identity and acculturation theories, perceptions of linked fate and common culture, experiences of ethnic discrimination, and participation in ethnic and church-based organizations may address various components of ethnic identification and are useful indicators for understanding the ethnic identity choices among certain minority groups. Prior research in political science has identified these types of resources as intangible attachments that motivate and shape participatory behaviors (Baretto, 2003).

Group identification and consciousness have been measured in a number of different ways in the research literature that are worthy of discussion. Tate (1993) measured group identification with two items taken from the 1984 National Black Election Study (NBES): whether the respondent feels affected by what happens to blacks in the US and the degree to which blacks think consciously about being black. In a different study, Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) combined multiple items designed to measure how feelings of group closeness, the perception of common problems, experience with discrimination and support for government programs impact political participation. In her study of African American and Latino involvement

in Chicago area politics, Marschall (2001) used a combined measure of low political trust/high political efficacy as a proxy for group consciousness. Lien (2001) on the other hand, included separate measures of group identity and consciousness. She operationalized “group identification” by one’s membership and concern about one’s own ethnic group and “group consciousness” by the individual’s perception that one’s own ethnic group has fewer opportunities than most Americans and by personal experience with discrimination.

If group based resources effect political adaptation, as proponents of ethnic disadvantage would suggest, then the following hypothesis should be supported by the data:

### **The Group Consciousness Hypothesis**

$H_1^{12}$ : Individuals with heightened levels of ethnic group consciousness and cultural retention are more likely to participate in American politics and will show higher levels of attachment to the American polity than those who do not.

The survey items used in this dissertation allowed me to build measures of two broad forms of identification: (a) a group identity based on acceptance of a common fate with other Latinos; and (b) a more exclusive identity based on identification with one’s own ethnic group. Those who endorse the notion of a common fate are conscious of sharing a panethnic identity and common interest with other Latinos. In contrast, a lack of common interest is reflected in the tendency to think of one’s interests as being distinct from that of other Latinos. To measure this, in 2002, respondents were

asked whether they believed that Hispanics/Latinos from different countries (1) share one Hispanic/Latino culture; or (2) have separate and distinct cultures.

According to Chong and Rogers (2003), group consciousness augments group identification by articulating collective discontents and strategies for improving the status of Latinos. I examine two components of group consciousness: (a) a belief that group disparities are produced by discrimination and are illegitimate; and (b) belief in the political efficacy of group action. In addition to the measures of discrimination discussed above, the national surveys asked respondents whether they believed that all Latinos are working together politically to achieve common goals and whether the respondent believed they would be better off if Latino groups worked together politically.

The theoretical predictions of each model are summarized in Table 4.1.

**The Hypothesized Models: Participation in US politics**

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Classical Assimilation</i>	<i>Ethnic Disadvantage</i>
<b>Acculturation and Cultural Assimilation</b>		
Years Lived In the United States	+	+
First Generation	-	-
Second Generation	-	-
Traditionalism	-	+
English Dominance	+	-
Bilingual	-	+
Spanish Dominant	+	-
<b>Identificational Assimilation</b>		
American Identity	+	-
US is true homeland	+	-
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>		
Income	+	+
Education	+	+
Economic Attachment	+	+
Percent co-ethnic	-	+
Percent citizen	+	+
Percent foreign born	-	+
Ratio of Income to Poverty	+	-
<b>Group Identity and Consciousness</b>		
Panethnic Identity	-	+
National Origin Identity	-	+
Linked Fate (One Culture)	-	+
Political Consciousness	-	+
<b>Attitudinal/Behavioral Receptional Assimilation</b>		
Group-Based Discrimination	-	+
Personal Discrimination	-	+
Better in the US	-	+
<b>Control Variables</b>		
Age	+	+
Marital Status	+	+
Female	-	-

Table 4.1. Hypothesized Effects of Explanatory Variables on Political Participation

## 4.4 The Multiple Pathways of Assimilation

Classical assimilation theory articulates a single path of assimilation down which it is assumed that all immigrants eventually travel. If this is true, then the following hypothesis should be supported by the data:

### The Similarity Hypothesis

$H_1^{13}$ : The unique life histories and life experiences of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans are irrelevant in determining the assimilation trajectory they will follow and hence the path to political assimilation is the same among subgroups of Latinos.

## 4.5 The Components of Political Assimilation: The Dependent Variables

### 4.5.1 Extending the Assimilation Framework to Political Outcomes

Dahl (1962), posited a model of immigrant *political* incorporation, describing it as a function of mobilization in conventional party politics. Dahl views political incorporation in terms of a three-stage model of ethnic incorporation that closely parallels classical theories of assimilation. In the first stage of incorporation, immigrants are viewed as unsophisticated political actors, who remain politically uninvolved because they lack both knowledge and resources. Immigrants gradually learn how to mobilize

in party politics, a phenomenon that demarcates the beginning of the second stage of his model. Immigrants are thought to possess a recognizable and mobilizable ethnic identity that provides sufficient resources to be able to negotiate their collective and individual interests. The third and final stage is characterized by diverse ethnic interests which make brokerage no longer viable. Lower levels of discrimination coupled with higher levels of education and wealth enable individuals to gain access into mainstream social, economic and political institutions. He believed that ethnic identity would become less politically relevant over time. Scholars have increasingly come to doubt whether Dahl's model of incorporation, which may have "worked" for European immigrants, appropriately characterizes the assimilation trajectory of post-1965 immigrants and if not, why?

Today political incorporation refers to levels of influence over political decision-making via descriptive representation (Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1984). For example, Browning et al. (1984) measured the degree of incorporation using a composite scale of the number or percentage of African American officeholders present in the policy-making arena, their presence in important leadership positions, and their active participation in dominant ruling coalitions. This implies that the degree of political incorporation is a function of the strength and ability of a group to effectuate its policy preferences (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 1984). It is generally assumed that high levels of incorporation are prerequisites to the actualization of political goals and objectives (Haynie, 2001). Scholars in the field of ethnic politics have either defined political incorporation as one type of political activity to the exclusion of others or have defined it too narrowly (Ong and Meyer, 2004) ignoring in the process issues

of identity and group interests (Andersen and Cohen, 2002).

As of late, there is a trend among political scientists to reconceptualize past notions of political incorporation (Ong, 1999; Wong, 2002). One issue that has received increasing attention is that immigrants' political issues may be oriented towards their country of origin and therefore do not reflect an immigrant's proclivity towards political incorporation. Cubans, for example, have lobbied U.S. officials to further their efforts to denigrate the Castro regime (Ong and Meyer, 2004). There is a need, then, to distinguish political activity pertaining to one's home country from participation based on domestic concerns whenever possible. Besides homeward looking concerns, a theory of Latino political incorporation must include ethnic resiliency. The roots of a pan-Latino movement built on ethnic pride and resiliency may be gaining a stronghold in this nation. On May 1, 2006, illegal immigrants protested across the country to take part in "Un Dia Sin Inmigrantes" as a reaction to immigration laws proposed by the federal government to restrict illegal immigration. Theories of political incorporation pertaining to new immigrants should incorporate this potentially newly formed collective identity, ethnic collective interests and concern for their community.

Political participation is an important way for immigrants to assimilate into American life. Studies of political assimilation<sup>7</sup> have focused primarily on the determinants of naturalization and differences in citizenship acquisition across different national origin groups (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Portes and Mozo, 1995; Lian, 1994). Voting and other forms of participation that occur after naturalizing have

---

<sup>7</sup>While I do not use the terms "incorporation" and "assimilation" interchangeably here, the majority of other scholars do.

received very little attention (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001) despite the fact that beliefs about the proper relationship between citizens and their government are central features of American political culture. Additionally, since thirty-nine percent of Latinos are ineligible to vote on account of their status as non-citizens (de La Garza, 2004), it is important to have a broad definition of political incorporation that includes nonelectoral activity (Wong, 2002), in addition to citizenship acquisition, party identification and voting. In this vein, Wong (2002) challenges researchers to move beyond these traditional notions of incorporation in order to provide a more adequate conceptual framework for assessing political incorporation among immigrants. The main limitations of existing theories, according to Wong, are twofold. First, incorporation among new immigrants is not necessarily linear and permanent; second, political incorporation means more than empowerment in the Marshall/Tabb sense.

In this dissertation, I define political incorporation broadly enough to encompass more than empowerment via elected officials. To do so, I expand the concept to include (1) the acquisition of political attitudes and values, (2) levels of political participation, and (3) naturalization. The motivation for having a broad definition of incorporation comes from the fact that public opinion, participation and representation are all flip sides of the same coin. For example, participatory integration and representative integration are not mutually exclusive, rather the former is a precondition of the latter. Obviously, absent full participation among Hispanics, representatives can remain unresponsive. In addition, democratic responsiveness is a function of shared and distinct political views. Using the sociological theories presented above as

a framework for understanding the political incorporation of Latinos, I discuss how immigrants relate to the American political system. I emphasize the role of identity and context in mediating this relationship and in fostering the development of political attitudes and behaviors.

#### **4.5.2 Electoral Activity**

Participation in electoral politics, in the form of registering to vote and actually voting, is the most obvious indicator of political assimilation.

The following items were asked of survey respondents in the 2002 Latino National Survey:

1. Have you ever voted in a United States Election?

Two additional questions were asked of survey respondents in 2004:

1. We often find out that a lot of people aren't able to vote because they were not registered, or they were sick, or they just didn't have time. Do you remember for sure whether you voted in the November 2002 congressional election in your district?
2. Do you remember for sure whether you voted in the November 2000 presidential election when George W. Bush ran against Al Gore and Ralph Nader?

In the case of voting, the universe is citizens who are registered voters. In the case of registration, the universe is citizens of the United States. Possible responses included "Yes Voted" and "No, did not vote." Unless otherwise indicated, a binary

variable equal to unity was included in the analysis to indicate that the respondent in fact voted in any of these elections.

### **4.5.3 Nonelectoral Participation**

A second type of dependent variable measures the level to which an individual is involved in participation in politics beyond voting. The following question was asked of respondents in the 2004 National Survey: People express their opinions about politics and current events in a number of ways. In the United States, in the past year, have you:

1. Attended a public meeting or demonstration in the community in which you live.
2. Contacted an elected official
3. Contributed money to a candidate running for public office
4. Attended a political party meeting or function
5. Worked as a volunteer or for pay for a political candidate

Possible responses included “Yes” and “No.” These individual items were summed to form a scale. The variable was considered an ordinal variable indicating the frequency with which the respondent participated in nonelectoral types of activities. A value of 0, for example, corresponds to “No Participation” and a value of 5 corresponds to “Frequent Participant.” Therefore, this variable does not distinguish between each of the possible types of participation, but rather measures the quantity

of the involvement. Additional analyses were done on these variables that preserved the specific type of participation. Those analyses required each variable to be coded as 1 if the behavior occurred and 2 if it did not occur.

#### **4.5.4 Citizenship**

United States citizenship is an important indicator of political assimilation among immigrant populations because citizenship is a prerequisite for full participation in American politics. Therefore, a model was estimated which had “time to citizenship acquisition” as its dependent variable. In 2002, first generation immigrants were asked how many years they have lived in the United States. These respondents were additionally asked to provide information about the year they became a citizen. Subtracting these two values yielded a positive count variable that indicated length of time it took to acquire citizenship status. The universe was foreign born immigrants only.

#### **4.5.5 Political Culture and American National Identity**

##### **American Liberalism and Civic Incorporation**

Civic incorporation is defined as support for economic individualism. Most researchers define economic individualism as a set of “core values encompassing the dual beliefs that” (de la Garza et al., 1996, p. 341) central to American political culture is the notion that 1) individuals should be self-reliant, meaning that they are responsible for providing their own basic needs (de Tocqueville, 1945; Fuchs, 1990; Lipset, 1964;

Huntington, 1981; Sniderman and Hagan, 1985; McClosky and Zaller, 1984; de la Garza et al., 1996); and 2) people should get ahead on their own through hard work (Feldman, 1988). Economic individualism is a core element in accounts of American values and beliefs (Feldman, 1988) as evidenced by the widespread belief in the work ethic apparent in mass opinion surveys and in-depth interviews (Sennet and Cobb, 1972; Lamb, 1974; Feagin, 1975; Lewis, 1978; Sniderman and Brody, 1977; Feldman, 1983; McClosky and Zaller, 1984). It is noteworthy that researchers have failed to find any significant differences between Mexican-Americans and whites in their acceptance of and support for economic individualism (de la Garza et al., 1996).

To measure support for economic individualism, all respondents were asked to indicate which of the following statements comes closer to their own view?

1. The government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all Americans. OR
2. This is not the government's responsibility; each person should take care of themselves.
3. Neither.

Importantly, the fact that neither was an option allows for the possibility that some other entity apart from the individual or the government, should be held responsible for individual welfare.

The extent to which Latinos support the major ideals and premises behind the American work ethic is yet another measure used to operationalize civic incorporation. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the following

questions: "Hard work offers LITTLE guarantee of success" and "It doesn't do any good to plan for the future because you don't have control over it." Possible responses included 4=*Agree strongly*; 3=*Agree somewhat*; 2=*Disagree somewhat*; and 1=*Disagree strongly*. Responses were recoded as 1 = *Agree strongly/Agree somewhat*; and 2 = *Disagree somewhat/Disagree strongly*.

### **Free Enterprise**

Americans have always given strong support to the free enterprise system (Lipset, 1979; McClosky and Zaller, 1984). The free enterprise system can be seen as the economic side of the individualistic social system, and support for the free enterprise system has typically been accompanied by a distrust of big government (Devine, 1972). McClosky and Zaller (1984) argued that support for capitalism and free enterprise forms one of the basic elements of political culture. The following item was designed to measure support for free enterprise: Would you say you favor a (smaller federal government with fewer services), or (a larger government with many services)? Possible choices included 1=*Smaller*; and 2 = *Larger*.

### **Melting Pot**

In the American context, the society envisioned by hard multiculturalism is generally contrasted with the symbolism embodied in the "melting pot" metaphor. This popular phrase projects the image and process by which diverse cultures come to shed their heritage in favor of a single American identity. To measure support for the idea of the United States as a melting pot, the following question was asked of

survey respondents: How important is it for Latinos to change so that they blend into the larger society as in the idea of a melting pot? Possible responses included: 1= *Very important*, 2 = *Somewhat important*, 3=*Not too important* and 4= *Not at all important*. Responses were recoded 1 = *Very important/Somewhat important* and 2 = *Not too important/Not important at all*.

### **National Identity**

De la Garza (2005) argued that an additional measure of the linkage between Latino values and the “national interest” is the difference between Latino perspectives of Latin America versus the United States. Two items pertaining to the relative benefit of life in the US versus one’s country of origin were included in the analysis. In 2002, respondents were asked the following question: “Do you feel confident that life for your children will be better than it has been for you, or don’t you feel this way?” Possible choices included 1 = *Life will be better* and 2 = *No, don’t feel this way*. Additionally, respondents were asked, “Do you think there is more opportunity to get ahead in the United States, more in the country you came from, or is it about the same?” Possible choices included 1 = *More in the US*; 2 = *More in the country you came from*; and 3 = *Same*.

To explore the meaning and value of identification as an American, an additional five items were selected from the *2004 National Survey of Latinos: Politics and Civic Participation* to measure Latinos views regarding American national and political identity: In order for an immigrant to say that they are part of American society, do they have to do each of the following, or not?

1. Do immigrants have to Speak English to say they are part of American society, or not? (1 = Yes, have to; 2 = No, do not have to);
2. Do immigrants have to believe in the U.S. constitution, to say they are part of American society, or not? (1 = Yes, have to; 2 = No, do not have to);
3. Do immigrants have to Be a U.S. Citizen or not? (1 = Yes, have to; 2 = No, do not have to);
4. Do immigrants have to Vote in U.S. elections to say they are part of American society, or not? (1 = Yes, have to; 2 = No, do not have to);
5. Which comes closer to your views?:
  - a. The United States has a single core Anglo-Protestant culture; or
  - b. The United States is made up of many cultures

These five questions provide the basis for the discussion of ethnocultural Americanism versus multiculturalism that is discussed in Chapter 5.

#### **4.5.6 Control Variables**

The analysis included several control variables. First, age is included to mitigate any confounding effect with years lived in the United States and also because research has shown that older individuals participate in politics at higher levels. Gender differences in participation rates highlight the need to include a binary variable equal to unity if the respondent is female. Finally, some studies have found that married

individuals are more active in politics than unmarried individuals, and therefore a dummy variable was included in the analyses. In some cases, differences among ethnic groups were estimated by allowing slope coefficients to differ among Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans.

## **4.6 An Empirical Model of Political Incorporation**

Berry's (1990, 1997) model of acculturation is a useful starting point for understanding variation in Latinos' identification with the American polity. Similar to the two-dimensional model of acculturation (Phinney, 2001), identification with the American polity can be viewed as a two-step process. The extent to which an immigrant's political activities are ethnically based on the one hand, and the extent to which they adopt American political attitudes and behaviors on the other, can be considered as two dimensions of their incorporation that vary independently (Table 4.2). According to Jones-Correa (1998), immigrants choose to maintain their positions outside the traditional political sphere as a way of balancing the demands by the host country and the country of origin. He described this process as the practice of the "politics of in-between," whereby the political participation is negotiated on the immigrants' own terms, which is done by keeping some distance and ties to both polities. Individual political attitudes and behaviors lie on a spectrum ranging from political alienation to ethnically based attitudes and behaviors to purely American attitudes and behaviors. A purely ethnic orientation includes being more concerned about government and politics in one's country of origin and participating only for ethnic based causes

or issues. Political engagement in American politics includes voting in US elections exclusively, participating in nonelectoral politics for reasons unrelated to ethnicity, and identifying with a US political party. In between are activities such as voting in both one’s country of origin and in US elections and dual-citizenship. Individuals who lie towards the “ethnic” side of the spectrum are politically separated, whereas individuals who lie towards the “American” side are politically assimilated. Individuals who are “in-between” are expected to be politically integrated. Finally, individuals who are not concerned with politics in either country are politically alienated. This presents a broad theoretical view of possible incorporation categories that may be evident among immigrants.

Table 4.2: Possible Modes of Political Incorporation

		Participation in Home Country Politics	
		<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
Participation in US Politics	<i>High</i>	Politically Integrated	Politically Assimilated
	<i>Low</i>	Politically Separated	Politically Alienated

Political incorporation is defined as “*the development of the capacity to mobilize effective political action in response to perceived political opportunities in a host country*” (Ong and Meyer, 2004, p. 4; emphasis in original) irrespective of the nature of the action. To predict actual placement in the four cells is dependent on knowing the characteristics of immigrant groups and the context of reception (Table 4.2).

Table 4.3: Causal Mechanism and Likely Outcomes for Three Assimilation Trajectories

	Path 1	Path 2	Path 3
Straightline Assimilation	Assimilation leads to Americanization (High political participation and adoption of American core values).	-	-
Ethnic Disadvantage Theory	Lack of contact with dominant groups precludes ethnic awareness. (Low participation and failure to adopt American core values).	Ethnic competition heightens ethnic awareness and resiliency based on awareness of outgroup membership. (High political participation and failure to adopt American core values).	-
Segmented Assimilation	Assimilation leads to Americanization (High political participation and adoption of American core values).	Ethnic resilience and reconstitution of ethnic culture based on awareness of outgroup membership. (High political participation, failure to adopt American core values).	Downward assimilation towards "minority underclass." (Low levels of participation, failure to adopt American core values).

Table 4.3 shows the three potential pathways (Path 1, Path 2 and Path 3) of immigrant political incorporation and their causal mechanisms. The straightline model suggests that all immigrants travel only one path; therefore, no other path corresponding to this theory is shown in Table 4.3. According to the straightline model, assimilation leads to Americanization which in turn implies high levels of political participation and the adoption of American core values such as American national identity. The ethnic disadvantage theory presupposes two pathways of assimilation (Path 1 and Path 2). Immigrants who follow Path 1 lack contact with dominant groups in society, for example, whites; therefore, they do not possess the group-based resources that mobilize them to participate in the American polity. These immigrants are characterized by low levels of participation and do not adopt American core values. Immigrants who follow Path 2, however, possess heightened ethnic awareness of their membership in an outgroup and participate in politics as a means of breaking down structural barriers to inequality in the United States. The segmented model assumes three possible pathways of assimilation. Path one is the same path that immigrants travel under straightline theory. Path 2 is characterized by ethnic resilience and the reconstitution of ethnic culture based on awareness of outgroup membership, and is the same as Path 2 of the ethnic disadvantage theory. There is an additional assimilatory path, Path 3, in which political incorporation is characterized by low levels of participation and the failure to adopt American core values, similar to the “minority underclass” living in the United States. In Table 4.3, the columns reflect the fact that America is a stratified society and that immigrants reside in a variety of community contexts.

Each path is assumed to be conditional on the community context in which the immigrant resides. More specifically, the general models of assimilation and incorporation play out differently for different immigrant groups, as a function of timing, context and culture. In the chapters that follow, I focus on Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban immigrants to examine how adequately these theories capture their experiences in the United States. In many of the models presented, the assumption is that immigrants have a latent propensity to participate in political life. The task is to understand how identity and context of reception influence this latent propensity.

## **4.7 Statistical Methodology**

A variety of standard multivariate analyses using multiple regression techniques is appropriate for all of the research questions I proposed above. The nature of the dependent variable dictates the appropriate model to use in each case. For example, when the variable is ordinal, ordinal logistic regression is used. Treating the measure as continuous and using any other method would result in bias and provide inconsistent estimators of the effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable. I elaborate on this below, in the appropriate subsection.

### **4.7.1 Binary, Ordinal and Multinomial Logistic Regression**

#### **Binary Logit Models**

Logistic regression is a widely used technique in political science. The binary nature of the voting models suggests the use of logistic regression where success is defined as

voting and failure is defined as non-voting. The logistic transformation is interpreted as the logarithm of success versus failure. The logistic transformation of the success probability  $\pi$  is given by

$$\text{logit}(\pi) = \log\left(\frac{\pi}{1-\pi}\right).$$

The above equation is then used as a link function to obtain the logit model:

$$\log\left(\frac{\pi}{1-\pi}\right) = \eta_i = \sum_{k=0}^K \beta_k x_{ik}.$$

Logistic regression models the logit of the odds of voting, which is not intuitively appealing. Therefore, I often convert the log odds to a probability to ease interpretation. Several times throughout this dissertation, for example, I estimate the following probability:

$$\pi_i = \frac{\exp(\sum_{k=0}^K \beta_k x_{ik})}{1 + \exp(\sum_{k=0}^K \beta_k x_{ik})} = \Lambda(\eta_i),$$

where

$$\Lambda(\eta_i) = \frac{\exp(\eta_i)}{[1 + \exp(\eta_i)]}.$$

For example, the model used to estimate registration and voting in US elections is

$$\text{logit}[\pi(\mathbf{x})] = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \cdots + \beta_p x_p,$$

alternatively

$$\pi(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{\exp(\beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \cdots + \beta_p x_p)}{1 + \exp(\beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \cdots + \beta_p x_p)},$$

where  $\pi(\mathbf{x}) = P(Y = 1)$  and  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_p)$  each  $x_i, i = 1, \dots, p$  represents a predictor variable. Inferences are made based on the estimated parameter  $\beta_i$ , which is the effect of  $x_i$  on the log odds that  $Y = 1$  after controlling for the other  $x'_j$ s in the model.

This model is useful for describing the odds of one outcome (“success”) versus another (“failure”). Odds-ratios are a useful way to describe and discuss the impact of an independent variable on the dependent variable. To illustrate the transformation of beta coefficients to odds ratios, suppose there are two groups of binary data, with probability of success  $p_1$  and  $p_2$ , respectively. Let  $\text{logit}(\pi_1) = \beta_0 + \gamma$  and  $\text{logit}(\pi_2) = \beta_0$ , where  $\beta_0$  and  $\gamma$  are parameter estimates. The odds ratio of success versus failure is given by

$$\theta = \frac{\pi_1/(1 - \pi_1)}{\pi_2/(1 - \pi_2)} = \exp(\gamma)$$

This quantity expresses the odds of success for the first group relative to the second. The odds ratio is used to explore the strength of association between the independent and outcome variables. Odds ratios are strictly positive. If the odds ratio is greater than one, the odds are increased; if the odds ratio is less than one, the odds decrease. Finally, if the odds ratio is equal to one, the odds of one outcome compared to another are the same.

Throughout this dissertation, I computed the percent change in the odds. The

percent change in the odds for a  $\delta$  unit change in  $x_k$ , holding other variables constant is calculated by:

$$100 \times \frac{\Lambda(\mathbf{x}, x_k + \delta) - \Lambda(\mathbf{x}, x_k)}{\Lambda(\mathbf{x}, x_k)} = 100 \times [\exp(\beta_k \times \delta) - 1].$$

It is useful to consider the extent to which change in one variable affects  $Pr(y = 1)$ . In this dissertation, I do so by allowing one variable to vary from its minimum to its maximum, while the other variables remain fixed, usually at their means. Symbolically,  $Pr(y = 1|\bar{x}, x_k)$  is the probability computed when all variables except  $x_k$  equal some specified variable. If  $Pr(y = 1|\bar{x}, \min(x_k))$  is the probability when  $x_k$  is equal to its minimum, and  $Pr(y = 1|\bar{x}, \max(x_k))$  is the probability when  $x_k$  is equal to its maximum, then  $Pr(y = 1|\bar{x}, \max(x_k)) - Pr(y = 1|\bar{x}, \min(x_k))$  is the predicted change in the probability when  $x_k$  changes over its range.

Oftentimes, too, it is useful to consider the effect of certain combinations of variables while the remaining variables are held constant. For example, let  $\mathbf{x}_0$  contain the mean of all variables except let  $x_1 = x$ ,  $x = (0, 1)$  and let  $x_2$  vary over its range. Then

$$\hat{Pr} = (y = 1|x_2, x_1) = \Phi(\mathbf{x}_0\hat{\beta}).$$

This strategy was used to compute predicted probabilities that correspond to ideal types in the population.

## Logistic models as Latent Variable Models

The binary response model can be extended to consider a latent variable approach to estimation. Since the notion of a latent variable will be discussed throughout this dissertation, it is essential to understand what the term means and the context in which it is used. Consider an individual's voting behavior as the observed  $y$ . The variable can only be observed in two states: the person either voted or did not vote. However, not all persons vote with the same level of certainty. One person may have been more "skeptical" in his decision to vote whereas another person may have been very firm in his decision. In both cases, we observe empirically the same  $y = 1$ . The idea of a latent  $y^*$  is that there is an underlying propensity to vote that generates the observed state. Although we do not directly observe  $y^*$ , at some point a change in  $y^*$  results empirically in the observation that the individual voted. For example, as individuals become increasing assimilated into American society, it is reasonable that the propensity to vote would increase as well. At some point, the propensity crosses a threshold that leads to participation.

For estimation purposes, let  $y_i^*$  be a linear function of the  $x_{ik}$  plus some residual error,  $\epsilon_i$ , as in

$$y_i^* = \mathbf{x}_i\boldsymbol{\beta} + \epsilon_i = \sum_{k=0}^K \beta_k x_{ik} + \epsilon_i.$$

The latent variable  $y^*$  is linked to the observed dichotomous variable by the following measurement equation:

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } y_i^* \leq \tau \\ 1 & \text{if } y_i^* > \tau \end{cases}$$

If  $y^* \leq \tau$ , then  $y = 0$ . If  $y^*$  crosses the threshold then  $y = 1$ .

The nature of some of the models suggests the presence of an interaction effect, for example between perceived discrimination and generational status. A methodology called *inteff*<sup>8</sup> is used here to estimate the interaction effect in nonlinear models. The magnitude of the interaction effect is computed by taking the cross derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable for each model. Consequently, any assessment of statistical significance of the interaction term is based on the estimated cross partial derivative and not on the coefficient from the interaction term (Chunrong and Norton, 2001).

#### 4.7.2 Ordinal Logit Models: Proportional Odds Models

Ordinal variables are ranked such that the categories they contain lie on a continuum ranging from high to low. Ordinal logistic regression is the most appropriate statistical model to use when the dependent variable is ranked from high to low. Nonelectoral participation is graded on a scale that ranges from “high” to “low” and therefore ordinal regression incorporates the nature of the dependent variable.

Ordinal variables are characterized by unknown distances between adjacent categories. The methodological preference of using statistical techniques designed to handle situations where an ordinal variable is ranked from low to high but the distance between adjacent categories is unknown has several advantages. First, by preserving the dependent variable in its current form we do not need to infer a lower bound

---

<sup>8</sup>At the time of this writing, this estimation technique is available only for interactions between two continuous variables

classification cut-off point for estimation purposes. Second, treating the outcome measure as if it were interval involves the implicit assumption that the intervals between adjacent categories are equal (Long, 1997). Finally, estimating simultaneous equations using proportional odds models takes advantage of the natural ordering of the outcome variable, hence remaining “faithful” to the nature of the response.

The cumulative probability of the ordered logit model is written as:

$$Pr(y_i > j | \mathbf{x}_i) = \frac{\exp(\alpha_j + \mathbf{x}_i \boldsymbol{\beta})}{1 + \exp(\alpha_j + \mathbf{x}_i \boldsymbol{\beta})}$$

Therefore, the parameterization used here is equivalent to that associated with regression-type estimates. In other words, for  $\beta_k > 0$ , higher values of  $x_k$  are associated with higher levels of  $y$ .

For the ordered logit model, the odds of an outcome being less than or equal to  $m$  versus being greater than  $m$  have the following equation:

$$\Lambda_m(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{Pr(y \leq m | \mathbf{x})}{Pr(y > m | \mathbf{x})} = \exp(\tau_m - \mathbf{x} \boldsymbol{\beta})$$

In the ordinal regression model, a latent variable,  $y^*$  ranging from  $-\infty$  to  $+\infty$  is mapped onto an observed variable  $y$ . Based on this relationship, a latent variable model for  $y^*$  can be written as a cumulative probability model. The measurement equation is given by:

$$y_i = m \text{ if } \tau_{m-1} \leq y_i^* < \tau_m \text{ for } m = 1, \dots, J$$

where the  $\tau$ 's are called thresholds or cutpoints. In the population,  $y^*$  is equal to:

$$y^* = \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k X_{ki} + \varepsilon_i = Z_i + \varepsilon_i$$

of which the ordinal regression model estimates part. For a model with  $K$   $\beta$ 's,  $M - 1$   $\delta$ 's are computed by:

$$Z_i = \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k X_{ki}$$

and the following threshold parameters are estimated:

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \tau_0 = -\infty \leq y_i^* < \tau_1 \\ 2 & \text{if } \tau_1 \leq y_i^* < \tau_2 \\ 3 & \text{if } \tau_2 \leq y_i^* < \tau_3 \\ \vdots & \text{if } \tau_{J-1} \leq y_i^* < \tau_J = \infty \end{cases}$$

The main assumption of this model emphasizes an interpretation of the odds that are the same across categories of the dependent variable. This assumption, which has been coined the proportional odds assumption, is often violated in practice. A Wald test proposed by Brant (1990) allows both an overall test that all of the coefficients are equal and a test of the equality of coefficients for individual variables. In the circumstance where this test revealed strong evidence that the assumption was violated, another estimation technique was preferred (see below).

### Multinomial Logit Models

The multinomial logistic model is similar to estimating simultaneous binary logits for all possible combinations of the dependent variable. This is the most appropriate model to use when the dependent variable is categorical. In this dissertation, multinomial logistic regression is used to model primary identification as a measure

of national identity because the levels of this variable are categorical in nature. For example, the model predicts the probability of identification as an “American,” member of an ethnic group, or as a “Latino/Hispanic.”

This model is commonly written as:

$$Pr(y_i = m | \mathbf{x}_i) = \frac{\exp(\mathbf{x}_i \beta_m)}{1 + \sum_{j=2}^J \exp(\mathbf{x}_i \beta_j)}, m > 1$$

Like the binary response model, this model can be parameterized in terms of odds. For example the odds of outcome  $m$  versus outcome  $n$ , given  $\mathbf{x}$ , is given by

$$\Lambda_{m|n}(\mathbf{x}_i) = \frac{\exp(\mathbf{x}_i \beta_m)}{\exp(\mathbf{x}_i \beta_n)}$$

It can be shown that taking the log of this equation yields the following equation that is useful in computing contrasts for all combinations of dependent variables:

$$\ln(\Lambda_{m|n})x_i = x_i[\beta_m - \beta_n].$$

When the multinomial model is the preferred estimation technique in this dissertation, contrasts are computed for every combination of the dependent variable.

Finally, both partial changes and discrete changes were used to summarize the effects of each variable on the probability of an event occurring. The partial change is defined as the unit change in the independent variable that causes  $y$  to change by  $\beta_k$  units, holding other variables constant. The discrete change is the change in the independent variable from one value to another value that causes a change in the predicted probability of the event occurring.

In order to test model fit, I used the likelihood ratio test as follows. The constrained model with parameters  $\beta_C$  was nested in the unconstrained model with parameters  $\beta_U$ . In each case, the null hypothesis is that the constraints imposed to create the constrained model are true.

As an alternative parameterization considered here, the multinomial model is conceptualized as a discrete choice model based on the idea that individuals choose outcomes that maximize the utility gained from that choice.

To concretize this notion, let the utility for choice  $i$  be  $u_i$ . A person chooses utility  $i$  when  $u_i > u_m \forall i \neq m$ , and the utility derived from choice  $i$  for individual  $j$  equals  $u_{ij} = u_i + \epsilon_{ij}$ . The probability of choosing alternative  $i$  is

$$Pr(y = i) = Pr(u_i > u_k \forall i \neq k)$$

These probabilities are derived from the MNLM.

A crucial assumption of multinomial regression models is the independence of irrelevant alternatives. This assumption implies that the multinomial logit model should only be used in cases where the outcome can plausibly be assumed to be distinct and weighted independently (McFadden, 1973). In this dissertation, a Hausman test of the IIA property was implemented by estimating the model on a restricted set of outcomes. The test is based on the assumption that if the other alternatives are irrelevant in computing subsets of outcomes, then their omission should not affect the parameter estimates that affect those outcomes.

## Sequential Logistic Models: Continuation Ratio Logistic Regression

Multinomial response problems can be simplified by taking into account the temporal ordering of the responses. This approach takes advantage of the sequential nature of decision-making. This model is useful for addressing the question of what sustains participation over time because it models the probability of participating in more than one political act given participation in at least one.

In this case, the interest is in conditional probabilities in modeling  $Pr(y_i = j)$  for  $j > 1$  given that  $y_i = j - 1$  denoted  $P_{ij}^+$ . More concretely,

$$P_{ij}^+ = Pr(y_i \geq j | y_i \geq j - 1) = \frac{\sum_{l=j}^J P_{il}}{\sum_{l=j-1}^J P_{il}}, j > 1.$$

A continuation ratio logit model is then given by:

$$\log \left( \frac{P_{ij}^+}{1 - P_{ij}^+} \right) = x_i \beta_j, j = 2, \dots, J.$$

Although the variable can be considered ordinal, proportional odds models are restrictive in not allowing separate structural mechanisms across different categories. If different mechanisms are at work for different levels of participatory transitions (i.e. going from none to one) the process can be broken down into a sequence of transitions. In this case, conditional probabilities model the probability that  $y_i \geq j$  for  $j > 1$ , given that  $y_i = j - 1$ , denoted as  $P_{ij}^+$ . As an illustration of this relatively unknown technique, consider the process of participating in nonelectoral politics, which can be viewed as a series of binary choices. This is illustrated diagrammatically below.

To estimate this model it is necessary to condition on appropriate subsamples

of the data. First, the entire sample is used to model the probability of 1 or more participatory act ( $P_{i2}^+$ ). In the model for the first transition, the response variable is coded as 1 if the respondent engaged in at least one participatory act, 0 otherwise. Note that  $P_{i1} = 1 - P_{i2}^+$ . The conditional probability of having participated in more than one act  $P_{i3}$  was modeled next using the continuation logit model using only the subset of respondents with at least one participatory act. In a model for the second transition, the response variable is coded 1 if the respondent has more than one participatory act and 0 otherwise such that

$$P_{i2} = P_{i2}^+(1 - P_{i3}^+)$$

and

$$P_{i3} = P_{i2}^+ P_{i3}^+,$$

which shows that the sequence of binary logit models completely describe the multinomial process.

### 4.7.3 Path Analysis and Structural Equation Modeling

Structural equation modeling techniques were used to assess whether the indicators of identity, behavioral and attitudinal assimilation mediated the relationship between socioeconomic status and political participation. Finally, model parameters were constrained to be equal to test whether assimilation trajectories that shape political behavior are the same for Mexican and Cuban immigrants.

Data for the structural equation and path analysis models were analyzed using AMOS 6.0 and EQS 1.0 software. These programs use the method of maximum likelihood estimation in order to obtain parameter estimates. The method is robust when data are missing (Arbuckle and Worthke, 1999; Byrne, 2002). The overall fit is generally determined by the chi-square statistic, which tests for comparability between the proposed and independence model where constructs are assumed to be unrelated (Bollen, 1989). Because the chi-square statistic is sensitive to large samples, alternative fit measures have been suggested (Hu and Bentler, 1999). These are the  $\chi^2$  ratio statistic ( $\frac{\chi^2}{df}$ ), which adjusts for sample size, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). In accordance with most researchers, a  $\chi^2$  ratio of between 1 and 3 (Arbuckle and Worthke, 1999) and a value of  $CFI \geq 0.95$  and  $RMSEA \leq .05$  was taken to indicate an acceptable fit (McDonald and Ho, 2002). The significance level criterion for all statistical tests was  $\alpha = .05$ , unless otherwise noted.

#### **4.7.4 Latent Class and Logistic Latent Class Analysis**

##### **Importance of Latent Class Analysis**

Latent class analysis allows researchers to identify typologies based on a set of latent characteristics or traits. Hagenaars and Halman (1988) explain that basic to ideal types is the notion that overt behavior can be conceived of as belonging or closeness to an underlying pure type. Latent class analysis analyzes data from a multiway contingency table describing *aggregate* responses and decomposes the tabular frequencies

into a set of latent classes that display certain characteristics. This type of analysis identifies a clustering of individuals who display certain traits and is used here to identify individuals who adopt multicultural or ethnocultural Americanism, American liberalism and electoral responsiveness versus non-responsiveness. Importantly, it is possible to statistically test for the structure of each underlying trait instead of imposing the structure on the data. This tends to negate any ambiguity associated with the number of dimensions associated with a latent construct, such as national identity. Instead, the number of classes emerges from the analysis.

In addition to obtaining the number of classes associated with a latent construct, latent class analysis has additional benefits. For example, it is possible to estimate the prevalence of each class or type. For example, if we identify a highly participatory class of voters, we can estimate the percentage of respondents who actually fall into this class. The conditional response probabilities generated by the model allow researchers to assess the likelihood of a particular response given that the respondent has been associated with a particular subtype. This model offers the additional benefit of reducing several indicators into fewer categories, and in this way resembles factor analytic techniques.

An exciting new program created by researchers at The Pennsylvania State University predicts the probability that a given member of the population will fall into one class versus another. By adding covariates to the latent class models, it is possible to explore how the measures of assimilation, acculturation, group-based resources and context of reception act to facilitate Latino political assimilation. In this respect, it is no different than adding predictors to a logistic or regression model to assess their

impact on a given dependent variable.

Typically, multivariate logistic regression analysis has provided political scientists with a typical portrait of voters. This type of analysis has several shortcomings that are addressed, in part, with latent class analysis.

Logistic regression assumes that predictor variables are exogenous and that the only endogenous variable is voting behavior. While some variables that enter into the model can legitimately be considered exogenous (for example, age and marital status), other variables, such as trust in government and political interest, cannot. Second, logistic regression assumes that variables are measured without error. This is highly unlikely to be the case for many variables, especially in surveys with immigrant respondents. If this error is ignored, seriously biased estimates result. Third, the presence of multicollinearity potentially masks significant effects due to the presence of correlations between variables. Fourth, unmeasured heterogeneity is usually ignored in logistic regression analysis and when it is not, it is often treated as a nuisance rather than as part of the structural information of the sample.

Latent class analysis attempts to explain the relationships among a set of observed measures by means of discrete but latent groups. Similar to cluster analysis, latent class analysis is designed to categorize cases into a smaller number of relatively homogenous clusters based on a set of manifest characteristics. In latent class analysis, however, the classes are based upon a probability model and does not require an arbitrarily chosen metric. The appropriateness of an LCA model assumes a statistical basis by comparing the characteristics of the observed data with those that would have been observed based upon the specified probabilistic model. Finally,

by accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity, LCA accommodates interactions of observed variables by accounting for the fact that different clusters can be similar with respect to certain variables but different with respect to others.

The *ℓEM* program was used for this analysis because of its ability to deal not only with manifest variables, but also with latent variables. This makes it possible to specify factor analytic models for categorical latent variables with categorical indicators (*ℓEM* program manual, 2005), which is the defining characteristic of latent class analysis.

### Unrestricted Latent Class Models

The classical formulation of the latent class model is defined as a probability model (Lazarsfeld and Henry, 1968; Goodman, 1974):

$$\pi_{xabcd} = \pi_x \pi_{a|x} \pi_{b|x} \pi_{c|x} \pi_{d|x}$$

where  $\pi_x$  is called the latent probability while  $\pi_{a|x}$ ,  $\pi_{b|x}$ ,  $\pi_{c|x}$ , and  $\pi_{d|x}$  are called the conditional response probabilities. The same unrestricted LCM can be formulated as a log-linear model for the incomplete frequency table  $m_{xabcd}$ . That is,

$$\log m_{xabcd} = u + u_x^X + u_a^A + u_b^B + u_c^C + u_d^D + u_{xa}^{XA} + u_{xb}^{XB} + u_{xc}^{XC} + u_{xd}^{XD}.$$

The relationship between the two formulations of the LCM can be illustrated by writing the conditional probabilities in equation 1 as a function of the log-linear

parameters appearing in equation 2, such as,

$$\pi_{a|x} = \frac{\exp(u_a^A + u_{xa}^{XA})}{\sum \exp(u_a^A + u_{xa}^{XA})},$$

which is a saturated logit model for the probability on  $A|X$ .

The simultaneous latent structure model is a natural extension of the single group LCA with  $G > 1$  groups.

$$\pi_{gxabcd} = \pi_{x|g} \pi_{a|xg} \pi_{b|xg} \pi_{c|xg} \pi_{d|xg},$$

meaning that for individuals in group  $g$ , the probability of being at level  $(i, j, k, l, x)$  on the latent and observed variables is equal to the product of (1) the conditional probabilities for each of the observed measures for latent class  $x$  in group  $g$ ; and (2) the conditional latent class probability of being in latent class  $x$  for members of group  $g$ . Within each group, the conditional response probabilities sum to 1.0.

### Restricted Latent Class Models

To test for homogeneity in the latent class conditional response probabilities, equality restrictions were imposed. Across-group equality constraints on the conditional probabilities enable the hypothesis of similarity of the groups' latent structures to be tested. The simplest type of equality restriction in the context of latent class analysis is to set these probabilities to be equal to each other across groups. For example, the following equality constraint restricts the response for category  $A$  of class  $X$  to be equal across  $G = 1, 2, 3$ .

$$\pi_{i1x}^{a|xg} = \pi_{i2x}^{a|xg} = \pi_{i3x}^{a|xg}$$

Where applicable, completely homogenous latent structures were tested incrementally, beginning with the heterogeneous  $T$  class model and testing partially homogenous restrictions thereafter. The decision to retain the partially homogenous model was based on the  $\chi^2$  test statistic. In other words, an improvement of fit was deemed acceptable if the increase did not differ significantly from the data.

#### 4.7.5 Poisson and Negative Binomial Regression

The measure of citizenship used in this dissertation is by nature a count variable, since it is the difference between an immigrant's year of entry and year of citizenship acquisition. This measure, then, provides a "waiting time" to citizenship acquisition. The Poisson model is the most appropriate model to use when the dependent variable is countably infinite, such as this. The Poisson and negative binomial regression models are applicable with count data, where  $Y \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$ . Count data can be seen as the result of an event generating process. If the event rate,  $u$ , is constant, the number of events follows a Poisson distribution, where

$$P(Y = y) = \frac{e^{-u} u^y}{y!}, y = 0, 1, 2, \dots \forall u > 0.$$

The property of equidispersion characteristic of the Poisson distribution is that  $E(u) = Var(u)$ . A regression model is obtained by specifying

$$u_i = E(y_i | \mathbf{x}_i) = \exp(\beta' \mathbf{x}_i).$$

Overdispersion requires the use of the negative binomial distribution, which similarly models count data. This model adds unobserved heterogeneity by specifying

$$u_i = \exp(\beta' \mathbf{x}_i) \epsilon_i.$$

The underlying assumption is that the  $\epsilon_i$  follow a gamma distribution. Absolute effects on  $u$  are calculated as discrete or multiplicative effects (see above),  $e^\beta$ , which depend on the values of the independent variables.

We are now ready to proceed with the analysis of the contexts and characteristics that define an immigrant's assimilation into the United States polity. The next chapter discusses the relevance of ethnic identity and identification in understanding how immigrants relate to US politics.

## Chapter 5

# The Meaning of Americanism and National Attachment from an Immigrants Perspective

It must talk the language of its native-born fellow-citizens, it must possess American citizenship and American ideals. – Theodore Roosevelt  
Advocates Americanism, 1915

### 5.1 Overview

In this chapter, I present the results of a latent class analysis on several categorical indicators of national identity among Latino subgroups in the United States. In accordance with previous literature, the latent class analysis revealed an interpretable solution of Latino national identity into three classes that can be loosely characterized

as ethnocultural Americanism, multiculturalism and modified multiculturalism. The simultaneous latent structure of national identity among Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans further revealed homogeneity across each national origin subgroup, indicating a substantially similar structure between them. A multinomial latent class regression was also performed on several covariates related to immigration status and group identity. The analysis revealed that context of reception and group consciousness significantly predicts membership in each class. A major finding of this chapter is that Latinos show overwhelming support for the contours of ethnocultural Americanism as evidenced by the large prevalence of this class. Overall, I found a high level of support for American values among Latinos – an indication that Latinos are assimilating both politically and culturally, despite popular belief to the contrary.

## 5.2 Review of Research

The ability of Americans to define who they are culturally, politically and economically is important for understanding the dynamics of immigrant incorporation. Some researchers have even suggested that Latino political assimilation depends crucially on the ability of *Americans* to clearly define the contours of *American* national identity (Citrin et al., 2003). The very meaning behind the components of American identification among immigrant populations, especially Latinos, is currently at issue in political discourse. Samuel Huntington (1982, 1996, 2004), for one, has become an outspoken critic of the role that immigrants are playing in destroying American national identity and interests.

For example, in 1997 he argued that defining American national interests presupposes agreement on the nature of the country whose interests are to be defined. National interest, according to Huntington, derives from national identity. We have to know who we are before we can know what our interests are. In his book appropriately entitled *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*, Samuel Huntington (2004) reiterated his understanding of the origins and dimensions of American national identity and reasserted that American national identity is threatened by growth among native born and immigrant populations of Latin American origin (Fraga and Segura, 2006). No sooner did Huntington pose the question, "Will the United States remain a country with a single national language and a core Anglo-Protestant culture?" than he provided *an* answer "[b]y ignoring this question, Americans acquiesce to their eventual transformation into two peoples with two cultures (Anglo and Hispanic) and two languages (English and Spanish)." In addition to their preference for cultural retention, Huntington argues that immigrants maintain strong ties to their home countries, are poorly educated, fail to become citizens, and develop ethnic enclaves apart from the rest of society.

The notion that Latinos, in particular, Mexican-Americans, support values that are central to American political culture such as economic self-reliance, limited government, and a commitment to speak English has been further undermined by American stereotypes depicting them as lazy and reliant on governmental services. Moreover, political pundits have argued that instead of promoting "Americanization" as in the past, today's dominant political culture encourages "multiculturalism," with negative implications for American politics. Yet another basis for claims that post-1965 immi-

grants are weakening American national identity is the common belief that today's immigrants are moving into a mature welfare state in which government assistance is aggressively advocated rather than into a society that encourages newcomers to make it on their own. It is not difficult to conclude that part of the reason we do not know "who we are" is due to the fact that newcomers are subversive of US culture because they are not attitudinally assimilating into American society.

As noted by Fraga and Segura (2006), it is difficult if not impossible to dispute that Anglo-Protestant culture has played a central role in the development of American national identity. Ethno-linguistic and religious ties are central aspects of Anglo-Protestant culture. Since its founding, this nation has worried about its ability to assimilate immigrants and their ethnic descendents into the political mainstream (de la Garza et al., 1996). Thomas Jefferson, for example, argued that immigrants would "bring with them the principles of the government they leave" and would then infuse them into the polity, making it a "heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass" (Fuchs, 1990, p. 12-13). Surprisingly, however, there is little empirical evidence with respect to how specific subcultures in the US feel with regard to these, as well as other, American values. Scholars have tended to focus either on Americans' beliefs regarding what "being American" means (Citrin, 1994) or on how Latinos and other ethnic groups view their own ethnicity and ethnic identity (Phinney et al., 1996). In contrast, Latinos' views regarding what it means to be an American and American identification have been largely overlooked (but see de la Garza et al., 1996).

In response to Huntington's theoretical claims, researchers Fraga and Segura (2006) insist that immigrants are not threatening the fabric of society, they are merely

transforming it. In fact, the 'threatening versus transforming' debate regarding American national identity is proving to be a source of cleavage between scholars of ethnic politics and mainstream political scientists. To what extent do Latinos endorse the liberal conception of national identity? How much support is there for an exclusionary definition of Americanism based on ethnicity? In 1997, Citrin and his colleagues posed these same questions but they were directed towards Anglos. In contrast, in this dissertation I examine the contours of support for and opposition to ethnocultural Americanism, American liberalism and national identity among Latinos living in the United States. After reviewing some of the factors that contribute to a sense of Americanism and national identity, I address the following empirical questions:

1. Are definitions of political and national identity similar among Latino subgroups? If so, then this provides evidence against the "multiple pathways of assimilation" hypothesis because it implies that the process of identification with the American polity is similar across subgroups.
2. Do Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban immigrants believe that in order to claim membership in the American political community one must endorse more restrictive notions of American values and attitudes? If so, this is evidence that Latinos are assimilating into American political culture.
3. Is political identity unidimensional or multidimensional and to what extent are the indicators of political identity homogenous across Latino subgroups? This question addresses the components of and strength of attachment to American attitudes and values.

4. What is the likely trend in support for adopting an American identity over an ethnic identity? The preference for an American identity over an ethnic or panethnic identity is taken as an indication that Latinos are becoming politically assimilated, as evidenced by a strong American national identity.
5. How does exposure to American culture and the context of reception change fundamental attitudes towards Americanism and "being American?" In other words, do immigrants identify with the American polity more if they are culturally assimilated and have had favorable experiences and contact with American society?

A quick statement of the rationale for this chapter is warranted. Since political assimilation has both attitudinal and behavioral components, any study of immigrant political assimilation would be lacking without an assessment of the degree to which they accept core political and American values. If Latinos are not adopting US beliefs, behavioral manifestations of political assimilation may mean that they are pursuing objectives that are incompatible with mainstream political culture (de la Garza et al., 1996).

This chapter is concerned with the attitudinal components of political assimilation while later chapters will be concerned with behavioral manifestations. Taking the most restrictive definition of "American creed," this chapter first examines the extent to which Latinos have internalized American liberal traditions to empirically determine whether past practices are changing due to the presence of Latinos. Latent class analysis was performed on several indicators of Americanism derived from both

the *2004 National Survey of Latinos: Politics and Civic Participation* and the *2002 National Survey of Latinos*. Turning next to a more objective measure of American identity, namely American self-identification, I explore the factors that motivate identification with the American political system and culture. This chapter sets the tone for future chapters by arguing that conditions in the host country fundamentally transform not only how people view themselves but also the meaning given to their own identity. Additionally, I show how these processes vary to some extent by ethnic origin and generational status. What follows also provides a context in which to understand how assimilation may be facilitated or impeded by exploring how Latinos identify with the American polity. The main results of this chapter are that (1) Latinos show overwhelming support for the contours of ethnocultural Americanism and American values as evidenced by the large prevalence of an “ethnocultural American” class; (2) membership in both the ethnocultural Americanism and the American liberal class changes with sociodemographic characteristics, exposure to US culture, perceptions of group-level discrimination and context of reception; (3) individual level discrimination has no effect on primary self-identification among either Mexicans or Cubans; (4) perceptions of group-level discrimination significantly increase the likelihood of selecting both panethnic and national origin identities over an American identity; (5) third generation Latinos are significantly more likely to identify as Americans than are first or second generation Latinos, whose identities are primarily oriented towards their country of origin.

### 5.2.1 American National and Political Identity

While Americans share much in common, the persistence of certain sub-cultural identifications suggests that individuals prefer at least some continuity of the values specific to their own culture. There is evidence that individuals tend to identify primarily as members of their own ethnic group or subculture than as Americans. For example, in studies asking people to report *nationality*, they typically report white, Euro-American, African-American or Asian-American rather than US or “American” (Peppas, 2001). But the contours of national identity run much deeper than self-identification. Does identification with one’s ethnic group preclude the ability to identify with American *values*? In one of the very few empirical studies in this area (Sidanius, 1997), de la Garza and his collaborators studied the relationship between patriotism and “ethnic consciousness” using a national survey of Mexican Americans. The authors found that (1) Mexican Americans were no less patriotic than Euro-Americans, but rather there was a positive relationship between attachment to one’s Mexican heritage and attachment to the nation as a whole. They concluded that in the United States, commitment to ethnicity is not an instrument for the “disuniting of America” but rather “American ethnics use ethnicity to create resources such as group solidarity and political organizations to facilitate their full participation into American society” (p. 337). In sum, the two indicators used in their study strongly suggest that Mexicans have a heightened awareness of American national identity.

The term “national identity” is defined as the characteristics that objectively define membership in a political community or that underlie a shared sense of distinctive

peoplehood. In most countries, national identity is centered on a common language, religion or ethnic heritage. In the United States, however, there are multiple components of national identity. The current debate over national identity stems from these multiple ideological conceptions of American nationality (Schildkraut, 2002) that have widespread agreement (de Tocqueville, Lipset, 1964; Williams, 1960; Huntington, 1981; Pole, 1967; Kohn, 1957). The specific content of national identity was first articulated by Smith (1993) and was later expanded by Schildkraut (2005). Schildkraut's model included "liberalism," "ethnoculturalism," and "incorporationism." Irrespective of the content of national identity, it has a psychological component that is encapsulated by the strength of emotional attachments to American symbols and to the institutions and practices that embody them.

**Ethnoculturalism** Ethnoculturalism has been an important defining element of American national identity since its inception (Schildkraut, 2005). Unlike liberalism, the ethnocultural tradition sets strong boundaries on group membership by maintaining that American identity is defined by white Protestantism rooted in Northern European heritage and ancestry (Smith, 1993, 1997). At the core of the ethnocultural conception of identity (Smith, 1988), is the belief in ascriptive criteria for citizenship, embodied in the idea that only some racial groups, religions or cultures are truly "American." This stereotypical image of an American as a white Christian has been internalized and shapes the thinking of many people toward non-whites in the United States. Despite the fact that the primacy of ethnocultural beliefs and practices has waned, there currently exists a resurgence of ascriptive notions regarding what it

means to be an American among individuals who assert that immigrants do not fit into ethnoculturalism's ideal types (Schildkraut, 2002). Opinion data still reveal that many people are willing to delineate American identity along ascriptive lines. For example, in the 1996 General Social Survey, 55% of the respondents said that being Christian is either somewhat or very important in making someone a "true American," and 70% said the same about being born in America. In addition, in a 1988 California poll analyzed by Citrin et al. (2002), 76% of respondents endorsed the idea that this was "very important" in making someone a "true American" while 61% stated that believing in God is a necessary ingredient.

**American Liberalism** According to Schildkraut (2005, p. 4), liberalism "is the image of America that comes most easily to mind when people think about what it means to be American" and is the defining essence of American political culture. The liberalist tradition is typically defined in terms of beliefs about universal human rights. As a philosophy, liberalism places individualism over governmental intervention and maintains that individuals should be afforded certain constitutional protections such as freedom and equality. Most authorities, in fact, view democracy, liberty, equality and individual achievement as essential components of American identity. The right to privacy translates into a belief system that includes tolerance, privacy and individual liberties. It also leads to a preference for minimal governmental oversight and a free market economy. According to liberalist philosophy, American nationalism is ideological or political in nature, meaning one's national origin is irrelevant to claim membership in the American political community. For example, according

to proponents of the liberal view of national identity, in order to consider oneself “an American”, one has only to endorse the national “creed” (Huntington, 1981). In short, membership in the American community is said to be open to all, irrespective of ancestry or background, as long as group members endorse principles of individualism, equality of opportunity, democracy and strong work ethic.

**Multiculturalism** Sparked by the civil rights movement and fueled by the influx of immigrants from Latin American and Asia, multiculturalism has emerged to challenge liberalism as an ideological solution for balancing unity and diversity in America. Schildkraut (2002) used the term “incorporationism” (p. 515) while others have preferred the term “multiculturalism” or “ethnic pluralism” to describe this immigrant-based conception of American identity.

Multiculturalism is generally defined by ethnic distinctiveness whereby no one group assumes dominance over any other group in society and where individuals can simultaneously maintain a positive commitment both to an ethnic particularism and to the larger political community. Jack Citrin (2001), for example, defined multiculturalism as a normative conception of political identity and national community with a derivative policy agenda. As a political formula, multiculturalism is an ideological political response which assumes that differences in culture, in the sense of a coherent cluster of beliefs, values, habits and observances, accompany ethnic diversity. Citrin and his colleagues further clarify the distinction between “hard” and “soft” dimensions of multiculturalism, which fall on a continuum depending on the extent to which they are committed to preserving different ways of life within a political

system. "Hard" multiculturalism, in particular, is an encompassing ideology maintaining that the purpose of politics is to affirm group difference. The multicultural component to American identity is not focused on the similarities between minorities and whites in terms of their rights to citizenship, but rather it is about promoting ethnic differences and diversity. This viewpoint is intended as a balance between complete cultural divisions and the notion that America is a homogenous society in which all members "look, sound and worship alike (Schildkraut, 2002, p. 515)."

Just as there is support for the more exclusive definition of American identity, scholars have also found support for an immigrant-based conception of national identity that is based on multiculturalism. For example, in Citrin's analysis of the 1994 General Social Survey, he found that when respondents were asked to place themselves on a multicultural continuum, their responses were evenly divided among those who favored the melting pot position, those who opted for the cultural maintenance option and those who disagreed with both (Citrin, 2001; Schildkraut, 2002). As Citrin noted, this pattern reveals that "many Americans may not consider maintaining one's ethnic heritage and blending into the larger society as mutually exclusive" (p. 260).

### 5.3 Social Identity Theory, Symbolic Politics and Group Attachment

The conceptual analysis of this chapter fits within the larger framework of social identity theory and symbolic politics. The later theory focuses on the relationship between symbolic predispositions towards national identity and political outcomes. The development of a strong sense of identification with and attachment to the nation is viewed as a mechanism through which people come to understand and navigate the political world (Schildkraut, 2002). A prerequisite for understanding Latino political behavior is understanding the meaning given to American symbols and the values attached to them. Of course, this begs the question of how Latinos come to identify as Americans from the start.

Social identity theory provides some insight as to a possible mechanism by which individuals would gain from the internalization of American symbols. While ethnic identity has been conceptualized as a complex construct including a commitment and sense of belonging to the group, positive evaluation of the group, interest in and knowledge about the group and involvement in social activities of the group (Phinney, 1990, 1996), ethnic identity is not the only group identity for members of immigrant groups, who have the option to identify as Americans. Insofar as group membership is important to immigrants, identifying as an American contributes to a sense of belonging. According to Tajfel and Turner (1986), social identity “consists of those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging” (p. 16). Some researchers have explored

the psychological implications of national identity and pointed out that one's nation plays an important role in the psychological task of self-definition (Scheibe, 1983). Identity derives from knowledge about one's self that is sensitive to changes in the environment, and is vulnerable to inconsistent feedback about the self. The process of assimilation creates the possibility that immigrants are internalizing valued aspects of American culture as part of their own identity.

### 5.3.1 Hypotheses

Since it is difficult to fault immigrants for not assimilating if they do not understand what they are assimilating to, the first objective of this chapter is to define what it is to be a part of American society *from an immigrant's point of view*. Given that the literature delineates three primary subtypes of national identity, it is hypothesized that the nature of the construct measuring American identity will be best described by a three class latent structure. Given the discussion above, it is difficult, a priori, to articulate a directional hypothesis as to the likely effect of acculturation on an immigrants understanding of the components of American identity. On the one hand, the ethnic disadvantage model posits that immigrants bring with them idealistic views about the nature of American society and that these views become increasingly cynical over time. The ethnic disadvantage model further predicts that the latent structures will be heterogeneous across subgroups. On the other hand, assimilation theory predicts that the pressure to assimilate and the forces of political and cultural socialization are likely to become internalized and latent affinity towards

American norms may become manifest. In contrast to the ethnic disadvantage theory, assimilation theory predicts that the nature of the latent structure will be homogeneous across subgroups. Therefore, a reasonable hypothesis is that discrimination is inversely related to Americanism but that, in the absence of discrimination, acculturation will have a strong positive relationship with the adoption of American political and cultural values and norms.

## 5.4 Results

Table 5.1 summarizes Latinos' views about what it means to be part of American society among various demographic and political groups. As revealed by the tabulations, there is a high level of consensus among Latinos regarding these particular indicators of Americanism. There is almost complete agreement, for example, that before claiming membership in the American community, one must believe in the United States Constitution. The primacy of constitutional principles is a universalistic criteria in liberal conceptualizations of American nationality, and the overwhelming majority of Latinos deem such beliefs important as well (82%). Speaking English is a more restrictive basis of American identity that some believe contradicts egalitarian principles embodied in the constitution. Nevertheless, 57% of Latinos believe that to be part of American society, one must speak English. There is very little variation between Latino subgroups with respect to speaking English as a criterion for making someone an American. Cubans are more likely to endorse this view (66%) while Mexicans are least likely (55%). Puerto Ricans are the group most likely to believe

that US citizenship is an important component of American identity (66%) while Mexicans are least likely to endorse this view. Cubans (70%) are more likely than either Mexicans (64%) or Puerto Ricans (68%) to believe that voting in US elections is an ingredient for making someone an American. As expected, Republicans were more likely to endorse the indicators of Americanism across all categories, but the variation tends to stay within 20 percentage points. The college educated and the relatively young were more likely to endorse these categories of Americanism, which contradicts Citrin et al.'s (1990) findings with respect to whites; however those in the highest income brackets were less likely to endorse these values. Some interesting and counterintuitive findings are revealed in the cross classification as well. For example, foreign born Latinos are more likely to endorse notions regarding what it means to be an American, and this holds across all categories except citizenship. Additionally, the Spanish dominant are more likely to give affirmative responses than are the English dominant or bilingual with respect to all measures except citizenship and multiculturalism. Nevertheless, Table 5.1 shows that the symbols of American nationality are generally agreed upon irrespective of ethnic origin and sociodemographic status.

Table 5.1: Social Background and American Identity

Question: In order for an immigrant to say that they are part of American society, do they have to do each of the following, or not?

	N	% Speak English	% Believe US Cons	% Believe US Citizen	% Believe Vote Elections	% Believe Mono-Culture	% Believe Multi-Culture
All Respondents	1705	57	82	56	64	10	84
<b>Ethnicity</b>							
Mexican	595	55	83	53	64	12	88
Puerto Rican	152	56	82	66	68	8	92
Cuban	272	66	93	65	70	9	92
<b>Identification</b>							
Prefers Hispanic	551	61	85	60	69	9	91
<b>Age</b>							
18-29	247	48	76	51	56	12	88
30-39	238	56	84	52	64	12	88
40-54	266	61	91	59	69	9	92
55+	244	68	93	72	79	8	93
<b>Education</b>							
High school dip or less	603	58	85	60	70	8	92
Some College	208	55	83	56	60	10	90
College graduate	132	55	89	49	59	6	94
Advanced degree	51	63	89	58	62	10	90

Table 5.1 (Continued): Social Background and American Identity

Question: In order for an immigrant to say that they are part of American society, do they have to do each of the following, or not?							
	N	% Speak English	% Believe US Cons	% Believe US Citizen	% Believe Vote Elections	% Believe Mono-Culture	% Believe Multi-Culture
<b>Income</b>							
Less than 30,000	426	59	85	58	69	10	90
30,000 to less than 50,000	188	53	82	54	60.9	12	88
50,000 or more	238	55	89	54	59	7	93
<b>Party Identification</b>							
Republican	355	66	91	62	71	11	89
Democrat	407	53	84	57	64	9	91
Independent	78	51	83	52	62	8.4	92
Something Else	55	55	78	46	54	11	89
<b>Nativity</b>							
US Born	440	54	83	60	58	8	92
Foreign Born	578	60	88	56	73	12	88
<b>Citizen</b>							
Yes	219	61	91	60	72	8	92
No	353	60	86	53	74	14	86

Table 5.1 (Continued): Social Background and American Identity

---

Question: In order for an immigrant to say that they are part of American society, do they have to do each of the following, or not?

	N	% Speak English	% Believe US Cons	% Believe US Citizen	% Believe Vote Elections	% Believe Mono- Culture	% Believe Multi- Culture
<b>Language Skill</b>							
English Dominant	215	56	84	63	54	6	94
Bilingual	341	55	85	52	62	10	91
Spanish Dominant	463	61	87	60	76	13.5	87

The five dichotomous response items from the 2004 National survey were used to measure attitudes towards being American, and the cross-classification of these items was obtained for Mexicans (group 1), Puerto Ricans (Group 2) and Cubans (Group 3) (Table 5.2). In applying the standard latent class model to the multidimensional table formed by these indicators, the first step is to decide the number of categories of the latent variable. Table 5.3 provides the model fit statistics for the  $T$ -class model, for  $T = 1, 2, 3$ . As can be seen from the table, the  $T = 3$  class model provides the best fit to these data ( $\chi^2_{42} = 53.44, p = .11$ , see Table 5.3)<sup>1</sup>. The three latent class model yielded an interpretable solution in terms of the division of Latino public opinion into regarding the five indicators of Americanism derived from the 2004 survey<sup>2</sup>, “Ethnocultural Americanism,” “Multiculturalism,” and “Modified Multiculturalism<sup>3</sup>.”

---

<sup>1</sup>When assessing model fit, the null hypothesis is that the model “fits” the data. Therefore, a non-significant  $p$  value is sufficient to retain the model. Obviously, claiming that one model provides a good fit does not preclude numerous other models from also providing a good fit to the same data.

<sup>2</sup>The question asked of respondents was “In order for an immigrant to say they are part of American society, do they have to do each of the following, or not?” (See Table 5.1). The answers to this question provided the basis for this analysis.

<sup>3</sup>Since the Ethnocultural Americanism and Multicultural classes comprised almost 90% of respondents, and because there are very little differences between the Multicultural and Modified Multicultural classes, the analysis focuses on differences between Ethnocultural Americanism and Multiculturalism. Any analysis of the Modified Multicultural class would be substantially similar to that of the Multicultural class presented in the text.

Table 5.2: Cross Classification of Americanism According to Five Dichotomous Response

Item Response					Group $i, j, k$		
Protestant Culture	Vote in US Elections	US Citizen	Speak English	Believe in US Constitution	Mexicans	Puerto Ricans	Cubans
1	1	1	1	1	27	10	19
1	1	1	1	2	2	1	4
1	1	1	2	1	9	2	0
1	1	1	2	2	1	0	0
1	1	2	1	1	16	0	0
1	1	2	1	2	2	0	0
1	1	2	2	1	8	0	0
1	1	2	2	2	8	0	0
1	2	1	1	1	2	2	1
1	2	1	1	2	0	0	0
1	2	1	2	1	3	0	2
1	2	1	2	2	1	0	1
1	2	2	1	1	3	0	2
1	2	2	1	2	3	0	3
1	2	2	2	1	15	1	1
1	2	2	2	2	11	2	1
2	1	1	1	1	268	73	145
2	1	1	1	2	12	4	3
2	1	1	2	1	96	29	40
2	1	1	2	2	11	3	4

2	1	2	1	1	72	13	29
2	1	2	1	2	8	2	1
2	1	2	2	1	58	17	17
2	1	2	2	2	19	5	1
2	2	1	1	1	41	8	10
2	2	1	1	2	9	3	0
2	2	1	2	1	26	14	9
2	2	1	2	2	11	5	2
2	2	2	1	1	57	10	30
2	2	2	1	2	13	9	4
2	2	2	2	1	109	18	39
2	2	2	2	2	54	10	6

Items: Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban Immigrants. Source: 2004 National Latino Survey

Table 5.3: Model Fit Statistics (Type III Sums of Squares) for Some Simultaneous Latent Structure Models Applied to the 2004 National Latino Survey

	Model	<i>LL</i>	AIC	BIC	$\chi^2$	<i>p</i>
Independence	$H_1$	-5836.69	11703.38	11783.96	968.83	0.00
2-class with complete heterogeneity	$H_2$	-5507.58	11258.43	11081.15	104.92	0.00
3-class with complete heterogeneity	$H_3$	-5488.17	11078.33	11352.31	53.44	0.11
Sample Size				1592		

An important question is whether identification as American is similar among the three Latino subgroups considered here. It is typical to group all Latinos together for purposes of the analysis or to assume they are different given vast cultural differences. Table 5.3 provides a statistical test as to whether the analysis should more appropriately assume that Mexicans, Puerto Ricans or Cubans are similar with respect to the various indicators under consideration or whether they are inherently different. The analysis starts by assuming that there are subgroup differences (i.e. Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans are completely heterogeneous) and lets the data assess whether the homogeneity constraints fit the data. If so, then the nature of American identification is similar across the three groups.

Table 5.4 gives chi-squared values for some simultaneous latent structure models applied to these data, using the  $T = 3$  class model that provided the most acceptable fit. First consider model  $H_3$  in Table 5.3. This model was obtained by positing a three class unrestricted latent structure for each group (See Table 5.3). Since this model does not apply homogeneity constraints, it is a model that allows for complete heterogeneity between groups. Since  $L^2(H_3) = 55.58$  on 42  $df$ ,  $H_3$  provides a rather good fit to the data. Additional homogeneity constraints were applied in order to explore whether enforcing additional constraints tended to maximize model fit. In this vein, models  $H'_3, H''_3, H'''_3$  and  $H^*_3$  were considered. Models  $H'_3$  and  $H''_3$  impose partial homogeneity but the nature of the restrictions are different. These models are nested within  $H_3$  since  $H'_3$  is obtained from  $H_3$  by imposing homogeneity on the

latent class proportions, in other words, the following constraints were enforced

$$\pi_{1t}^{GX} = \pi_{2t}^{GX} = \pi_{3t}^{GX}, t = 1, 2, 3.$$

Table 5.4: Chi-Squared Values for Some Alternative Simultaneous Hypotheses Applied to the Simultaneous Latent Structure Models From the  $T = 3$  Class Model of the 2004 National Survey Data

Model	df	$\chi_{LL}^2$	$\chi_{GF}^2$	$p_{GF}$
$H_3$	42	55.58	53.44	0.11
$H_3'$	46	51.30	55.01	0.17
$H_3''$	72	115.11	118.23	0.00
$H_3'''$	78	154.82	143.17	0.00
$H_3^*$	49	58.25	56.83	0.21

On the other hand,  $H_3''$  is obtained from  $H_3$  by imposing homogeneity on *all* conditional probabilities, namely

$$\pi_{i1t}^{\overline{MGX}} = \pi_{i2t}^{\overline{MGX}} = \pi_{i3t}^{\overline{MGX}}, i = 1, 2, t = 1, 2, 3; \quad (5.1)$$

$$\pi_{j1t}^{\overline{VGX}} = \pi_{j2t}^{\overline{VGX}} = \pi_{j3t}^{\overline{VGX}}, k = 1, 2, t = 1, 2, 3; \quad (5.2)$$

$$\pi_{k1t}^{\overline{CGX}} = \pi_{k2t}^{\overline{CGX}} = \pi_{k3t}^{\overline{CGX}}, k = 1, 2, t = 1, 2, 3; \quad (5.3)$$

$$\pi_{l1t}^{\overline{EGX}} = \pi_{l2t}^{\overline{EGX}} = \pi_{l3t}^{\overline{EGX}}, l = 1, 2, t = 1, 2, 3; \quad (5.4)$$

$$\pi_{m1t}^{\overline{BGX}} = \pi_{m2t}^{\overline{BGX}} = \pi_{m3t}^{\overline{BGX}}, m = 1, 2, t = 1, 2, 3; \quad (5.5)$$

where  $M$  = melting pot,  $V$  = voting,  $C$  = citizenship,  $E$  = English and  $B$  = believe in Constitution.

Model  $H_3'''$  imposes homogeneity on *both* the conditional probabilities as well as the latent class probabilities. In other words, this model imposes complete homo-

geneity on the parameter estimates for the latent class model. With a chi-squared value  $L^2(H_3''') = 154.82$  on 78 *df*,  $H_3'''$  provides an unacceptable fit to the data. The unacceptability of an across-group equality constraint on the latent class conditional probabilities indicates a significant difference in the distribution of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans in these categories. Finally, model  $H_3^*$  is a model nested between  $H_3$  and  $H_3'''$  with the particular homogeneity constraints determined from the original unrestricted model. With a chi-squared value  $L^2(H_3^*) = 58.25$  on 49 *df*,  $H_3^*$  provides the best fit to the data (Table 5.4). Parameter estimates for this model appear in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5: Estimated Parameters for the Final Latent Class Model ( $H_3^*$ ).

Model	Group	Latent	$\pi_{st}^{GX}$	$\pi_{1st}^{MGX}$	$\pi_{1st}^{VGX}$	$\pi_{1st}^{CGX}$	$\pi_{1st}^{EGX}$	$\pi_{1st}^{BGX}$
	$s$	Class $t$						
$H_3^*$	1	1	.57	.10	.95 <sup>a</sup>	.79	.75 <sup>a</sup>	.95 <sup>a</sup>
		2	.31	.18	.30	.13	.15	.61
		3	.12	.00	.00 <sup>b</sup>	.39	.52	.84
	2	1	.48	.13	.95 <sup>a</sup>	1.00 <sup>b</sup>	.75 <sup>a</sup>	.95 <sup>a</sup>
		2	.32	.05	.00 <sup>b</sup>	.34	.36	.62
		3	.21	.00	1.00	.27	.82 <sup>a</sup>	.81
	3	1	.54	.11	.99	1.00 <sup>b</sup>	.82 <sup>a</sup>	.95
		2	.38	.00	.43	.20	.52	.95 <sup>a</sup>
		3	.08	.36	.00 <sup>b</sup>	.28	.41	.56

Notes: Only “Yes” answers are shown for each class.

<sup>a</sup> The parameter value is subject to an across-group homogeneity constraint

<sup>b</sup> The parameter value is subject to within-group restrictions.

(The entries of 0.00 for  $H_3^*$  were fixed restrictions.)

$\pi_{st}^{GX}$  = percentage of each subgroup that are members of each class.

$\pi_{1st}^{MGX}$  = conditional probability of “Yes” to US as Melting Pot given class membership.

$\pi_{1st}^{VGX}$  = conditional probability of “Yes” to Voting in US elections given class membership.

$\pi_{1st}^{CGX}$  = conditional probability of “Yes” to Citizenship given class membership.

$\pi_{1st}^{EGX}$  = conditional probability of “Yes” to speaking English given class membership.

$\pi_{1st}^{BGX}$  = conditional probability of “Yes” to believing in US Constitution given class membership.

A similar analysis was performed on the various indicators derived from the 2002 National survey. In contrast, a 2-class restricted model with full homogeneity on the conditional latent class probabilities emerged to provide the best fit to the data (see Table 5.6).

Table 5.6: Model Fit Statistics (Type III Sums of Squares) for Some Simultaneous Latent Structure Models Applied to the 2002 National Latino Survey

	Model	$LL$	AIC	BIC	$\chi^2$	$p$
2-class with complete heterogeneity	$H_1$	-5331.10	653.46	1049.31	503.46	0.00
2-class with complete homogeneity	$H_1'$	-5410.96	717.19	859.69	663.19	0.00
3-class with complete heterogeneity	$H_2$	-5307.29	683.84	1285.53	455.84	0.11
Sample Size				1448		

The conditional probabilities represent a measure of the degree of association between each of the manifest variables and each of the latent classes. What, then, is the overall pattern that emerges from the analysis? The latent structures of Americanism for Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans are elaborated below.

#### **5.4.1 Ethnocultural Americanism (Class I)**

As can be seen from Table 5.5, there is a strong ethnocultural component to American identity reflected by the clustering of responses. For example, among Mexican respondents who claim membership in class I, more than 7 out of 10 believe that in order to be an American one must speak English (.75 in Table 5.5), more than 9 out of 10 believe that to be American one must believe in the US constitution (.95), almost 8 of 10 believe that to be an American one must be a US citizen (.79) and more than 9 out of 10 believe that to be an American one must vote in US elections (.95) (See Table 5.5). In addition, the conditional probability of accepting the notion that the US is made up of a single core Anglo-Protestant culture given membership in this class is .10 for Mexicans, .13 for Puerto Ricans, and .11 for Cubans. The fact that these are high can be seen only in relation to whites' views with respect to this measure. In all cases, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans in class I are twice as likely than whites (.05) to agree that the US has a single core Anglo-Protestant culture (de la Garza, 2005). On this basis, this class is considered the class of respondents who hold prescriptive conceptions of what it means to claim membership in the American community. The conditional latent class probabilities indicate that Mexicans (.57)

(Table 5.5) are more likely than either Puerto Ricans (.48) (Table 5.5) or Cubans (.54) (Table 5.5) to be in the ethnocultural class. In total, this class comprises the majority of the total population (.55)(not shown in Table).

#### 5.4.2 Multiculturalism (Class II)

The multicultural class, which accounts for approximately 26% of the entire sample, represents respondents who adopt multicultural conceptions of American identity. This is best seen by the fact that Latinos in this class overwhelmingly believe that speaking English is not necessary in order to claim membership in the American community. For example, 85% of Mexicans in this class believe that it is not necessary to speak English in order to be an American (Table 5.5)<sup>4</sup>. While a large proportion of respondents in this class feel that belief in the US Constitution is a necessary prerequisite for “being an American,” presumably because it guarantees equal rights and freedom, the overwhelming majority of Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban respondents in this class do not believe that a prerequisite for claiming membership in the American community is either voting in US elections (70% of Mexicans, 100% of Puerto Ricans and 57% of Cubans)<sup>5</sup> or acquiring American citizenship (87% for Mexicans, 66% for Puerto Ricans and 80% for Cubans). For example, the conditional probability of believing that it is necessary to vote in US elections given member-

---

<sup>4</sup>Since possible responses are “Yes” or “No,” the probabilities must sum to one. The figure quoted in the text of 85% comes from Table 5.5 and is computed as computed as  $(1 - .15)$  Only affirmative responses are provided in the table for conciseness

<sup>5</sup>These percentages are taken from Table 5.5 indirectly. For example, the percentage for Mexicans was computed as  $1 - .30 = .70$ . The percentages were similarly derived for Puerto Ricans and Cubans.

ship in this class is only .30 for Mexicans, .00 for Puerto Ricans and .43 for Cubans (see Table 5.5). Additionally, the conditional probability of believing that to be an American one must be a citizen given membership in this class is .13 for Mexicans, .34 for Puerto Ricans and .20 for Cubans. The larger estimate among Puerto Ricans presumably reflects the fact that they are granted citizenship status by birth. Finally, the majority of respondents in this class believe in the multicultural conception of American identity as reflected by their acceptance that the US is made up of many cultures. For example, all Cubans in this class view America as being a diverse place. A similar profile with respect to this measure emerged among Mexicans (82%) and Puerto Ricans (95%).

The same analysis performed on the 2002 data with respect to the measures of American liberalism revealed that a two-class solution provided the best fit, with differences between classes lying primarily with the role of individual self-reliance and governmental paternalism. Parameter estimates for the two class model are shown in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8<sup>6</sup>. As can be seen from both tables, one class adheres to the strict interpretation of American liberalist philosophy while one class favors American liberalism but with governmental paternalism. The structure of these classes is elaborated on below.

---

<sup>6</sup>Table 5.7 provides a more intuitive and straightforward way of presenting the data. Table 5.7 is the final restricted model whereas Table 5.8 provides the heterogeneous model. The interpretation of the classes and their meaning is largely the same.

Table 5.7: Estimated Parameters for the Restricted Simultaneous Latent Structure Two-Class Model of American Liberalism: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans

	Latent Class I	Latent Class II
	American Liberalism	Governmental Paternalism
<b>Self-reliance</b>		
Governmental Paternalism	.73	.42
Individual Self-reliance	<b>.25</b>	<b>.54</b>
Neither	.02	.04
<b>Role of Government</b>		
Limited	<b>.11</b>	<b>1.0</b>
Expansive	.89	.00
<b>Personal Opportunity</b>		
Better in US	<b>.76</b>	<b>.66</b>
Not Better in US	.24	.34
<b>Economic Opportunity</b>		
Better in US	<b>.93</b>	<b>.91</b>
Better in Home Country	.00	.02
Same	.07	.07
<b>Melting Pot</b>		
Important to Blend	.86	.82

Retain Culture	.14	.18
<b>Work Ethnic</b>		
Hard Work Does Not Pay	.39	.26
Hard Work Pays	<b>.61</b>	<b>.74</b>
<b>Religious</b>		
Yes	<b>.94</b>	<b>.90</b>
No	.06	.10
<hr/>		
<b>Conditional Latent Class Prob.</b>		
Mexicans	.80	.20
Puerto Ricans	.78	.22
Cubans	.69	.31
<hr/>		

Note: Bolded numbers are plotted in Figure 5.1

Source: 2002 National Survey of Latinos

Table 5.8: Estimated Parameters for the  $T = 2$  Class Model  
With Complete Heterogeneity

Model	Group Latent		$\pi_{st}^{GX}$	$\pi_{1st}^{SGX}$	$\pi_{1st}^{RGX}$	$\pi_{1st}^{OGX}$	$\pi_{1st}^{EGX}$	$\pi_{1st}^{MGX}$	$\pi_{1st}^{WGX}$
	$s$	Class $t$							
$H_1$	1	1	0.85	0.71	0.16	0.82	0.94	0.86	0.41
		2	0.15	0.23	1.0	0.55	0.85	0.77	0.21
	2	1	0.90	0.81	0.23	0.64	0.83	0.81	0.36
		2	0.10	0.0	1.0	0.84	0.68	0.79	0.12
	3	1	0.71	0.61	0.31	0.75	0.99	0.86	0.41
		2	0.29	0.61	0.61	0.63	0.94	1.0	0.21

Source: 2002 National Survey of Latinos

### **5.4.3 American Liberalism (Class I)**

A consequence of the partial homogeneity constraints is that the components of American liberalism are the same across ethnic subgroups. In other words, a statistical test of the structure of American liberalism revealed that it is substantially comparable across Latino subgroups. The latent class probabilities, however, were allowed to vary among ethnic origin groups (hence, partial as opposed to full homogeneity). In this class the majority of respondents favor individual self-reliance, or the belief that it is each person's responsibility to take care of him- or herself (.54) as opposed to governmental paternalism (.42) or neither (.04) (Table 5.7). All of the respondents in this class favor a smaller government with fewer services as opposed to a large government with many services. With respect to conditions in the US relative to one's country of origin, 66% of respondents believe that personal opportunity is better in the US while 91% believe that economic opportunities are better (Table 5.7). Eighty-two percent of Latinos in this class accept the melting pot conception of American identity while 74% have accepted the Protestant work ethic, namely that hard work offers the best guarantee of success (Table 5.7). Finally, 90% of respondents in this class manifests a belief in God. Overall, 20% of Mexicans, 22% of Puerto Ricans and 32% of Cubans are members of this class (Table 5.7).

### **5.4.4 Governmental Paternalism (Class II)**

As shown in Figure 5.1, the main differences between the American liberal class and the governmental paternalism class pertains to the fact that 73% of respondents in

this class believe that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all Americans (See also Table 5.7). In addition, 89% of respondents favor an expansive government that provides many services. The majority of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans all claimed membership in this class (80%, 78% and 69% respectively).




Figure 5.1. Components of American Liberalism

## 5.5 How Does Acceptance of American Liberalism change with Acculturation, Exposure and Context of Reception in US Society

In contemporary politics, divisions between multiculturalism and liberalism on the one hand and ethnocultural Americanism on the other, are further delineated by race, ideological self-definitions and partisan affiliation (Citrin, 2001). For example, Democrats and self-identified liberals are more likely than Republicans and conservatives to support multiculturalism. Therefore, to explore how other factors change the distribution of latent classes, I re-ran the latent class models adding covariates. The latent class model with covariates allowed me to test the following propositions: (1) American identification increases Latino support for American liberalism; (2) Exposure and acculturation increases the probability that Latinos will endorse American attitudes and values; (3) Latinos who are structurally assimilated will adopt more favorable attitudes regarding American political culture; and (4) Context of reception, particularly discriminatory context and favorable community context changes the distribution of responses for each class. Beta coefficients and odds ratios for the relative effect of the covariates on membership in each class (Ethnocultural Americanism, Multiculturalism or American Liberalism) are presented separately for the two analyses below.

### 5.5.1 A Multinomial Logistic Latent Class Analysis of Americanism

**American Liberalism versus Governmental Paternalism** Among Mexicans and Cubans, the odds of being in the American liberal class versus the governmental paternalism class increase with age, education (Mexican and Cubans only), income and English proficiency (Table 5.9). First generation Mexicans and Puerto Ricans are more likely to be in the American liberal class but first generation Cubans are more likely to be in the multicultural class. Nativity status appears to distinguish membership in each class. For example, Mexican citizens are less likely to be in the American liberal class while Cuban citizens are less likely to be in the class favoring governmental paternalism. Mexicans who believe that life in the US is “better” relative to Mexico are significantly less likely to be in the American liberal class. For Cubans, however, the odds ratio is greater than one, indicating that Cubans who believe that life in the US is “better” relative to Cuba are significantly more likely to be in the American liberal class. While the unadjusted latent class probabilities were low, the adjusted estimates are much higher. Importantly, after controlling for other factors, membership in the American Liberal class increases by .22, .12 and .37 percentage points for Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans, respectively (see Figure 5.2). These figures represent the difference of the class prevalence that is reported in Figure 5.2 (i.e.,  $.4186 - .2022 \approx .22$ , etc.). Substantively, this means that age, acculturation, education, nativity status and context of reception are associated with the relative proportion of individuals who favor the components that are the basis for

each class. Importantly, the measures of identificational assimilation were not found to be related to class membership.

Table 5.9: Beta Coefficients and Odds Ratios: American Liberalism versus Governmental Paternalism

	Mexicans		Puerto Ricans		Cubans		$\Delta 2 \times LL$	<i>p</i>
	$\beta$	<i>O.R.</i>	$\beta$	<i>O.R.</i>	$\beta$	<i>O.R.</i>		
<b>Acculturation and Cultural Assimilation</b>								
Ideology	0.33	1.40	-0.29	0.75	-0.31	0.73	2.76	0.43
Acculturation	-0.19	0.83	0.02	1.02	0.00	1.00	76.06	0.00
First Generation	0.08	1.08	1.14	3.14	-2.13	0.12	80.76	0.00
Citizen	-0.52	0.60	-	-	0.28	1.32	7.86	0.09
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>								
Education	0.87	2.38	-0.04	2.78	0.65	1.89	61.64	0.00
Income	0.01	1.01	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	11.42	0.08
<b>Identificational Assimilation</b>								
American Identification	1.26	9.55	-	-	1.46	4.32	6.46	0.17
True Homeland (US)	-0.53	0.59	-	-	0.15	1.16	3.88	0.42
<b>Attitudinal Behavioral Receptional Assimilation</b>								
Better in US	-0.46	0.63	-	-	0.09	1.10	16.61	0.00
<b>Group Consciousness and Context of Reception</b>								
Group Based	-0.24	0.78	-0.31	0.74	0.39	1.47	6.74	0.35
Discrimination								
Individual	-0.23	0.80	-0.64	0.53	-0.25	0.78	7.80	0.25
Discrimination								

Latino/Hispanic Identification	0.30	1.35			-0.30	0.74	14.64	0.23
<b>Control Variable</b>								
Age	0.04	1.04	0.04	1.05	0.05	1.06	74.80	0.00

Notes: The reference category is latent class "American Liberalism"

**Ethnocultural Americanism versus Multiculturalism** The odds of being in the Ethnocultural American class versus the Multicultural class increase with education and years lived in the United States (Table 5.10). Latinos who hold traditional values and who are proficient with English<sup>7</sup> are more likely to be in the ethnocultural American class. For all three groups, increasing perceptions of group-based discrimination are associated with less support for ethnocultural Americanism.




Figure 5.2. Distribution of American Liberalism with Covariates

<sup>7</sup>Linguistic proficiency is reverse coded here such that increasing values are associated with Spanish dominance.

Table 5.10: Beta Coefficients and Odds Ratios: American Liberalism versus Governmental Paternalism

	Mexicans		Puerto Ricans		Cubans		$\Delta 2 \times LL$	<i>p</i>
	$\beta$	<i>O.R.</i>	$\beta$	<i>O.R.</i>	$\beta$	<i>O.R.</i>		
<b>Acculturation and Cultural Assimilation</b>								
Traditionalism	0.77	2.17	0.11	1.12	0.23	1.26	28.84	0.00
Language	-0.31	0.87	-0.14	0.74	-0.23	0.80	172.76	0.00
Years In US	0.05	1.05	–	–	0.02	1.02	14.82	0.01
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>								
Education	0.87	2.38	-0.04	2.78	0.65	1.89	61.64	0.00
Income	-0.003	1.00	1.02	0.96	0.01	1.01	1.82	0.61
<b>Group Consciousness and Context of Reception</b>								
Group Based Discrimination	-1.83	0.16	-1.57	0.21	-0.02	0.98	15.18	0.00
Individual Discrimination	-0.09	0.91	0.17	1.19	-0.41	0.68	1.88	0.60
<b>Control Variable</b>								
Age	0.03	1.03	0.02	1.02	0.00	1.00	3.71	0.29

Notes: The reference category is latent class "Ethnocultural Americanism"

## **5.6 The Nature of Ethnic Identity Choices Among Immigrant Populations**

I next turn to a more objective measure of Latinos' degree of attachment to the nation, namely primary mode of self-identification. The primary question I consider is whether individuals of Latin American descent tend to think of themselves as "Americans" rather than as Latinos or co-ethnics.

## **5.7 The Distribution of Identity Choices Among Latino Immigrants**

The 2002 National Latino Survey asked the following question to survey respondents:

1. People choose different terms to describe themselves. I'm going to read you a few different descriptions. Please tell me whether you have ever described yourself as any of the following
  - a. Respondent/parent Country of origin?
  - b. A Latino/Hispanic
  - c. An American

Tables 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13 report the distribution of ethnic self-identity modes by ethnicity and generational status. As can be seen from the tables, there exists tremendous variation in how Latinos view themselves despite the fact that they are viewed by outsiders as being relatively homogenous.

Table 5.11: Percentage Distribution of Ethnic Self-identities Among Latinos By Subgroup and Generation

	Mexican				Puerto Rican				Cuban			
	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd Gen	<i>p</i>	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd Gen	<i>p</i>	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd Gen	<i>p</i>
Identification												
Country of Origin	98	83	66	0.00	93	90	81	0.07	93	81	56	0.00
Latino	87	79	75	0.00	91	78	76	0.00	79	78	33	0.01
American	25	81	96	0.00	65	92	100	0.00	56	87	89	0.00

Notes: Test of significance based on  $\chi^2$  test of independence for 'Yes' and 'No' response. Only 'Yes' shown.

Column Percentages shown

Table 5.12: Percentage Distribution of Ethnic Self-identities Among Latinos By Subgroup and Generation (Within Identification)

	Mexican				Puerto Rican				Cuban			
	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd Gen	<i>p</i>	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd Gen	<i>p</i>	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd Gen	<i>p</i>
Identification												
Country of Origin	67	19	14	0.00	57	31	12	0.07	82	17	2	0.00
Latino/Hispanic	64	19	16	0.00	60	28	12	0.00	80	19	1	0.01
An American	30	33	34	0.00	46	37	17	0.00	70	26	4	0.00

Notes: Test of significance based on  $\chi^2$  test of independence for 'Yes' and 'No' response. Only 'Yes' shown.

Column Percentages shown

Table 5.13: Percentage Distribution of Primary Mode of Identification Among Latinos By Subgroup and Generation

Identification	Mexican			Puerto Rican			Cuban		
	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd Gen	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd Gen	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd Gen
Country of Origin	72	39	24	65	53	40	74	32	14
Latino/Hispanic	25	29	19	18	14	16	12	15	14
An American	3	32	57	17	33	44	14	53	71
Total	3	100	100	100	100	44	100	100	100
$\chi^2, p$	318.41, 0.00			17.92, 0.00			58.56, 0.00		
Note: Column Percentages shown									

As shown in the responses to this question, there are differences both within each national origin group and between groups. The overwhelming majority of first generation Latinos regardless of national origin, reported having identified in terms of their own ethnic group. As shown by Table 5.11, first generation immigrants are more likely than either second or third generation immigrants to identify as a member of their own ethnic group. This pattern is reversed by the third generation, where the plurality of Mexicans prefer to self-identify as an American. Only 25% of first generation immigrants reported identification as American but by the third generation this percentage increased to 96%. Of all subgroups, first generation Cubans are more likely than first generation Mexicans or Puerto Ricans to report self-identifying as an American. With respect to identifying as a member of one's ethnic group, responses vary. Among the first generation, for example, 98% of Mexicans, 93% of Puerto Ricans and 82% of Cubans indicated that they had done so. This pattern also changes with exposure to American culture as indicated by drop in the percentage of third generation Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban immigrants who reported identifying in national origin terms. By the second and third generation, however, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans are all less likely to have identified themselves as members of their own ethnic group with Cubans being the most likely to change and Puerto Ricans being the least likely to change. Table 5.12 reports the distribution of responses within identification. Of all Mexicans who identified themselves as a member of their ethnic origin group, 67% were first generation immigrants while only 14% were third generation immigrants. With respect to Puerto Ricans, 57% were first generation compared to the 12% who were third generation. Finally, of all Cubans who gave

affirmative responses to this question, 82% were first generation immigrants and only 2% were third generation Cubans.

Just as first generation immigrants are more likely to self-identify as a member of their own ethnic group, they are also likely to identify as a panethnic. The percentage of respondents who reported having identified as Latino/Hispanic was higher among first generation immigrants across all categories. However, by the third generation, Latinos were more likely to identify both in terms of a panethnic group and as an American than they were their own ethnic group.

### 5.7.1 A Multinomial Logistic Model of Identity Among Latino Immigrants

The coefficients in Table 5.14 are the standard output from a program that estimates the multinomial logit model. The minimal set of contrasts involves all possible comparisons with outcome *American*. This means that identification with one's country of origin is compared to American identification ( $C|A$ ) and identification as Latino/Hispanic is also compared to American identification ( $L|A$ ). These coefficients correspond to the equations:

$$\ln\Omega_{C|A}(\vec{x}) = \beta_{0,C|A} + \sum_{i=1}^9 \beta_{i,C|A} \vec{x}$$

$$\ln\Omega_{L|A}(\vec{x}) = \beta_{0,L|A} + \sum_{i=1}^9 \beta_{i,L|A} \vec{x}$$

where  $\vec{x}$  is a vector of independent variables including *group-based discrimina-*

tion, individual-level discrimination, first generation, second generation, language proficiency, education, age, gender, income<sup>8</sup>. As can be seen from Table 5.14, the hypothesis that group-based discrimination does not affect primary identification can be rejected at the .00 level. The LR and Wald tests indicate that all the variables in the model are statistically significant at the  $p = .05$  level except for *individual-based discrimination* and the income dummy variables.

---

<sup>8</sup>With  $J = 3$  dependent categories, there are  $J - 1 = 2$  parameters,  $\beta_{k,m|r}$  associated with each variable  $x_k$ . The hypothesis that  $x_k$  does not affect the dependent variable can be written as  $H_0 : \beta_{k,1|r} = \beta_{k,2|r} = \beta_{k,3|r} = 0$ . Since  $\beta_{k,r|r}$  is necessarily 0, the hypothesis imposes constraints on  $J - 1$  parameters. This hypothesis can be tested with either a Wald or LR test. The interpretation of the LR test is similar to the Wald test statistic: If the hypothesis that group-based discrimination has no effect on primary identification is true, a  $G^2$  statistic of 20.09 or larger would occur 0% ( $p < 0.001$ ) of the time due to sampling variation.

Table 5.14: Logit Coefficients and  $z$ -scores for  
Multinomial model of National Identity

Variable	Country of Origin vs. American		Latino vs. American	
	$\beta$	$Z$	$\beta$	$Z$
<b>Acculturation</b>				
English Dominant	-.684***	-4.08	-.790***	-4.21
First Generation	2.29***	10.83	1.27***	5.24
Second Generation	1.02***	5.20	.567***	2.60
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>				
Less than HS	.918***	3.44	.259	0.85
High School	.588***	2.82	.233	0.98
Some College	-.107	-0.52	-.706***	-2.83
<b>Group Consciousness</b>				
Group-Based Disc	.719***	2.86	1.31***	4.39
Individual Disc.	.042	0.10	.426	0.92
<b>Control Variables</b>				
Female	.373***	2.53	.471***	2.72
Age	-.020***	-3.59	-.031***	-4.58

Table 5.15: Predicted Probability of Identification by Perception  
 of Group-Based Discrimination and Generational Status

	American			CO			Latino		
	<i>GD</i> = 0	<i>GD</i> = 1	Diff	<i>GD</i> = 0	<i>GD</i> = 1	Diff	<i>GD</i> = 0	<i>GD</i> = 1	Diff
Gen 1	.178	.086	.092	.693	.684	.009	.129	.230	-.101
Gen 2	.257	.128	.129	.602	.613	-.011	.141	.259	-.118

It is possible to also test the hypothesis that the two outcomes American and panethnicity can be combined. This is done by first selecting the individuals who prefer identification as either an American or as a co-ethnic, estimating the following binary logit model

$$\ln\Omega_{A|L}(\vec{x}) = \beta_{0,A|L} + \sum_{i=1}^9 \beta_{i,A|L} \vec{x}$$

and then computing the LR test of  $H_0 : \beta_1 = \dots = \beta_9 = 0$ . For these data,  $G^2_{A|L} = 162.5$ ,  $df = 13$ ,  $p < .001$ <sup>9</sup>. The hypothesis that American and Latino identities are indistinguishable with respect to the independent variables in the model is rejected at the .01 level. Similarly, a test of the hypothesis that country of origin and Latino identities are indistinguishable with respect to the independent variables in the model is also rejected at the .01 level.

I next turn to the predicted probabilities generated by the model (Table 5.15). Table 5.15 shows primary mode of identification by perceptions of group-based discrimination and generational status. The results suggest that first and second generation Latinos who perceive discrimination to be a problem are less likely to identify as Americans than if they do not perceive discrimination to be a problem. Second generation immigrants are more likely to identify as a member of their home country if they perceive discrimination to be a problem. Finally, first and second generation Latinos are more likely to identify as Latino/Hispanic if they perceive discrimination to be problematic.

---

<sup>9</sup>The Wald test gives a similar result:  $W_{A|L} = 132.8$ .

To examine the effect of age on the probability of falling into category *J* all variables were held at their means while age was allowed to vary over its range (Figure 5.3). The results indicate that as age increases the probability of identifying both with one's country of origin and along panethnic lines decreases while the probability of identifying as an American increases.




Figure 5.3. Mode of Identification By Age

Primary interest is in the variable measuring the effect of one's perception of group-level discrimination on the mode of identification. Table 5.16 shows the effect of the perception of group-based discrimination on primary mode of identification. The odds

of identifying as an ethnic or panethnic group member versus an American increase significantly with increasing perceptions of group-based discrimination. Figure 5.4 shows how the predicted probability of group identification varies with increasing levels of discrimination. As can be seen from the figure, the probability of identifying as American decreases while the probability of identifying either with one's country of origin or along panethnic lines increases with increasing perceptions of group-level discrimination.

Table 5.16: Factor Change in the Odds for Group-Based Discrimination

Factor Change in the Odds of $m$ vs. $n$			Outcome $n$		
			$C$	$L$	$A$
Outcome $m$	$C$	Country of Origin	-	.554	2.05
	$L$	Latino/Hispanic	1.81	-	3.70
	$A$	American	.487	.270	-




Figure 5.4. Predicted Probability of Identification given Perceptions of Group-based discrimination Among First Generation Latinos (Foreign Born)

Table 5.17: Discrete Change in Odds of Primary Self-Identification

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Change</i>	$\bar{\Delta}$	<i>C</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>A</i>
Group Discrimination	$\Delta 1$	.123	.043	.142	-.185
	$\Delta\sigma$	.120	.034	.147	-.181
	$\Delta\text{Range}$	.038	.011	.046	-.057
Personal Discrimination	$\Delta 1$	.050	-.041	.075	-.034
	$\Delta\sigma$	.046	-.037	.069	-.033
	$\Delta\text{Range}$	.009	-.007	.013	-.006
Gen 1	0 $\rightarrow$ 1	.268	.403	-.031	-.372
Gen 2	0 $\rightarrow$ 1	.123	.185	-.021	-.164
Language	$\Delta 1$	.153	-.118	-.111	.230
	$\Delta\sigma$	.096	-.083	-.061	.144
	$\Delta\text{Range}$	.070	-.060	-.045	.105
Less than HS	0 $\rightarrow$ 1	.128	.192	-.060	-.132
HS	0 $\rightarrow$ 1	.080	.120	-.026	-.093
Some College	0 $\rightarrow$ 1	.067	.044	-.101	.057
Age	$\Delta 1$	.234	-.154	-.197	.351
	$\Delta\sigma$	.003	-.002	-.003	.005
	$\Delta\text{Range}$	.047	-.023	-.047	.070
Female	0 $\rightarrow$ 1	.055	.042	.040	-.082
Less than \$20,000	0 $\rightarrow$ 1	.038	-.058	.014	.044
Less than \$40,000	0 $\rightarrow$ 1	.017	.008	.018	-.026
Less than \$75,000	0 $\rightarrow$ 1	.016	.008	-.024	.017
<b>Probability at Mean</b>			.495	.224	.281

Table 5.17 contains estimates of discrete change from the model of primary identification. First, consider the dummy variable *first generation*. Holding all other variables at their means, being a first generation Latino decreases the probability of identifying as an American by 37.2% and increases the probability of identifying with one's country of origin by 40.3%. By comparison, the average absolute change for a standard deviation change in the perception of group-level discrimination is 12% and

is 5% for the perception of individual-level discrimination. The effect of group-level discrimination exerts the largest effect on the probability of identifying as American: the probability of identification as an American per standard deviation change in group discrimination decreases by 18%.

I now turn to the question of whether the effect of discrimination on identity choice is the same regardless of one's generational status. To test the hypothesis of no effect requires testing the effect of discriminatory treatment, group and individual- based, at the intergenerational level. This suggests adding an interaction effect between discrimination and generational status to the model. The results are presented in Table 5.18.

Table 5.18: Interaction Effect: Generational Status and Discrimination

Interaction Effect	Country of Origin	Hispanic/Latino
Gen 1 * Group Discrimination	1.37**	-.117
Gen 2 * Group Discrimination	1.60**	.337
Gen 1 * Individual Discrimination	-1.09	.480
Gen 2 * Individual Discrimination	-.968	-.789

The results indicate that the perception of group-level discrimination on identity choice is significantly different for first and second generation Latinos than it is for third generation Latinos (Table 5.18). More specifically, individuals in both the first and second generation who perceive group-level discrimination to be a problem are more likely than third generation Latinos to identify with their country of origin.

Table 5.19: Selected Multinomial Logit Contrasts				
Variable	US Born		Foreign Born	
	1 vs 3	2 vs 3	1 vs 3	2 vs 3
Group-Based Discrimination				
<i>b</i>	.480	1.32***	1.11**	1.46***
<i>p</i>	.160	.00	.013	.007
Second Generation**				
<i>b</i>	1.02***	.512**	.000	-.029**
<i>p</i>	0.00	.021	.978	.018
Language				
<i>b</i>	-2.29**	-2.44**	-.390*	-.588**
<i>p</i>	.022	.015	.070	.019
Less than College Education				
<i>b</i>	.695**	.217	.719*	.442
<i>p</i>	.015	.471	.073	.345
Linked Fate (Latinos share one culture)				
<i>b</i>	.236	.824**	-.218	.370
<i>p</i>	.480	.013	.629	.459

Notes: 1=CO; 2=Latino;3=American  
\*\* Years in US for foreign born

Separate analyses from two different regressions of US born and foreign born respondents are shown in Table 5.19. As can be seen from Table 5.19, group-based discrimination is a predictor of “American” identity for three of the four contrasts reported. First generation immigrants (i.e., foreign born) who perceive discrimination among Latinos to be a problem prefer both ethnic and panethnic identities to an American identity. Holding other factors constant, US born immigrants of second generation status are more likely than third generation immigrants to prefer both

Latino and panethnic identities to an American identity. With respect to first generation immigrants, exposure to American culture significantly increases the likelihood of preferring an American identity as opposed to a panethnic identity (result not shown). English dominant and highly educated Latinos also prefer American self-identification. First generation Latinos who believe that Latinos share one culture are significantly more likely to prefer panethnic identification to an American one.

Finally, Table 5.20 shows the results by ethnic origin<sup>10</sup>. The table shows odds ratios and standard deviation changes for each variable. The context of reception and group consciousness variables proved to be the most consistent predictors of primary identification. The results show that Mexicans who perceive group-based discrimination to be problematic are significantly more likely to prefer to identify with their country of origin than as Latino but the opposite is true among Puerto Ricans. On the other hand, perceptions of group-based discrimination are significantly associated with an American identity over a panethnic one among individuals of Cuban descent. With respect to individual level discrimination the analysis revealed that Puerto Ricans who have experienced personal discrimination are more likely to identify as Puerto Ricans than as Latinos. Context of reception predicts identification in other ways among Mexicans as well. Mexicans who perceive conditions to be better in America are more likely to identify as a member of a panethnic group than as Mexicans.

---

<sup>10</sup>Only the results that were significant are presented. There were 6 possible contrasts for each independent variable for each national origin group.

Table 5.20: Multinomial Logit Contrasts for selected independent variables

Variable	Mexican			Puerto Rican			Cuban		
	1 vs 2	1 vs 3	2 vs 3	1 vs 2	1 vs 3	2 vs 3	1 vs 2	1 vs 3	2 vs 3
<b>Group Discrimination</b>									
<i>b</i>	0.377**	0.123	-0.254*	-0.112*	-0.070	0.043	0.387	-0.146	-0.533*
<i>e<sup>b</sup></i>	1.46	1.13	.776	0.894	0.933	1.043	1.47	0.864	0.587
<i>e<sup>bstdX</sup></i>	2.30	1.31	.570	0.751	0.839	1.112	3.23	0.643	0.200
<b>Personal Discrimination</b>									
<i>b</i>	-0.219	-0.198	0.021	0.198**	0.013	-0.185*	0.072	-.019	-0.092
<i>e<sup>b</sup></i>	0.803	0.820	1.02	1.22	1.01	0.831	1.07	0.980	0.913
<i>e<sup>bstdX</sup></i>	0.687	.712	1.04	1.46	1.03	0.704	1.14	0.963	0.842
<b>First Generation</b>									
<i>b</i>	1.485***	3.057***	1.572***	0.590	1.66***	1.07*	0.623	1.93***	1.31**
<i>e<sup>b</sup></i>	4.42	21.26	4.81	1.80	5.28	2.93	1.86	6.92	3.72
<b>Better in US</b>									
<i>b</i>	-0.144**	-0.288	-0.182	0.148	-0.129	-0.277	-0.223	-0.493	-0.269
<i>e<sup>b</sup></i>	0.865	0.749	0.834	1.15	0.878	0.757	0.799	0.611	0.763
<i>e<sup>bstdX</sup></i>	0.801	0.642	-.851	1.25	0.818	0.650	0.685	0.435	0.634
<b>US Ties</b>									
<i>b</i>	-0.283*	-1.05**	-0.770*	-	-	-	0.413	-1.28***	-1.69***
<i>e<sup>b</sup></i>	0.753	0.349	0.463	-	-	-	1.51	0.278	0.183
<i>e<sup>bstdX</sup></i>	0.737	0.321	0.436	-	-	-	.150	0.286	0.191

Notes: 1=CO; 2=Latino;3=American

Several of the assimilation measures were strongly related to identification (results are not shown). Within each national origin subgroup, first generation immigrants are overwhelming more likely to self-identify as members of their ethnic group than as members of a panethnic group or as an American. Second and third generation Mexicans are more likely to prefer a panethnic identity than are first generation immigrants. Mexicans and Cubans with decreasing ties to their country of origin are significantly more likely to identify as Americans. In addition, the relative conditions of Latin America versus the United States are associated with mode of identification among Mexicans. In contrast, Puerto Ricans were less likely to identify with their country of origin than as Latino over time ( $b = -0.041, p = .076$ ). All Latinos, regardless of national origin, are significantly more likely to identify as Americans if they are English dominant. With respect to structural assimilation, education and income were significantly related to patterns of identification among Cubans. Cubans are significantly more likely to identify with their country of origin than as an American with increasing income level ( $b = .079, p = .075$ ) and less likely to identify with their country of origin than as Latino with higher education ( $b = -.668, p = .012$ ). Age was also a significant predictor among Cubans, who are less likely to identify as a Latino/Hispanic than with their country of origin as they get older ( $b = .046, p = .034$ ).

Several interaction terms were included in each model. Findings indicate that first generation Mexicans who perceive that social conditions in the United States are better than they are in their country of origin are more likely to prefer either an American identity ( $b = -0.143, p = 0.04$ ) or a panethnic identity ( $b = -0.353, p =$

0.06) versus a Mexican identity than are second or third generation immigrants with similar beliefs. First generation Cubans, on the other hand, are more likely than second or third generation Cubans to prefer an American identity over a Cuban identity conditional on perceiving social conditions to be better in the United States than in their country of origin ( $b = -0.497, p = 0.000$ ). On the other hand, first generation Cubans who perceive group-based discrimination to be a problem are more likely than second and third generation Cubans to prefer a panethnic identification over an American one ( $b = 0.557, p = 0.077$ ).

## 5.8 Conclusion: The Integration of Identity

Huntington's assumptions regarding the impact of Latino political and cultural incorporation are questionable (Alba, 2006) at best and, at worst, they are simply inaccurate. The one of interest here is that the social cleavage between immigrants, mostly of Mexican origin, and mainstream society are so deep and difficult to cross that they will remain a distinct and identifiable group. Huntington claims that "the choices Americans make will shape their future as a nation and the future of the world." In his analysis, he suggests that the range of choices begins with a reification of and recommitment to our nation's Anglo-Protestant cultural origins. In contrast, in this chapter, I have shown that Latinos are very committed to Anglo-Protestant ideals and generally hold American values in high esteem almost to the exclusion of their own. The analysis further revealed that the structure of beliefs about being American and American values are partially homogeneous across national origin groups with

some heterogeneous components. Conditional latent class probabilities revealed that Mexicans are more likely than Cubans or Puerto Ricans to internalize ethnocultural conceptions of Americanism, but that this class comprised the largest prevalence of Latinos across each ethnic group. This finding clearly demonstrates that notions of what it means to be part of American society are similar among Latinos. If reification of and commitment by Latino immigrants to this nation's Anglo-Protestant cultural origins is important for the future of American society, as Huntington suggests, these findings suggest that there is little to be concerned about.

Previous research has shown that, when viewed as a theory of national identity, multiculturalism fails to resonate strongly in American public opinion (Citrin et al., 2001). This chapter extends previous research by demonstrating that similar results hold among Latinos as well, who tend to support stricter definitions of what it means to "be an American" rather than adopting "lenient" boundaries regarding who can claim membership in the American community. In this regard, differences in racial/ethnic identification did not significantly effect the likelihood of being in the class favoring the "American" point of view. However, exposure to American culture in terms of both years lived in the United States and generational status did change opinion towards the meaning of "being an American." With respect to the measures of acculturation, language, generation status and years lived in the United States also consistently increased the likelihood of an American identification over other modes of identifications. The strong effect of discrimination coupled with the positive effect of acculturation suggests the need to reconsider how current theories of assimilation apply to post-1965 immigrants from Latin America.

The most often-cited evidence of Latinos' failure to assimilate into American cultural life pertains to their "preference" to remain "linguistically separate" and to retain their "home country values" (de la Garza, 2005, p. 7). Consequently, much speculation revolves around the idea that immigrants remain more faithful to their countries of origin, while at the same time disregarding what is best for American national interests. Preferring Spanish over English is a primary way to retain their cultural origins. Despite claims to the contrary, several scholars have insisted that English is the dominant language of native born Hispanics and that immigrants, in general, learn English. Stevens (1994), for example, argued that immigrants from Latin American "become proficient in English at a more rapid pace than immigrants from other non-English-language countries." As noted by de la Garza (2005), allegations regarding anti-English attitudes and behavior among Hispanics are not empirically grounded. He argues that rather than threaten a core American value, their linguistic patterns are more easily seen as supporting the centrality of English to American life. The analyses presented in this chapter tend to support this latter argument. The unequivocalness regarding Latinos' acceptance that part of what it means to claim membership in the American community means speaking English is particularly noteworthy in this regard. This coupled with the large proportion of immigrants in the sample who are either English dominant or bilingual contradict any claim that Latinos prefer to remain linguistically separate or retain their home country values.

In addition, context of reception emerged as a significant predictor of class membership. With only one exception the perception of a common linked fate did not

predict identification with any group. Nevertheless, the analysis revealed that perceptions of group-based discrimination seem to matter a great deal in both structuring beliefs about what it means to be an American and in distinguishing between the modes of identification considered here. Notably, the perception of group-based discrimination consistently predicted attitudes towards Americanism and national identity. Interestingly, in a similar study undertaken by Citrin et al. (2001) on whites' attitudes towards multiculturalism, he found that animosity towards minority groups was a source of opposition to multiculturalism. The present study turns this finding on its head, by demonstrating that Latinos perceptions of this animosity is a source of opposition to *being American* and Americanism. According to Citrin et al. (2001), a symbolic meaning of multiculturalism is that minority groups receive special treatment which they feel is unjust. Again, the current research considered and found support for the opposite statement, namely that for many Latinos, one symbolic meaning of Americanism seems to be exclusionary treatment that they also perceive to be unjust. For example, Latinos are less likely to be in the latent class favoring ethnocultural conceptions of American national identity if they believe that discrimination against Latinos is problematic. Common sense would dictate that anti-immigrant sentiment reinforces these perceptions and fundamentally alters the symbolic nature of Latinos' attachments to American ideals.

The results are in line with existing research on identificational assimilation among Latinos in general. Similar to Schilderkraut (2004), I did not find that direct experiences with discrimination due to one's race or ethnicity impacts self-identification among Latinos. In contrast, however, I find that the perception that Latinos are mis-

treated as a group increases the likelihood of selecting *both* pan-ethnic and national origin identities as opposed to an American identity. In addition, I find that generational status is a strong predictor of opting for an American identity over either a panethnic or ethnic identity. Specifically, third generation Latinos are significantly more likely to identify as Americans than are either second or first generation Latinos. Finally, the ability to speak English is also strongly related to one's identificational preference: Latinos who speak English well are significantly less likely to identify with either their country of origin or as a Latino, all else being equal. Taken as a whole, these results are important for several reasons. First, they support the straightline model of immigrant assimilation by suggesting that national identity increases with increasing levels of acculturation and exposure to the United States. In addition, they tend to support the hypothesis that minority groups who perceive that their ethnic origin group is discriminated against by the host society tend to form reactive identities as a consequence of the discrimination. Importantly, the discrimination need not be directed at the individual personally for this reactive ethnic identity to emerge.

The fact that a two-class structure was deemed the best fitting model with respect to the measures of American liberalism, and the fact that the two classes differed only with respect to attitudes towards governmental paternalism suggest that Latinos unequivocally accept the fundamental tenets of American liberalism. Claims that Latino social values undercut other aspects of today's sociopolitical mainstream are equally unsupported. Indicative of this is the overwhelming support among Latinos for economic individualism, their belief that hard work leads to success, their preference to

blend rather than retain culture and their tendency to be more positively oriented toward life in the United States than in their country of origin. The results demonstrate the importance of the context of immigrant reception, such as the presence or absence of discrimination, to shape ethnic identity choices, particularly the preference for opting for an American identity.

In conclusion, with respect to national identity and national interests, Latino values are not radically transforming the American polity. In contrast, the findings presented in this chapter indicate that Latinos overwhelmingly accept core political values instead of undermine them but that assimilation into mainstream society depends on opportunities to assimilate which are effective only when they are in fact perceived to exist (Alba, 2006).

## Chapter 6

# A Test of the Straightline, Ethnic Disadvantage and Segmented Assimilation Theories

### 6.1 Introduction

Little is known about how alternative theories of acculturation explain differences in electoral participation among Latinos (de la Garza, 2004) and much of what is known finds its origin from data that is now more than 16 years old (LNPS, 1989). Given the recent surge in immigration to this country, it is unclear whether findings from earlier studies, even those done as recently as 10 years ago, continue to hold empirically. This chapter comprehensively evaluates the predictions of three competing theories derived from the sociological literature on immigrant assimilation as they are applied to patterns of Latino political participation. Classical or “straightline” theory pre-

dicts a positive relationship between acculturation and political behavior while the ethnic disadvantage and segmented frameworks predict an inverse relationship. This research expands the current literature on Latino political participation by examining three generations of Cuban, Mexican and Puerto Rican immigrants and by evaluating whether the predictions of these competing models hold to empirical scrutiny. Using logistic regression models based on data from the *2002 and 2004 National Survey of Latinos: Politics and Civic Participation*, I find substantial support for the hypotheses of the straightline assimilation model, limited support for hypotheses of the ethnic disadvantage model and virtually no support for the segmented assimilation framework. As in the last chapter, inconsistencies suggest that extant conceptual frameworks regarding post-1965 immigrant populations should be revised to include the role of identification, particularly as an American, as a mitigating force for political alienation. Overall, the degree to which context of reception, acculturation and group-based resource variables explain the variance in political behavior differs by national origin and generational status and is contingent on the type of resource under consideration (Wong et al., 2002). A latent class analysis of Latino attitudes and behaviors is also presented in this chapter. The latent class analysis revealed two typologies of Latino political participation, namely individuals who are highly responsive to the electoral system and those who are highly unresponsive.

This chapter is divided into four main sections that proceed as follows. In section one, I test the plausibility of a multidimensional model of straightline assimilation as originally proposed by Gordon and his predecessors. In section two, I test the three theories of assimilation as they pertain to voting and registering to vote in

US elections. To do so, I consider how linguistic, structural, identificational and attitudinal/behavioral assimilation affect the likelihood of participating in electoral politics, specifically voting and registering to vote. Next, I consider the role of group-based resources and the mitigating effects of identification and cultural retention on non-participation with an eye towards examining the ethnic disadvantage model of immigrant assimilation. Finally, I test the segmented assimilation theory by considering the impact of socialization and context of reception on an individual's decision to participate in politics. Section three discusses the results of a latent class analysis that shows how the assimilation, group-based resources and identity variables shift an individual's underlying propensity from nonparticipant to participant in electoral politics. The fourth and final section turns to citizenship as an indicator of political assimilation, and studies the various factors that decrease the waiting time to citizenship acquisition once an individual becomes eligible for citizenship status.

## **6.2 Review of Research**

As noted by de la Garza in 2004, Latinos have historically had to overcome numerous institutionalized discriminatory barriers before they could exercise their voting rights. The Voting Rights Act of 1975 coupled with the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund was largely responsible for removing these barriers. The environment produced by these changes coupled with increasing levels of Hispanic immigration has created the "new Latino electorate," which is a term used to describe the pool of potential Latino voters.

Despite these efforts to equalize access to political participation, less obvious and overt barriers remain. For example, minority voters still encounter barriers to voting in states where voters have approved English-only laws and ballot initiatives. According to a recent report<sup>1</sup>, eighteen discriminatory voting procedure changes and redistricting plans proposed in Arizona, a heavily populated Latino state, have been overturned by the Department of Justice since 1982. In fact, protecting the voting rights of residents in states as diverse as Arizona has proven, in general, to be difficult. Despite discrimination and language barriers, however, the last two presidential elections recorded an unprecedented Latino voter turnout.

Due to the perceived impact that numerical strength will have on the electorate, many scholars have sought to identify the various reasons Hispanics tend to participate in politics. The traditional model of voter participation, which views participation as being conditioned on income and other individual characteristics (Verba and Nie 1972; Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Cassel and Luskin 1988), has been the model of choice to explain patterns of Latino political behavior (Marschall, 2001; de la Garza 2004). Early studies predicting participation based on socioeconomic indicators such as income, education, age, gender, marital status, ethnicity and citizenship (Montoya, 2002) have repeatedly shown that Latinos participate at levels lower than Anglos (Michelson, 2001). Later studies have found that higher levels of political cynicism, lower rates of naturalization, structural barriers to registration and voting, and low levels of information and interest in the United States political system are largely

---

<sup>1</sup>Reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act: Policy Perspectives and Views from the Field, available online at [http://www.renewthevra.org/view\\_from\\_hill/Debo.pdf](http://www.renewthevra.org/view_from_hill/Debo.pdf), June

responsible for low turnout rates (McClain and Garcia, 1993). The empirical accuracy of the socio-economic model has recently been shown to be lacking as a comprehensive model of Latino political behavior. Consequently, researchers have looked to other factors such as organizational involvement, and various dimensions of ethnicity, to provide richer explanations of Latino political participation.

Nevertheless, the standard socioeconomic status model has proven to be a useful starting point for explaining Latino political participation, despite the fact that it often provides us with conflicting results (de la Garza, 2004). For example, Arvisu and Garcia (1996) and DeSipio (1996) have shown that age is positively associated with Latino voting while Hritzuk and Park (2000) found no association. In addition, Arvisu and Garcia found that education does not consistently result in higher turnout rates, and this is true especially among Cubans (de la Garza, 2004). DeSipio (1996) reports that national origin is not a significant factor distinguishing voters from nonvoters. There is disagreement regarding the effect of marital status, gender, employment status, home ownership, and metropolitan residence on the immigrant's propensity to vote (Bass and Casper 2001, DeSipio and Pachon, 2002). These inconsistencies demonstrate the overall complexity of Latino voting patterns, with potential subgroup differences further complicating models of their participatory behavior. For example, the consistently low turnout of Puerto Ricans compared with other groups has been attributed to their status as sojourners. Puerto Ricans are less politically involved in the United States than they are in their country of origin. Explanations have focused on lack of mobilization (Dominguez, 2002) and on the relative political alienation of Puerto Ricans in the United States as compared with Puerto Rico (McClain and

Garcia, 1993).

Due to the growing influx of immigrants, scholars in recent years have turned to the question of whether turnout is a function of the continuous incorporation of citizens who are not fully socialized into electoral politics. Increasing levels of political socialization have been shown to increase political participation, particularly voting (Leal, 1999). Given the importance of religion in Hispanic life, several researchers have also turned their attention to the role of the church as a key actor in the political socialization of Latinos. On this point, as well, the evidence is conflicted. In one of the first studies on this topic, Verba et al. (1995) found no evidence to support the claim that religious organizations serve a socialization function. This nonfinding was later supported by Hritzuk and Park (2000). Recent work challenges these findings by arguing that church attendance, regardless of denomination, is positively associated with higher turnout, but that differences in denomination explain little about Latino political participation (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2000). Jones-Correa and Leal (2000) further argue that in the absence of other institutions, churches are disproportionately important to Latino civic life and, given their ethnic nature, Latino parishes have the potential to serve as centers for political mobilizing. A study undertaken in 2002 further complicates the role of religion on Latino political behavior. This study found that neither skills learned through participation in church activities nor church-based mobilization significantly affects turnout. The only religious variable that had a positive effect was experience as a born-again Christian.

Montoya (2002) demonstrated significant differences in voting behavior between men and women between and within Hispanic subgroups. For example, she found

that voting patterns among Mexican men and women are more similar to each other than are Puerto Rican or Cuban men and women. Mexican women are more likely to participate when they have additional monetary resources, as they grow older or as their proficiency of English increases. In contrast, these factors are not as important for Mexican men or Puerto Rican and Cuban women, whose voting behavior generally depends on the extent and quality of work skills. Organizational involvement was the only statistically significant explanatory variable that consistently explained the behavior of all Latinos and other researchers have substantiated the role of organizational involvement in motivating participation. Diaz (1996), for example, found that Puerto Ricans and Mexicans involved with organizations vote at significantly higher rates than those who are not members of any group. Organizational involvement had no effect on Cuban participation, however.

Paradoxically, Latinos on the whole seem to be more concerned about issues in the United States than they are about political issues related to their country of origin (Dominguez, 2002). Nevertheless, many Latinos are less politically involved in the United States than they are in their country of origin due to a lack of efforts to mobilize them and to their relative alienation in the United States as compared with their home country (McClain and Garcia, 1993). Substantial differences in educational attainment and income explain, in part, these differences in political behavior. Generally speaking, Latinos are economically disadvantaged relative to other groups, with poverty rates being at least three times higher among Hispanics than whites (Wildsmith, 2005; Ramirez, 2000). Partial and/or incomplete socialization into the electoral system may be an additional factor in explaining low turn out rates and this

lack of socialization is exacerbated by the continuous influx of immigrants (Hritzuk and Park, 2000). Feeling politically efficacious, viewing voting as a duty or symbolic act rather than as an instrument of change and interest in and knowledge of political processes have all been shown to be significantly related to voting among Latino immigrants (de la Garza, 2004).

Much of the literature on minority political participation emphasizes the impact of socioeconomic variables on political participation and the link between mobilization and participation but relatively few studies have explored the relationship between group consciousness and political behavior (Stokes, 2003). Additionally, most of the research in this area is based on African American participation. Shingles (1981) was one of the first scholars to provide an explanation for the effect of group consciousness on political participation among Blacks. He argued that black consciousness contributed to mistrust and a sense of internal political efficacy which encourages policy related participation. More specifically, he found that individuals who feel strongly efficacious and do not trust the government are likely to take part in activities requiring a high degree of personal initiative. Later studies on black group consciousness have doubted the relationship between group-based resources and political participation and question the relevance of group consciousness. Bobo and Gilliam (1990), for example, suggested that given changing race relations in contemporary society, group consciousness has taken a back seat to local representation as a critical component of Black political participation. Tate (1993), accepting the role of group consciousness as a relatively important predictor of participation, noted that some types of group-based resources may be more important than others. She suggested,

for example, that participation in an ethnic organization may be more important to Black participation than group consciousness alone.

Building on the work of Tate (1993), scholars have begun to examine how group-based resources matter for political activity. For example, Chong and Rogers found that their multidimensional measure of group solidarity was modestly related to electoral participation but had a powerful relationship to participation beyond voting. Both Chong and Rogers (2003) and Stokes (2003) found that different aspects of group consciousness matter to different degrees for distinct types of political activities. In a similar study pertaining to Asians, Wong et al. (2005) found that the effects of group consciousness, group identity, sense of common culture, membership in an Asian American organization, and experience with discrimination on registration and voting appear to be relatively weak and inconsistent. Nevertheless, similar to Chong and Rogers (2003), they found that having a sense of ethnic group consciousness and being a member of an ethnic organization were positively associated with participation *beyond* voting. They reasoned that Asian American organizations provide opportunities to participate and are powerful agents of Asian political participation. Notably, adopting a panethnic or ethnic identity had no effect on political participation while having strong ethnic ties to one's country of origin increased the likelihood that Asians would participate in activities related to politics in the United States.

The literature is conflicted as to how group consciousness effects minority political participation. Miller et al. (1981) argued that a perception of self-location within a particular stratum and the psychological feeling of belonging to that stratum fail to

capture the psychological dimensions of participation (Stokes, 2003). Using a multidimensional concept of group consciousness that includes feelings of power deprivation (polar power), relative dislike for the outgroup (polar affect), and the belief that inequities in the social system are responsible for a group's disadvantaged status in society (system blame), they found a strong relationship between group consciousness and political participation. Uhlaner and her collaborators similarly found that ethnicity does matter for political participation and suspected that culturally specific factors may be responsible for observed differences in Asian American participation. On the other hand, Wilcox and Gomez (1990) did not find a relationship between group consciousness and participation among African Americans. Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) found that group consciousness fails to account for political engagement among racial and ethnic groups. Finally, as I discussed above, other researchers have found that although group consciousness is unrelated to electoral participation significantly predicts participation beyond voting (Wong, 2005; Chong and Rogers, 2003).

Scholars generally assume that the dimensions of ethnicity among distinct subgroups of Latinos are significantly different due to socioeconomic, historical and cultural differences. Lien (1994) developed several dimensions of ethnicity including acculturation, attachment to ethnic culture, and discrimination which had two components – alienation and deprivation. He found that Asians and Mexicans, two groups with different socioeconomic, historical and cultural characteristics produced similar psychological profiles when ethnicity was viewed as an “emerging phenomena formed through a multidimensional process – variously called ethnicization (Sarna, 1978), racialization (Omi and Winant, 1986), or ethnic Americanization (Fuchs, 1990).”

Might Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans have similar psychological profiles despite their significant differences? Might these profiles impact political participation in similar ways? These are some of the research questions that are addressed in this chapter.

Several additional limitations can be identified in the existing scholarship and are addressed in this chapter. First, Portes and Rumbaut posited the phenomenon of reactive ethnic identity as a generational effect, yet the existing studies do not consider generation as an explanatory variable. A second limitation is that identity involves more than ethnic identification yet studies have largely overlooked how the awareness of one's status as an oppressed group affects political behaviors (Wong et al., 2005). Third, since ethnic origin groups have different historical contexts, it is important to perform separate analyses wherever possible, yet, due mostly to data limitations, no study to date does. Finally, although Schildkraut's (2004) study is noteworthy, her model does not specifically test the hypothesis she posits, namely that reactive ethnicity mitigates the political alienation that results from the perception of discrimination. In order to test this hypothesis, one needs to examine the effect of individual and group level discrimination on political behavior and attitudes for those who assume a reactive ethnic identity and those who do not. However, this suggests the presence of an interaction term: any construct measuring identity and discrimination in level form merely measures the independent effects of these variables on political behavior and not the joint effects of *both* variables on political behavior. In the analysis that follows, I address these limitations by: (1) adding generational status, years lived in the US and measures of group consciousness and resources to

the models; (2) developing ethnic identity more comprehensively; and (3) adding interaction terms where appropriate.

### **6.3 Assimilation as a multidimensional concept**

This section tests the plausibility of a multidimensional concept of assimilation for Latino immigrants as suggested by straightline assimilation theorists. Therefore, the original hypothesis that assimilation is a four-factor structure comprising: (1) identificational; (2) attitudinal receptional and behavioral; (3) cultural; (4) structural and (5) political components is tested against the alternative hypothesis that assimilation is best conceptualized as a unidimensional construct. See Appendix A for further details regarding the variables used, the model, and the fit statistics.

Overall, the model supports the hypothesis that assimilation is a multidimensional concept comprised of the five facets of structural, attitudinal/behavior, identificational, cultural and political factors. While this finding supports the straightline model, it does not rule out the possibility that as Latinos interact with the dynamic social environments in which acculturation takes place, differential patterns of association may lead to segmented outcomes (Portes and Zhou, 1993). In other words, the results do not rule out segmented assimilation theory as a possible outcome of the assimilation process but a failure to confirm the multidimensional nature of assimilation would a priori rule out the straightline model as an adequate theory of immigrant assimilation. In what follows, I focus on examining several key measures of acculturation and on delineating the patterns of Latino acculturation with an eye

towards explaining political participation.

## 6.4 Results

Before proceeding to the multivariate results, it is instructive to examine the distribution of the independent and dependent variables used in the subsequent models. Table 6.1 shows the group means for the measures of assimilation, acculturation, group-based resources, contextual effects and control variables used in the analysis. As can be seen from the table, Cubans have established stronger ties to America relative to Mexicans as reflected by the longer number of years they report having lived in the United States as well as their stronger ties to the United States, on average. The majority of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans are foreign born, first generation immigrants. Slightly under half of the sample of Puerto Ricans report proficiency in two languages (.48) while Mexicans (.49) and Cubans (.51) are more likely to be Spanish dominant. The plurality of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans all prefer to identify with their own ethnic group. Nevertheless, a fairly substantial proportion of Latinos prefer other modes of identification. Puerto Ricans (.26) and Cubans (.22) are more likely than Mexicans (.19) to prefer an American identity over either a panethnic or ethnic group identity. Mexicans (.13) are more likely than Puerto Ricans (.09) or Cubans (.10) to believe that Latinos share one culture, the basis for the measure of linked fate. Cubans are less likely than Mexicans or Puerto Ricans to believe that group based discrimination is a problem but all three ethnic groups report similar average levels of individual-level discrimination. Almost one-third of

Puerto Ricans report being “born-again” Christians while only 13% of Mexicans and 19% of Cubans report this type of religious association. About half of all Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans earn less than \$35,000 per year. Cubans more than Mexicans or Puerto Ricans are structurally integrated in the US economy as indicated by their higher reported levels of economic attachment. Cubans and Mexicans report that conditions in the US are better than in their country of origin. Additionally, an overwhelming majority of Latinos believe that racial discrimination is a major or minor problem in the United States. Mexicans and Puerto Ricans are significantly more likely to be a victim of discrimination (meaning themselves or their family) than are Cubans. Cubans tend to be slightly older on average than Mexicans or Cubans. Exactly half of Mexican and Cubans are married compared to approximately 48% of Puerto Ricans. Finally, a slight majority of Mexicans, Cubans and Puerto Ricans are female.

Table 6.1: Acculturation, Measures of Assimilation and Context of Reception By National Origin

Variable	Mexican		Puerto Rican		Cuban	
	Mean	<i>N</i>	Mean	<i>N</i>	Mean	<i>N</i>
<b>Acculturation and Cultural Assimilation</b>						
Generation 1	62%	2,012	56%	176	79%	271
Generation 2	20%	526	31%	98	18%	63
Generation 3	14%	249	13%	43	3%	9
Years Lived in the US	14.05	635	–	–	23.21	270
Assimilation	10.32	1003	11.56	304	10.71	315
English Dominant	24%	1047	37%	317	13%	343
Bilingual	27%	1047	48%	317	36%	343
Spanish Dominant	49%	1047	15%	317	51%	343
Ties to the US	6.03	563	–	–	6.63	238
<b>Identificational Assimilation</b>						
American Identification	19%	1031	26%	314	22%	330
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>						
Less than \$35,000	50%	854	48%	136	49%	144
Less than High School	42%	435	19%	61	21%	71
Completed High School	31%	338	35%	111	30%	100
Economic Attachment	1.43	1047	1.79	317	2.05	343
<b>Group-Based Resources</b>						
Group-Based Discrimination	5.73	1045	5.86	317	6.68	340
Individual-Level Discrimination	10.54	1047	10.45	317	11.03	341

Linked Fate	13%	1047	9%	312	10%	336
Primary Identification						
Panethnic	25%	1031	17%	314	13%	330
Primary Identification						
Ethnic Group	57%	1031	58%	314	65%	330
Political Consciousness	47%	970	45%	296	44%	305
Born-Again Christian	13%	908	29%	247	19%	270
<b>Context of Reception</b>						
Better in US	1.23	973	.43	286	1.16	295
Percent Hispanic	20%	2293	12%	1567	18%	1593
Percent Foreign Born	14%	2293	12%	1567	17%	1593
Percent Citizens	61%	2293	58%	1567	57%	1593
Ratio of Income to Poverty	6%	2293	6%	1567	6%	1593

Table 6.2 shows participation across a range of measures of political incorporation by Latino subgroup. While previous research finds that Latinos register and vote at rates much lower than other groups, these data do not support this contention. In fact, despite the large percentage of individuals who are not citizens and therefore ineligible to vote, a comparison between foreign-born and U.S. citizens reveal that naturalized Latinos register and vote at rates higher than their U.S. born counterparts who are citizens by birthright. Eighty-two percent of foreign born Latinos are registered to vote, compared to 78% of U.S. born individuals. Similarly, 76% of foreign born Latinos reported having previously voted in a U.S. election compared to 72% of U.S. born Latinos. While this result could possibly be due to measurement error in the data, other researchers have observed a similar discrepancy between foreign born and native born populations. For example, Wong et al. (2004) found that foreign born Asians participate at higher rates than their native born counterparts.

Table 6.2: Political Participation Among Latinos

	Total		Mexican		Puerto Rican		Cuban		US Born		Foreign born <sup>1</sup>	
	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>
Citizen	49	1,512	25	601	100	282	60	353	100	896	37	1,237
Registered	80	1,342	77	637	78	278	87	278	78	886	82	456
Ever Voted	74	1,353	73	643	69	280	82	277	72	894	76	459
Voted 2000	83	1,070	82	464	74	199	91	235	81	616	87	454
Voted 2002	79	1,047	76	459	73	196	87	228	74	610	86	437

<sup>1</sup> Only Foreign Born Citizens are included in measures of Voting and Registration

## Electoral Participation Among First, Second and Third Generation Immigrants

The first set of questions to be addressed in the multivariate analysis pertains to how acculturation and exposure effect Latinos' participation in electoral politics. Table 6.3 presents the logistic regression coefficients pertaining to these variables for Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans separately. As can be seen from the table, the results strongly support many of the predictions of straightline assimilation theory. For example, exposure to US culture across generational status has a powerful effect on turnout and registration for Mexicans and Cubans. Second and third generation Mexican and Cuban immigrants are significantly more likely to have voted in a US election than first generation immigrants, holding other factors constant. In addition, linguistic assimilation is a strong predictor of electoral participation. For example, the odds of voting and registering for English dominant and bilingual Mexicans and Cubans are significantly higher than for Spanish dominant Mexicans and Cubans. Both economic attachment and income are significant predictors of Latino political behavior but their effects differ by subgroup. Among Cubans, income is significantly and positively associated with voting and registering to vote. On the other hand, economic attachment has a relatively larger effect than income among both Puerto Ricans and Mexicans. Among Mexicans, for example, each additional increase in economic attachment increases the odds of registering by 58% ( $(\exp(.459) - 1) \times 100$ ) and the odds of voting by 75% ( $(\exp(.564) - 1) \times 100$ ). Educational attainment was only an important factor in explaining voting behavior among Puerto Ricans.

Turning to the effect of identificational assimilation, primary identification as an American had the largest effect on the probability of both registering and voting among Cubans. The odds of voting and registering to vote for Cubans whose primary mode of identification is American are significantly higher than they are for Cubans who prefer a panethnic identity. On the other hand, there is no significant effect for either Mexicans or Puerto Ricans. Age is significantly related to the probability of registering and voting among all three Latino subgroups. With respect to marital status, the results show that married Mexicans and Puerto Ricans register to vote at higher levels than do those that are unmarried. Marital status has the largest effect on Puerto Rican and Mexican voting behavior. Puerto Ricans who are married are almost 4 times as likely to register to vote as similarly situated Puerto Ricans who are not married. The effect for Mexican electoral participation is also positive but smaller in magnitude. Among Puerto Ricans, too, being female was found to significantly increase the likelihood of both voting and registering to vote.

Table 6.3 Logistic Regression of Voting and Registration on Assimilation, Identity and Control Variables

	Registered						Voted					
	Mexican		Cuban		PR		Mexican		Cuban		PR	
	$\beta$	s.e.	$\beta$	s.e.	$\beta$	s.e.	$\beta$	s.e.	$\beta$	s.e.	$\beta$	s.e.
<b>Acculturation and Assimilation</b>												
Second Generation	1.63***	.300	.905*	.5480	.232	.449	1.58***	.332	2.33*	1.17	.205	.423
Third Generation	.800**	.366	.111	.640	.669	.338	1.17***	.407	1.98	1.31	1.86*	.610
English Dominant	2.06***	.594	1.15*	.611	.314	.818	1.75**	.910	1.99***	.606	.639	.764
Bilingual	1.65***	.334	1.72***	.316	.177	.656	1.71***	.349	1.73***	.243	.139	.610
<b>Identificational Assimilation</b>												
American ID	.076	.313	2.29**	1.03	-.710*	.431	.600	.698	2.15**	1.086	-.258	.838
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>												
Income	.096***	.023	.060*	.0322	-.017	.039	.111***	.024	.0966***	.035	.0334	.034
Education	.0587	.159	.2275	.207	.799***	.283	.369***	.128	.655***	.209	.308*	.184
Economic Attachment	.459***	.192	.187	.22	.209	.18	.564***	.212	.375*	.213	.416**	.194
<b>Context or Reception</b>												
Better in US	-.151	.101	.042	.135	.034	.156	-.119	.093	.011	.130	.134	.159
<b>Control Variables</b>												
Age	.097***	.012	.125**	.0196	.042**	.019	.096***	.013	.143***	.022	.070***	.019
Married	.725**	.317	-.453	.419	1.367***	.523	.701**	.339	-.625	.442	-.286	.449
Female	.100	.282	.466	.416	1.26**	.501	.593***	.224	.632	.440	.954**	.451

Constant	-7.88***	1.17	-6.30***	1.85	-2.610	1.93	-7.98***	1.26	-8.05***	2.02	-3.50	1.81
N	805		241		254		805		241		254	
$P > \chi^2$	.000		.000		.000		.000		.000		.000	
Pseudo- $R^2$	.360		.382		.214		.470		.465		.225	
Percent Correctly Predicted	.85		.91		.80		.86		.92		.76	

Notes: reported standard errors are robust

\*  $p < .10$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

## Voting and Electoral Participation Among the Immigrant Generation

In order to assess the effect of exposure to US culture within generational status, the same model was re-run with the addition of years lived in the United States and ties to one's country of origin<sup>2</sup>. Table 6.4 shows the results for foreign born Mexican and Cuban immigrants. For example, among Mexicans, in addition to education, income, economic attachment and American self-identification, years lived in the United States and decreasing ties to one's home country significantly predict registration status. For each additional year lived in the US, the odds of voting and registering are increased by a factor of 1.13 or 13% for Mexicans. Each standard deviation increase in years lived in the US increases the odds of voting fourfold. Additionally, among first generation Cubans, decreasing ethnic ties and years lived in the United States are positively and significantly related to the probability of registering to vote.

---

<sup>2</sup>The questions pertaining to length of residency, ties to country of origin and relative perceptions of US versus country of origin were only asked to respondents who indicated they were foreign born. Therefore, it is impossible to determine how years lived in the US effects voting and registration for second and third generation immigrants. Nor is it possible to examine this variable for Puerto Ricans, who are residents of the US by birth.

Table 6.4: Logistic Regression of Voting and Registration on Assimilation  
Identity and Sociodemographic Variables

	Registered to Vote				Voted in US Election			
	Mexican		Cuban		Mexican		Cuban	
	<i>b</i>	s.e.	<i>b</i>	s.e.	<i>b</i>	s.e.	<i>b</i>	s.e.
Years Lived								
in the United States	.122***	.024	.137***	.035	.564***	.212	.131***	.037
Ties to Country of	-.380**	.193	-.581*	.235	-.475***	.207	-.737***	.257
Origin								
Attitudinal Receptional	-.151	.101	.042	.135	-.119	.093	.011	.130

Notes: Other control variables include sociodemographic variables,  
Acculturation and Identity Variables

In this section, I have demonstrated that exposure and increasing ties to the host country unequivocally predict Latino political participation in American politics. Most scholars, however, distinguish between increasing ties to the US and decreasing ties to one's home country, noting that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Above, I showed that an examination of the hypothesis that strong ties to the home country has no effect on electoral participation reveals that it must be rejected among the respondents in this sample. In other words, Mexican and Cuban immigrants with strong ties to their country of origin are significantly less likely to participate in electoral politics. For example, the change in predicted probability of voting in US elections over the range of ethnic ties is .176 for Mexicans and .148 for Cubans, holding other variables constant at their means. In comparison, the predicted probability of voting for Mexicans with strong ties is .042 compared to .011 for Cubans. To investigate the interaction between identity and ethnic ties, I plotted the probability of voting while allowing ethnic ties to vary over its range. The result for Mexicans is shown in Figure 6.1. The figure provides visual evidence that as ties to one's homeland decrease, the probability of registering and voting in US elections increases. Among Mexicans, those with weak ties to Mexico and who identify primarily as American have the highest overall predicted probability of voting.




Figure 6.1. Predicted Probability of Voting in US Elections and Ties to Mexico by Identification (Mexicans Only)

Yet another important question to be addressed here is how sustained political contact with one's home country impact participation in US politics, a question that has not been rigorously addressed in the literature. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 provide output from a regression of citizenship and voting behavior in one's home country on level of acculturation, assimilation to the US and sociodemographic characteristics.

Table 6.5: Dependent Variable: Political Orientation toward Home Country

	1st Gen				2nd Gen				3rd Gen			
	$\beta$	O.R.	s.e.	<i>p</i>	$\beta$	O.R.	s.e.	<i>p</i>	$\beta$	O.R.	s.e.	<i>p</i>
<b>National Origin Group</b>												
Mexican	-.3631		.1770	.040	-.1894		.4615	.681	-1.613		.7554	.033
Puerto Rican	.0461		.2592	.859	-.4271		.5707	.454	.4716		1.091	.667
Cuban	.3742		.1816	.039	.8323		.5290	.123	2.569		.9018	.004
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>												
Education	.0235		.0409	.566	.0574		.1098	.601	.1627		.195	.404
Income	.0161		.0136	.237	-.0434		.0288	.131	.0042		.0507	.934
<b>Acculturation and Assimilation</b>												
Years in US	-.0226		.0068	.001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ties to Country of Origin	-.2305		.0686	.001	-.1811		.1152	.116	-.1251		.1965	.524
Retain Culture	.3834		.2174	.077	-.5535		.4614	.230	.6109		.7400	.409
Bilingual	-.3646		.2057	.076	-.1959		.4590	.670	.3758		.7420	.613
Volunteer (ethnic based)	-.0945		.2034	.642	.8311		.4868	.088	.5586		.8325	.502
<b>Identificational Assimilation</b>												
No Panethnic Identification	.0052		.1764	.977	.6548		.4680	.162	.0214		.7171	.976
<b>Control Variable</b>												
Age	-.0061		.0054	.256	-.0417		.0215	.053	.0095		.0250	.703

Logistic Regression Coefficients, Odds Ratios, Standard Errors and p-values

Table 6.6: Transnational Political Ties												
	Mexican Immigrants						Cuban Immigrants					
	Citizen CO			Voted CO			Citizen CO			Voted CO		
	$\beta$	O.R.	$p$	$\beta$	O.R.	$p$	$\beta$	O.R.	$p$	$\beta$	O.R.	$p$
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>												
Education	-0.0415		.843	.135		.447	-0.460		.004	-0.277		.432
Income	-0.0136		.660	.004		.910	-0.090		.000	-0.157		.003
<b>Acculturation and Assimilation</b>												
English Dominant	-1.952		.062	-		-	-2.36		.000	-0.122		.913
Bilingual	-1.804		.000	-1.42		.018	-1.26		.000	1.06		.115
One Culture	.1860		.732	.201		.609	1.30		.015	1.71		.021
Years Lived in US	.0401		.032	-0.073		.009	-0.056		.000	-0.003		.909
Return to CO	.2366		.616	.074		.409	-0.046		.636	-0.026		.848
<b>Identificational Assimilation</b>												
No Panethnic Identification	.7262		.061	-0.503		.118	-0.124		.678	-0.098		.884
<b>Control Variable</b>												
Age	-0.0513		.000	.010		.573	-0.011		.195	.007		.682
N			365			360			-			-
-2LL			-119.49			-144.720			-			-

Notes: Observations weighted, robust standard errors. Omitted categories: Spanish dominant, prefers Latino or Hispanic identification. Cuban estimates are bivariate due to small sample size.

The results clearly show that as years in the US increase, political ties to one's home country decrease among first generation immigrants ( $b = -.023, p = .001$ ). Similarly, first generation immigrants who prefer to retain their culture rather than blend into American society are more likely to be politically active in their country of origin, other factors equal. Mexicans are less likely to claim Mexican citizenship with age, income, as proficiency in English increases and as they come to identify as a member of a panethnic group. The only significant variable pertaining to voting behavior was years lived in the US, which decreases the probability of turnout in Mexican elections. According to Figure 6.2, both English and Spanish dominant Mexicans are less likely to vote in Mexican elections with increasing exposure to US culture. However, the steeper slope for the Spanish dominant in Figure 6.2 suggests that exposure has a greater effect for Spanish dominant compared to English dominant Mexicans even though the English dominant are less likely to vote in Mexico at all levels of exposure.




Figure 6.2. Predicted Probability of Voting in Mexican Elections and US Acculturation

## 6.5 Group-Based Resources and Latino Political Participation

Wong et. al (2005) discuss the distinction between group identity and group consciousness. In particular, whereas primary identification merely means that an individual identifies with one group more than another, group consciousness implies the awareness of shared status with other members of the panethnic community as well as a strong sense of solidarity (Wong et. al, 2005; Bobo and Gilliam, 1990). Although the literature portrays these concepts as independent, the indicators of group-based resources may indeed prove to be related (Wong et. al, 2005). To examine these relationship, if any, I first explored the bivariate correlations between the variables measuring group consciousness and identity. Table 6.7 shows that those with a strong sense of panethnic group consciousness are significantly more likely to identify primarily as Latino than are those without such a sense ( $p = .0075$ ). Similarly, individuals who report having a strong sense of panethnic group consciousness are significantly less likely to identify as American ( $p = .0254$ ). Nevertheless, these measures are not highly correlated indicating that although the two variables are related, they can also be distinguished from each other (Wong et. al, 2005).

Table 6.7: Relationship Between Group Identity and Group Consciousness

Group Consciousness	Percentage Primary Group Identity			
	Latino/Hispanic	American	Country of Origin	Total
Latinos from different countries share one culture				
Yes	28%***	16**	54	100%
No	22%	21	56	100%
Latinos from different countries are working together politically				
Yes	23%	21	55	100%
No	23%	20	55	100%
<i>N</i>	627	561	1598	

NOTE: Cell entries are row percentages

Asteriks represent significant  $\chi^2$  values at \*  $p \leq .10$ , \*\*  $p \leq .05$  and \*\*\*  $p \leq .01$ .

### 6.5.1 Bivariate Relationships Among Group-Based Resources and Political Participation

Is there an association between the measures of group identity, group-based resources and political behavior among Latino subgroups? Wong et al. (2004) asked a similar question with respect to Asians. In contrast, with respect to Latinos, the results suggest that Cubans who exhibit a strong sense of panethnic group consciousness are significantly *less* likely to register and vote than those without a strong sense (see Table 6.8). Mexicans and Cubans who prefer an American mode of identification are significantly more likely to vote and register than are those whose primary identity is not American. Puerto Ricans who prefer to identify as an American are significantly more likely to vote than those who do not prefer such an identity. Mexicans and Cubans who prefer to identify with their panethnic group are less likely to register than those who do not. Puerto Ricans, Cubans and Mexicans who identify primarily with their own ethnic group are significantly less likely to vote than those who do not and the latter two groups are also significantly less likely to register to vote. Among Mexicans, volunteering to an organization specifically representing Mexican concerns is associated with higher levels of registration and voting. Similarly, belonging to an ethnic-based organization tends to increase levels of voting among Puerto Ricans. Mexicans who report experiencing discrimination are more likely to both register to vote and vote.

Clearly, group-based resources are associated with more participation at the bivariate level but the effect of these resources for each Latino subgroup is quite dif-

ferent. Are these relationships maintained once potentially intervening variables are considered, such as English language, socioeconomic status and generational status?

Table 6.8. Registration and Voting by Country of Origin and Group Identification Measures

	Registered to Vote			Voted in U.S. Election		
	<i>Mexican</i>	<i>Puerto Rican</i>	<i>Cuban</i>	<i>Mexican</i>	<i>Puerto Rican</i>	<i>Cuban</i>
<b>Group Consciousness</b>						
Latinos from different countries share one culture						
Yes	36%	71	44**	32	82	41**
No	38%	76	63	36	73	61
Latinos from different countries are working together politically						
Yes	39%	77	63	35	73	60
No	36%	75	64	35	72	61
<b>Group Identity</b>						
Primary Identity is American						
Yes	71%***	74	88***	72***	81**	85***
No	29%	76	54	26	70	52
Primary Identity is Latino						
Yes	33%*	75	55	30**	79	55
No	39%	76	63	37	72	60
Primary Identity CO						
Yes	27%***	77	54***	25***	67***	51***
No	49%	74	76	48	80	74
Volunteered for organization belonging to Ethnic Group						

Yes	89%***	84	84	82**	79*	76
No	75%	77	87	71	67	83
Discrimination Against Group						
Yes	44%***	76	65	42***	76	63
No	35%	76	60	32	71	59

Asterisks represent significant  $\chi^2$  values at \*  $p \leq .10$ , \*\*  $p \leq .05$  and \*\*\*  $p \leq .01$ .

Multivariate results of the effect of group consciousness and identity on voter turnout and registration is presented separately for Mexicans, Cubans and Puerto Ricans (see Tables 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11). For Mexicans, self-identification as an evangelical Christian is positively related to registration and voting behavior. The odds of voting among Mexicans who are of this type of faith is 1.92 times higher than it is among Mexicans who do not hold such beliefs (Table 6.9). In addition, the perception of group-based discrimination is shown to increase the probability of voting in US elections while personal discrimination increases the probability of registering to vote (Table 6.9). An examination of the contrast between adopting a Mexican versus an American identity reveals that the former decreases the probability of both voting and registering to vote (Table 6.9). Likewise, adopting a panethnic identity over an American identity also decreases the probability of voting (the table shows that American - CO is positive and therefore the contrast CO - American is negative). Turning to the effect of group-based resources on Cuban participation, it is apparent that the perception of a common linked fate decreases the probability of Cuban participation with respect to both voting and registering to vote (Table 6.10). In addition, primary identification as Cuban or as a member of a panethnic group significantly and consistently decreases political activity. This is shown by the positive coefficient on the contrast between American versus country of origin and American versus panethnic identification in Table 6.10. The results with respect to Puerto Ricans were not as informative. Nevertheless, we again see the role of discrimination in motivating political behavior (Table 6.11). The perception of individual level discrimination significantly increases the likelihood that Puerto Ricans will register to

vote (Table 6.11). In addition, adopting an American identity over a Puerto Rican identity significantly increases the probability of registering to vote (Table 6.11).

Table 6.9. Group Based Resources and Voting Behavior Among Mexicans

	Registration Among Citizens		Voting Among Citizens	
	$\beta$	Robust S.E.	$\beta$	Robust S.E.
<b>Group Consciousness</b>				
Linked fate with other Latinos (one culture)	.267	.268	.582	2.08
Political Consciousness	.234	.177	-.102	.195
Evangelical Christian	.653***	.256	.518*	.279
Group-Based Discrimination	.036	.039	.080**	.047
Personal Discrimination	.117**	.061	.054	.052
<b>Group Identity</b>				
American vs CO Identity	1.31***	.227	1.70***	.252
Panethnic vs CO Identity	.190	.200	.238	.222
American versus Panethnic Identity	1.12	.254	1.47***	.281
		$N = 355$	$N = 355$	
		Wald $\chi^2 = 93.82, p = 0.00$	Wald $\chi^2 = 66.92, p = 0.00$	
		Psuedo $R^2 = .2358$	Psuedo $R^2 = .3387$	

Table 6.10. Group Based Resources and Voting Behavior Among Cubans

	Registration Among Citizens		Voting Among Citizens	
	$\beta$	Robust S.E.	$\beta$	Robust S.E.
<b>Group Consciousness and Identity</b>				
Linked political fate with other Latinos	-1.17**	.514	-1.29***	.551
Work Together Politically	-.306	.351	.024	.368
Evangelical Christian	.451	.423	.428	.452
Group-Based Discrimination	.067	.050	-.031	.054
Personal Discrimination	.053	.082	.001	.087
<b>Group Identity</b>				
American vs CO Identity	2.38***	.518	2.37***	.506
Panethnic vs CO Identity	.595	.445	.946*	.492
American versus Panethnic Identity	1.79***	.616	1.43**	.618
	$N = 129$		$N = 129$	
	Wald $\chi^2 = 42.20, p = 0.0017$		Wald $\chi^2 = 43.67, p = 0.0010$	
	Psuedo $R^2 = .4693$		Psuedo $R^2 = .5458$	

Table 6.11. Group Based Resources and Voting Behavior Among Puerto Ricans

	Registration Among Citizens		Voting Among Citizens	
	$\beta$	Robust S.E.	$\beta$	Robust S.E.
<b>Group Consciousness</b>				
Linked political fate with other Latinos	-.550	.571	.495	.618
Work Together Politically	.197	.343	.394	.324
Evangelical Christian	.326	.406	.255	.380
Group-Based Discrimination	.134**	.059	-.011	.066
Personal Discrimination	.152*	.091	.002	.081
<b>Group Identity</b>				
American vs CO Identity	.673**	.391	.595	.396
Panethnic vs CO Identity	-.340	.466	.444	.447
American versus Panethnic Identity	.332	.528	.150	.538
	$N = 209$		$N = 210$	
	Wald $\chi^2 = 43.49, p = 0.0007$		Wald $\chi^2 = 41.81, p = 0.0012$	
	Psuedo $R^2 = .2679$		Psuedo $R^2 = .2935$	

The next set of results explores the relative outcomes of discrimination dependant on generational status and ethnicity. This hypothesis requires the addition of interacted variables to the models specified above<sup>3</sup>. The results suggest that the odds of voting among third generation Mexicans who perceive discrimination to be a problem are 1.62 times that of first generation immigrants who perceive discrimination to be problematic (results not shown). An alternative interpretation asks about the generational effect on participation among those who perceive discrimination to be a problem and those who do not. The results show that the odds of voting among third generation immigrants are 3.69 times higher if they perceive discrimination to be a problem than if they do not.

To assess the relationship between voting, exposure, identity and language retention, predicted probabilities were generated for a range of values corresponding to years lived in the United States while the other covariates remained fixed at their means. Symbolically, the predicted probability is given by

$$\hat{Pr} = (\text{Vote} = 1 | x_1, I_1 = j, I_2 = k, I_3 = l) = \Phi(\mathbf{x}_0 \hat{\beta}), j = 0, 1; k = 0, 1; l = 1, 2$$

where  $x_1$  is years lived in the US,  $I_1$  is an indicator variable corresponding to respondent's ethnic origin,  $I_2$  indicates respondent's primary mode of identification and  $I_3$  indicates linguistic capability. Table 6.12 shows the average of these probabilities for individuals at various lengths of stay in the US. Disregarding exposure for the moment, Table 6.12 reveals that English dominant Mexicans who identify primarily

---

<sup>3</sup>These results are included in the text only and are not presented in any table or figure.

as an American register and vote at higher rates than Spanish dominant Mexicans who identify with their country of origin. The situation is similar for Cubans. Turning now to the interaction between exposure, identity and language, it is apparent that exposure has a slightly greater effect on voting and registration for Cubans than Mexicans. Initially, the probability of voting and registering among Cubans is lower than among Mexicans but at some point their socialization into American culture outweighs that of Mexicans and the probability of voting and registering among Cubans becomes greater than it is among Mexicans. Clearly, exposure mediates the effect of language retention and identification as Mexican or Cuban for Mexicans and Cubans, respectively, but the mediating effect is stronger for Cubans. This is shown by comparing the predicted probabilities for Mexicans and Cubans in the last row of Table 6.12. The only exception to this pattern occurs between English dominant Mexicans and Cubans who self identify as Americans (.996 versus .976 in Table 6.12). The effect of exposure among highly acculturated individuals matters less than it does among the Spanish dominant who identify with their country of origin<sup>4</sup>. Overall, Mexicans who speak English and identify themselves as Americans have the highest overall predicted probability of voting among all the categories.

---

<sup>4</sup>There are competing explanations for these results. For example, it may be that the model was not capable of providing a good estimate for individuals who have lived in the US longer periods of time due to their small number.

Table 6.12: Group Based Resources and Electoral Participation by Identification and Linguistic Proficiency, Mexicans and Cubans Only

Years in US (Exposure)	Mexicans				Cubans			
	ED/AI		SD/CO		ED/AI		SD/CO	
	Voting	Register	Voting	Register	Voting	Register	Voting	Register
10	.143	.093	.037	.055	.022	.013	.014	.032
30	.658	.543	.308	.400	.256	.367	.172	.184
50	.957	.932	.837	.885	.838	.910	.758	.797
70	.996	.980	.985	.980	.976	.982	.986	.994

Notes: These probabilities were predicted from the logistic regression models of voting and registering to vote by varying the base values pertaining to identification and linguistic proficiency while the other independent variables were held constant at their mean values.

ED = English Dominant; AI = American Identity; SD = Spanish Dominant; CO = Country of Origin

Table 6.13 Interaction Effects of Group Discrimination And  
Voting in US Elections

	Mexican			Puerto Rican			Cuban		
	<i>b</i>	s.e.	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	s.e.	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	s.e.	<i>p</i>
American × Individual									
Discrimination	.433	-.157		.161	.211		.183	.423	
Latino × Individual									
Discrimination	.251	.134		-	-	-	-	-	-
American × Group									
Discrimination	-	-	-	-	-	-	.000	.123	
CO × Group									
Discrimination	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.030	.109	
CO × Individual									
Discrimination	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.199	.175	

Table 6.14 Interaction Effects of Group Discrimination And Registering to Vote

	Mexican			Puerto Rican			Cuban			
	<i>b</i>	s.e.	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	s.e.	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	s.e.	<i>p</i>	
American × Individual										
Discrimination	-	-		.141	.201		-	-		
Latino × Group										
Discrimination	-	-		-	-	-	.313	.140		
American × Group										
Discrimination	-	-	-	.024	.131		.082	.148		
CO × Group										
Discrimination	-	-	-	-.026	.114		-.260	.127		
CO × Individual										
Discrimination	-	-	-	-.202	.187		-.254	.179		

Table 6.15: Context of Reception by Voting, Registration and National Origin

Variable	Mexican				Puerto Rican				Cuban			
	US Born		Foreign Born		US Born		Foreign Born		US Born		Foreign Born	
	Voted	Reg	Voted	Reg	Voted	Reg	Voted	Reg	Voted	Reg	Voted	Reg
Percent												
Hispanic	.146***	.154**	.336*	.340**	.105**	.108	.252	.245	.105***	.110	.501*	.5031
Percent												
Foreign Born	.109***	.111**	.229*	.227**	.100***	.101*	.225**	.218	.101***	.104*	.457	.459
Percent												
Citizen	.591***	.590	.626***	.634**	.577	.578*	.562	.563	.578*	.579*	.5460	.546
Ratio of Poverty												
to Income Level	.057***	.058	.070	.069	.056**	.0575	.083	.083	.055	.056	.076	.077

Notes: Test of hypothesis that  $H_a : diff > 0$  where  $diff = \bar{X}_{(0)} - \bar{X}_{(1)}$  among individuals by voting and registration (citizens only)

Source: US Census Summary Tape File 4

To test segmented assimilation theory, I examined the effect of context of reception on voting and registration. Table 6.15, which is a crosstabulation of context of reception and neighborhood variables by nativity status and national origin, provides some insight into how socialization and neighborhood context impacts voting and registration. The table provides the results of a test that there is no statistical difference in neighborhood context between voters/non-voters and registrants/non-registrants. In other words, it is a test of whether the difference in these contextual variables is different from zero. Mexicans who voted and registered are significantly less likely to live in areas characterized by high Latino concentrations. Similarly, US born Puerto Rican and Cubans are who live in areas with high concentrations of Latinos are less likely to vote. With few exceptions, Latinos who live in areas characterized by large foreign born populations are less likely to vote and register. Foreign born Mexicans are significantly more likely to vote and register if they live in areas with a large proportion of citizens. Finally, US born Puerto Ricans and Mexicans are significantly less likely to vote if they live in areas characterized by high ratios of poverty to income levels.

Do the univariate results change when other, possibly confounding variables are added to a multivariate logistic regression? To ascertain the effect of these contextual variables while holding other variables constant, I next re-ran the regressions including the contextual variables and the interaction of these variables with generational status, language and discrimination variables. Only two significant results emerged from the analysis. The results remain substantially similar to those presented above. For example, the cultural and structural assimilation measures and the context of

reception variables remained statistically significant. Additionally, I found that Mexicans who live in highly concentrated Latino areas are significantly less likely to vote ( $b = -.977, se = .536, p = 0.06$ ). For each standard deviation change in percent Hispanic ( $s.d. = .201$ ) the odds of voting decrease by 17.7%. Each percentage point decrease in percent Hispanic increases the odds of voting by 1.22, holding the acculturation, group-based resources and sociodemographic variables constant at their means. An additional finding was that of a significant association between the percentage of citizens in the area and Cuban political behavior. Cubans who live in areas characterized by high percentages of citizens are significantly more likely to vote ( $b = 1.49, se = .583, p = 0.01$ ). For each standard deviation change in percent citizens ( $s.d. = .119$ ), the odds of voting increase by 19%.

According to segmented assimilation theory, immigrants living in low-SES communities are worse off if they assimilate fully than if they do not. The estimated coefficients from the various interaction terms are presented in Tables 6.16 and 6.17. Table 6.16 presents the results using income to poverty rate in the neighborhood. Among a total of 54 coefficients, only two attained statistical significance. Both, however, are in an opposite direction than predicted by segmented assimilation theory. For example, the results suggest that Mexicans living in a poor area are more likely to vote and register as years lived in the United States increases. In Table 6.17, I change the context measure to perceived discrimination against one's ethnic group. Again, of the 54 coefficients estimated, only 5 reach statistical significance. Of these, none were in the direction of segmented assimilation theory.

On the whole, it seems there is very little evidence in favor of segmented assimila-

tion theory. Since well over 100 tests were conducted, some of the coefficients should be significant purely by chance. Furthermore, a large number were in a direction opposite to segmented assimilation.

Table 6.16: Interaction Between Disadvantaged Context and Assimilation

Acculturation and Assimilation	Poor Neighborhood					
	Mexicans		Puerto Ricans		Cubans	
	Voted	Registered	Voted	Registered	Voted	Registered
Length of Stay	+	**	+	**	+	-
Length of Stay > 5	-	-	-	+	-	-
% Citizens in Neighborhood	+	-	-	-	+	+
% Citizens > .59	-	-	-	-	+	+
% Co-ethnics in Neighborhood	-	+	+	+	+	+
% Co-Ethnics > .25	-	-	+	-	+	+
% Foreign Born	+	+	-	-	+	+
% Foreign Born > .21	-	-	-	+	+	+
Language	+	+	+	+	+	+

Table 6.17: Interaction Between Disadvantaged Context and Assimilation  
 Perception of Group-Based Discrimination

	Mexicans		Puerto Ricans		Cubans	
	Voted	Registered	Voted	Registered	Voted	Registered
Acculturation and Assimilation						
Length of Stay	-	-	-	-	-	+
Length of Stay > 5	***	-	+	+	-	-
% Citizens in Neighborhood	+	+	+	-	-	-
% Citizens > .59	+	-	+	-	-	-
% Co-ethnics in Neighborhood	+	+	+	+	+	-
% Co-Ethnics > .25	+	+	+	+	+	-
% Foreign Born	+	+	-	+	+	+
% Foreign Born > .21	+	-	-	-	+	-
Language	+	+	-	+	-	***

## 6.6 A typology of Latino voting behavior

In this section, non-voting is regarded as a possible outcome of the voting decision, and it is assumed that individuals manifest an underlying propensity to vote or not based on their disposition towards political objects at various different structural levels. It is possible to objectively identify different “typologies” of voters according to this underlying propensity and this allows an explanation for the causes and consequences of non-voting. Accordingly, I provide a latent class analysis of Latino voting behavior using data from the 2002 National Survey of Latinos. The items selected to represent voting behavior are strictly related to voting and not other forms of participation.

Figure 6.3 shows the elements of the latent class model (Lubke and Muthen, 2005). The  $Y_i$ 's are dichotomous observed variables that act as indicators for the latent trait,  $\eta$ , such as the propensity to vote or not vote in a US election. Each  $\epsilon$  represents the error variance unique to each  $Y$  variable. The factor is therefore composed of a pure measure of the latent construct separated from the error variance (Shrayne et al., 2006).

Not all variables must be endogenous to the latent class variable represented by  $C$  in Figure 6.3. For example, the measures of acculturation, assimilation, group-based resources and context of reception can be included in the model to predict the distribution of  $C$ , the latent class. These variables are represented by  $X$  in Figure 6.3. Because  $C$  is considered a discrete variable by nature, non-linear methods, such as multinomial logistic regression, are required to estimate the effect of the covariates on latent class membership in cases when more than 2 latent classes emerge to provide




Figure 6.3. Latent Class Model of Latino Voting, Source: Shryane et al., 2006

the best fit to the data. When there are only 2 latent classes, multinomial logistic regression reduces to binary logistic regression, similar to methods used to estimate the effect of several variables on a discrete set of dependent variables.

One goal of this chapter is to test whether or not there is significant heterogeneity among Latinos with respect to voting in particular at different structural levels. The hypothesis is that Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans have different latent dispositions towards electoral politics and that these latent dispositions depend on sociodemographic characteristics, level of acculturation, reception into US society and other structural or attitudinal mechanisms traditionally believe to be barriers to participation. The following three items from the 2004 Latino National Survey: Politics and Civic Participation were chosen:

QN48 Have you ever voted in a United States Election? (Yes Voted = 1, No, did not voted = 2)

QN49 We often find out that a lot of people aren't able to vote because they were not registered, or they were sick, or they just didn't have time. Do you remember for sure whether you voted in the November 2002 congressional election in your district? (Yes Voted = 1, No, did not voted = 2)

QN50 Do you remember for sure whether you voted in the November 2000 presidential election when George W. Bush ran against Al Gore and Ralph Nader? (Yes Voted = 1, No, did not voted = 2)

The crosstabulation for each ethnic group is shown in Table 6.18. It is apparent

that the largest probability corresponds to  $Y_1 = 1, Y_2 = 1, Y_3 = 1$  for each subgroup of Mexicans ( $G = 1$ )(.68), Puerto Ricans ( $G = 2$ )(.67) and Cubans ( $G = 3$ )(.87).

In latent class analysis the number of latent factors is specified by the data. As shown in Table 6.19, the two class model provides the most acceptable fit and also the most meaningful theoretical interpretation with respect to voting behavior. This model can be interpreted as a highly participatory class of voters and a highly non-participatory class. Therefore, the two latent class model offers a meaningful typology for analyzing voting behavior.

Table 6.18: Crosstabulation of Voting Patterns

$G$	$Y_1$	$Y_2$	$f$	$P(Y_1, Y_2, Y_3 = j, k, l)$
1	1	1	323	.68
1	1	2	40	.08
1	2	1	16	.03
1	2	2	99	.21
2	1	1	122	.67
2	1	2	13	.07
2	2	1	12	.07
2	2	2	34	.19
3	1	1	187	.87
3	1	2	11	.05
3	2	1	4	.02
3	2	2	14	.06

Notes:  $G$ =group; 1=Mexican; 2=Puerto Rican; 3=Cuban

Table 6.19: Type III Sums of Squares for Goodness of fit

	$LL$	AIC	BIC	$\chi^2$	$p$
Independence	-1773.910	3559.819	3588.465	396.47	0.00
2-class with complete heterogeneity	-1598.194	3226.389	3298.002	0.00	0.00
2-class with complete homogeneity	-1599.956	3213.914	3247.333	3.785	.151
Sample Size			875		

The results of fitting a two-class latent structure to the data are shown below. Figure 6.4 presents the probabilities,  $\pi_t^X$  of falling into each of the two classes for Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban immigrants, respectively. Notably, the respondents are not equally distributed across classes. Roughly 85% of Cubans fall into class 1, whereas only 67% of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans were assigned to Class 1 respectively. These estimates are very close to the marginal proportions reported above (Table 6.18).

The cell entries of Table 6.20 refer to the conditional probability ( $\hat{\pi}^{\bar{A}X}$ ) that a respondent obtains a particular score on a manifest variable given that he or she belongs to a particular class. For instance, a Mexican immigrant who belongs to latent class 1 voted in the 2000 presidential election with probability 1.0. Similarly, the conditional probability of having voted in the 2002 congressional election given membership in class 1 is .99. The table reveals that a similar latent class structure exists for Cuban immigrants. The conditional probabilities of voting given membership in class 1 are 1.00 for both the 2000 and 2002 elections, respectively. We again observe a similar latent class structure for Puerto Ricans. For example, the conditional probability of voting in the 2000 election given membership in class 1 is .99 for Puerto Ricans. Similarly, the conditional probability for 2002 is .99. From these probabilities, it is evident that there is a highly participatory class to which 67% of Mexicans, 68% of Puerto Ricans and 85% of Cuban immigrants belong. On the other hand, there is a highly nonparticipatory class to which 33%, 33% and 15% of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans belong, respectively. In this class of non-voters, the conditional probability of *not* voting in the 2000 presidential election given membership in class 2

is .75 for Puerto Ricans (cf. .73 for Mexicans and .56 for Cubans). What, then, is the overall pattern that emerges from these data? There is a highly participatory class of Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban immigrants. It therefore seems reasonable to label this class of individuals “electorally responsive.” Conversely, there is a smaller but highly nonparticipatory class which is deemed the “electorally nonresponsive” class (Figure 6.4). The next section delves further to explore the characteristics that the predict membership in each class.

Table 6.20: Estimated Parameters for the Unrestricted Heterogeneous and Partially Restricted Homogeneous LCM

<i>Model</i>	Group Latent		$\pi_{st}^{G\bar{X}}$	$\pi_{st}^{\bar{V}00GX}$	$\pi_{st}^{\bar{V}02GX}$
	<i>s</i>	Class <i>t</i>			
$H_1$	1	1	.67	1.0	.99
		2	.33	.27	.14
	2	1	.33	.99	.99
		2	.68	.25	.23
	3	1	.85	1.0	1.0
		2	.15	.44	.22
$H'_1$	1	1	.70	.99 <sup>a</sup>	.96 <sup>a</sup>
		1	.30	.21	.16
	2	1	.69	.99 <sup>a</sup>	.96 <sup>a</sup>
		2	.31	.21	.16
	3	1	.90	.99 <sup>a</sup>	.96 <sup>a</sup>
		2	.10	.21	.16

a The parameter value is subject to an across-group homogeneity constraint.

$$\pi_{st}^{\bar{V}00GX} = \text{Voted in 2000}; \pi_{st}^{\bar{V}02GX} = \text{Voted in 2002}$$

Table 6.21 shows the two-class model that estimated regression coefficients for Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban immigrants and Table 6.22 shows the significance levels for the reduction in log likelihood when each variable is added to the model.




Figure 6.4. Gamma Parameter Estimates for Latent Class Membership (Voting)




Figure 6.5. Rho Parameter Estimates of Electoral Participation

The effects of assimilation on class membership were quite substantial. The multiplicative effect of assimilation on class membership reveals that each additional unit increases the odds of being in class 1 (electorally responsive) relative to class 2 (electorally nonresponsive) by 21%, 7% and 80% for Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans, respectively. Linguistic assimilation tended to be related to class membership in directions one would expect. As proficiency in English increases, the odds of being in the class characterized as electorally responsive increases for both Puerto Ricans and Cubans. The change in the predicted probability of being in class I relative to class II over the range of linguistic proficiency is .087 for Puerto Ricans and .272 for Cubans. The effect of group consciousness is largest among Cubans and opposite to that of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. Believing in a common linked fate increases the odd of membership in class I by 1.68 for Mexicans and 1.36 for Puerto Ricans. On the other hand, the pattern is reversed among Cubans. Cubans who believe in a common linked fate among all Latinos are significantly less likely to be in the electorally responsive class ( $O.R. = .568$ ). Mexicans and Cubans who believe it is important for Latinos to maintain aspects of their culture have higher odds of being in class I relative to class II, a finding that is not inconsistent with the finding for linked fate. The latter refers to unity among all Latinos whereas the former refers to unity among one's ethnic group. Volunteering in an ethnic based organization significantly increases the odds of being in a highly participatory class for both Mexicans (1.31) and Puerto Ricans (1.35). Finally, increasing levels of education and age increase the odds of being in a highly participatory class.

Table 6.21 Covariates, Parameter Estimates ( $\rho$ ) and Class Prevalence ( $\gamma$ )						
Electoral Responsiveness versus Electoral Nonresponsiveness						
Variable	Mexican		Puerto Rican		Cuban	
	$\beta$	$\hat{\pi}$	$\beta$	$\hat{\pi}$	$\beta$	$\hat{\pi}$
<b>Acculturation and Assimilation</b>						
Language	0.037	1.04	-0.064	0.938	-0.204	0.815
Assimilation	0.188	1.21	0.065	1.07	0.576	1.78
Generation 1	0.232	1.26	0.961	2.61	-0.245	0.783
Years in US	0.029	1.03	0.015	1.02	0.018	1.02
<b>Group-Based Resources</b>						
Linked Fate	-0.516	0.597	-0.309	0.735	0.565	1.76
Volunteer	0.268	1.31	0.302	1.35	-0.074	0.929
Retain Culture	-0.364	0.695	0.042	1.04	-1.02	0.361
Melting Pot	-0.150	0.861	-1.25	0.287	0.913	2.49
Perceived Discrimination	0.688	1.99	0.491	1.63	-.237	0.789
Discrimination	0.587	1.80	1.23	3.42	0.233	1.26
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>						
Socioeconomic Status						
Education	-0.169	0.845	-0.128	0.880	-0.216	0.806
Income	0.008	1.01	-0.004	0.996	0.049	1.05
$\gamma$						
$P(X = 1)$	.656		0.615		0.831	

$P(X = 2)$	0.344	0.386	0.1687
$\rho$			
Voted 2000			
$P(Y = 1 X = 1)$		0.998	
$P(Y = 1 X = 2)$		0.182	
Voted 2002			
$P(Y = 1 X = 1)$		0.984	
$P(Y = 1 X = 2)$		0.365	

---

Notes: Class 1 is the reference category.  $P(Y = 1|X = 1) + P(Y = 2|X = 1) = 1$ .

X is the latent class, Y is the response "Yes, voted." All Latinos

Table 6.22: Beta Parameter Test Type III Sums of Squares Based on  $2 \times LL$ 

Covariate	Exclusion LL	Change in $2LL$	df	$p$
Panethnic	-620.20	6.47	3	0.09
Assimilate	-659.16	12.74	3	0.01
Retain Culture	-682.32	6.76	3	0.07
Melting Pot	-672.98	3.61	3	0.31
Generation 1	-683.98	14.00	3	0.00
Generation 2	-685.91	.787	2	0.68
Language	-621.80	9.67	3	0.02
Work together politically	-690.55	3.13	3	0.37
Volunteer	-680.52	7.64	3	0.05
Home Country Politics	-675.86	2.56	3	0.46
Education	-622.56	11.21	3	0.01
Income	-617.95	1.98	3	0.57
Individual Discrimination	-679.96	1.32	3	0.72
Group-Based Discrimination	-675.52	0.65	3	0.88
Political Efficacy	-677.27	9.99	3	0.01
Political Apathy	-683.98	6.45	3	0.09
Age	-637.28	40.64	3	0.00
Married	-684.32	12.91	3	0.00
Female	-683.98	5.28	3	0.15

## 6.7 A negative binomial model of Latino citizenship acquisition

Among first generation immigrants, citizenship acquisition is an important indicator of political assimilation. Researchers exploring patterns of Latino naturalization tend to model it as a dichotomous response using logistic regression analysis. Consequently, we know the factors that predict citizenship versus noncitizenship but we do not know the factors responsible for decreasing the rate at which immigrants naturalize. This

knowledge would greatly help us understand how quickly immigrants are assimilating to the polity once they are eligible to do so<sup>5</sup>. The rate at which immigrants choose to become citizens once eligible has further implications for other types of political activity since citizenship is a legal prerequisite for voting (although in practice, the lack of citizenship may not preclude individuals from registering to vote and even voting). In any event, the most often cited reason given by Latinos for attaining citizenship status is that it provides them with the ability to vote.

Among Latinos, there is substantial inter-group variation that characterizes whether or not to become a United States citizen or to participate in politics. Naturalization is less of an issue among Puerto Ricans because they are granted citizenship status due to their commonwealth origins (McClain and Garcia 1993); it is, however, an important indicator of attachment to the US polity for foreign born Mexicans and Cubans. Overall, there is broad agreement in the literature that naturalized Hispanics vote at lower rates than the native-born. The fact that the majority of Mexicans and Cubans living in this country were not born in the United States highlights what has been considered to be a major barrier to political participation: the large proportion of Latinos that are ineligible to vote. In an attempt to explain naturalization rates among the foreign born, several studies have found that a process of reinforcement through exposure to the political system underlies the development of political attitudes among immigrant groups (Wong, 2000). Highton and Burris (2002), for example, studied the interaction between nativity status and exposure and report

---

<sup>5</sup>There are laws dictating how long an individual must wait before he or she is eligible to become a citizen. On average, these laws mandate a 5 year waiting period.

that nativity status has a powerful effect on turnout, but only when considered in conjunction with the number of years lived in the United States.

Many researchers have noted that Hispanic immigrants naturalize at a very slow pace. In Jones-Correa's (1998) well-cited study of naturalization rates among 112 Latinos from New York city, he found that naturalization is often delayed due to the conflict that immigrants feel from on the one hand desiring to join the political community and on the other feeling as if they are betraying their homeland. Cubans are unique in that strong anti-Castro sentiment coupled with a unique political status have produced high naturalization rates (McClain 1993). In addition, discrimination may be causally related to one's decision *not* to acquire citizenship status. For example, in my research on Cuban refugees, I found that in addition to income, age and satisfaction with the United States, perceived discrimination is significant to a Cuban's decision to become a United States citizen. Additionally, DeSipio (2001) found that individual differences such as education and income are more significant than nationality differences in explaining immigrant naturalization, even though national origins continue to have predictive value. Another factor that should be considered is that individuals in the second generation have long had a pattern of distancing themselves from immigrants rather than linking them to the polity (de la Garza, 2004; Browning and de la Garza 1986, Mollenkopf et al., 2001). These researchers believe that the extent that different nationalities adhere to this pattern, they could reduce the pace at which conationals naturalize.

This section explores the factors related to the waiting time to citizenship among first generation immigrants. Two continuous variables derived from the 2002 National

Latino Survey were used to model the dependent variable. First generation immigrants were first asked the year they came to the United States. They were further asked to provide the year in which they became a citizen. Subtracting these two values yielded a positive count variable that indicated length of time it took them to acquire citizenship status.

### 6.7.1 Results

The average waiting time to citizenship over the sample was 13.3 with a variance of approximately 64, which indicates significant overdispersion of the data. The form of the overdispersion is shown in Figures 6.6 and 6.7. The diamonds show the predicted probabilities from a Poisson distribution with  $\mu = 13.3$ . Compared to the Poisson distribution, the observed distribution has substantially fewer counts less than five, which makes sense given the legal restrictions, and more observations greater than five. Overall, the sample variance is larger than would be expected if naturalization was governed by a Poisson process in which both Mexicans and Cubans naturalized at the same rate. This leads quite naturally to other estimation techniques, such as the negative binomial response model, which accounts for such heterogeneity in the data. Both figures indicate that this model represents a significant improvement over the Poisson distribution.

The simplest way to interpret the results of the negative binomial response model is by using the factor changes in the expected count (See Appendix C for variable codings and regression output). The separate regressions for Mexicans and Cubans




Figure 6.6. Negative Binomial and Poisson Predicted Probabilities vs. Observed Proportion for Model Fit




Figure 6.7. Negative Binomial Predicted Probabilities Based on Estimated Means

are given in Tables 6.23 and 6.25, respectively. For Mexicans, the expected waiting time decreases when individuals identify with Mexico versus as a Latino/Hispanic ( $\beta = -.19, p = .07$ ). Mexicans who do not believe that group-based discrimination is a problem naturalize at faster rates than Mexicans who do believe that group-based discrimination is a problem ( $\beta = -.06, p = .01$ ). Mexicans who believe that life is better in Mexico ( $\beta = -.085, p = .07$ ) and who have weak ties to Mexico ( $\beta = -.06, p = .01$ ) naturalize at faster rates than Mexicans who believe that life is better in the US<sup>6</sup> and who have strong ties to Mexico. Finally, the results show that educational attainment ( $\beta = -.187, p = .00$ ) decreases waiting time while years lived in the United States ( $\beta = .041, p = .07$ ) tends to increase it.

---

<sup>6</sup>This result is counterintuitive. See Appendix C for final regression model.

Table 6.23: Negative Binomial Regression of Waiting time to citizenship

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Factor Change</i>			<i>Discrete Change</i>			
	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Std</i>	<i>Marginal Effect</i>	$0 \rightarrow 1$	$\Delta$ Range	$\Delta 1$	$\Delta s$
<b>Identificational Assimilation</b>							
American Identification	0.939	0.986	-3.76	-3.66	—	—	—
Identified Mexico as true homeland	0.774	0.880	-3.60	-3.57	—	—	—
<b>Cultural Assimilation</b>							
Language Scale	1.10	1.20	1.35	—	10.76	1.36	2.61
Years In US	1.03	1.40	1.96	—	59.36	1.96	19.82
<b>Attitudinal/Behavioral Receptional</b>							
Life Better in US	1.06	1.09	0.82	—	4.97	0.82	1.23
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>							
Education	0.842	0.848	-2.42	—	-6.51	-2.42	-2.32
Income	0.992	0.944	-0.119	—	-2.80	-0.119	-0.814
<b>Group Consciousness</b>							
Mexican Identification	0.876	0.943	-1.87	-1.93	—	—	—
Political Consciousness	0.954	0.977	-0.668	-0.667	—	—	—
Personal discrimination	0.921	0.863	-1.16	—	-11.26	-1.16	-2.07
<b>Ties to Country of Origin</b>							
Ties to Mexico	0.853	0.846	-2.24	—	-10.07	-2.24	-2.36
Plans to move back to Mexico	0.761	0.886	-3.847	-3.614	—	—	—
<b>Control Variable</b>							

Age 1.02 1.27 0.275 — 17.01 0.275 3.33

Notes: Mexican Immigrants Only

**Table 6.24: Predicted Probability of Citizenship given fixed values of American Identification, Discrimination and Ethnic Ties holding other variables at their mean**

Variable		Predicted mean $\mu$	$P(y > Maxk = \mu)$
True Homeland	Mexico	15.33	0.53
	United States	10.76	0.28
Primary Mode of Identification	Country of Origin	12.19	0.49
	Latino/Hispanic	13.27	0.53
Group-Based Discrimination	3 (Major Problem)	10.81	0.52
	6 (Minor Problem)	9.69	0.38
	9 (Not a Problem)	8.37	0.22
Ethnic Ties	-2 (Strong Ties)	12.93	0.41
	0	11.13	0.30
	2 (Weak Ties)	9.59	0.21

Note:  $\mu = 15$ . Mexican Immigrants Only

Turning next to the output for Cuban respondents, we observe a different pattern. For example, income ( $\beta = -.023, p = .04$ ), identification with the US versus Cuba as one's true homeland ( $\beta = .35, p = .02$ ) and years lived in the US ( $\beta = .030, p = .00$ ) are the only variables that significantly affect citizenship acquisition. More specifically, Cubans with high income levels have shorter waiting times than Cubans with low levels of income. Identification with Cuba as one's true homeland and years lived in the US increase waiting time. The positive coefficient on the exposure variable for both Mexicans and Cubans suggests that there may be a window of opportunity and once that opportunity is missed it is gone forever. Tables 6.25 and 6.26 are alternative ways to analyze and think about the data. The tables show the probability that waiting time will be greater than expected for the significant variables fixed at various levels while the other variables in the model are held constant at their means for each regression separately. For example, Mexicans who identify with Mexico are predicted to wait 15.33 years before acquiring citizenship versus 10.76 years for Mexicans who identify the US as their true homeland. This suggests that with respect to political assimilation, ties to one's home country matters less for Mexicans than it does for Cubans. The predicted probability that waiting time will exceed its expected value among individuals who identify with Mexico is .49 compared to .53 among Mexicans who identify as Latino/Hispanic. The probability of exceeding the expected waiting time for individuals with strong ties to Mexico is more than twice that of individuals with only weak ties. Among Cubans, on the other hand, individuals who identify Cuba as their true homeland are expected to wait approximately 2 years longer than Cubans who identify the US as their true homeland (7.54 - 5.29). The predicted prob-

ability that waiting time will exceed its expected value is twice as large among Cubans who identify as Cuba versus as Latino/Hispanic. Finally, lower income Cubans have significantly longer waiting times than Cubans with high incomes (Table 6.26).

Table 6.25: Negative Binomial Regression of Waiting time to citizenship

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Factor Change</i>		<i>Discrete Change</i>				
			<i>Marginal</i>				
	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Std</i>	<i>Effect</i>	<i>0 → 1</i>	<i>Δ Range</i>	<i>Δ 1</i>	<i>Δ s</i>
<b>Identificational Assimilation</b>							
American Identification	.873	.948	-1.46	-1.40	—	—	—
Identified Cuba as true homeland	1.35	1.15	9.07	9.67	—	—	—
<b>Cultural Assimilation</b>							
Years in US	1.03	1.45	1.01	—	52.53	1.01	11.16
Language	.949	.905	-.563	—	-4.18	-.563	-1.07
<b>Attitudinal/Behavioral Receptional</b>							
Better in US	.967	.943	-.354	—	-2.14	-.354	-.627
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>							
Education	.820	.795	-2.13	—	-6.58	-2.13	-2.46
Income	.983	.859	-.189	—	-5.16	-.189	-1.63
<b>Group Consciousness</b>							
Cuban Identification	1.01	1.00	.087	.087	—	—	—
Political Consciousness	1.09	1.04	.900	.904	—	—	—
Personal Disc	.987	.973	-.142	—	-2.41	-.142	-.292
<b>Ties to Country of Origin</b>							
Future Plans to move back to Cuba	1.06	1.02	.571	.578	—	—	—

Ties to Cuba	.974	.974	-.287	—	-1.18	-.287	-.284
<b>Control Variables</b>							
Age	1.01	1.20	.130	—	8.92	.130	1.95

Note: Cuban Immigrants Only

Table 6.26: Predicted Probability of Citizenship given fixed values of American Identification, and Income holding other variables at their mean

Variable		Predicted mean $\mu$	$P(y > Maxk = \mu)$
True Homeland	Cuba	7.54	0.22
	United States	5.29	0.07
Primary Mode of Identification	Country of Origin	5.99	0.11
	Latino/Hispanic	5.07	0.06
Income	1 (Low Income)	7.82	0.24
Discrimination	15 (Medium Income)	5.61	0.09
	29 (High Income)	3.93	0.02

Note:  $\mu = 13$ . Cuban Immigrants Only

## 6.8 Summary and Conclusions

This chapter explored three competing models of assimilation theory with respect to Latino electoral behavior. The various measures of acculturation and assimilation did a relatively better job than either the ethnic disadvantage or segmented assimilation models at predicting electoral participation across all Latino subgroups. More specifically, generational status and years lived in the United States increased the likelihood of registering to vote and voting among Mexicans, Cubans and Puerto Ricans. Highton and Burris (2002) suggested that socialization and exposure to American culture explain why turnout is higher among Latinos who have resided in the US for greater periods of time. According to these authors, citizens who have lived in the country for longer periods of time tend to be more linguistically assimilated, which may assist the acquisition of political information and further increase turnout. In fact, English dominance was highly related to political participation across all subgroups further supporting the predictions of straightline assimilation theory. In addition, those who have resided in the US longer tend to be more structurally assimilated. Structural assimilation was also significantly related to electoral participation but the precise relationships differed by subgroup. Interestingly, identificational assimilation, that is preferring an American identity to a national origin or panethnic identity, was consistently and strongly related to voting and registering to vote, with its strongest effect being exerted on Cuban participation. I suggest that in addition to socializing and exposure factors, the meaning given to “being American” explains, in part, why electoral participation is higher among Cubans who identify as American. Researchers

have suggested that American national identity is meaningful because it leads to political outcomes (Citrin, 2003) and the present findings tend to support this assertion. Latinos do not merely make empty claims that they are American, claiming membership in the American community has political consequences as well. The variables measuring attitudinal and behavioral assimilation were not in the direction predicted by straightline theory, and therefore do not support the model in that respect. For example, the variable pertaining to the relative conditions in the US being better than they are than one's country of origin did not consistently predict electoral participation among Mexicans, Puerto Ricans or Cubans. In fact, a counterintuitive finding was that Mexicans who believe life is better in the US had longer waiting times to citizenship acquisition. Therefore, the "better life" hypothesis was not supported by these data.

An important finding from this chapter is that not only do increasing ties to the US increase political participation, but decreasing ties to one's country of origin increase it as well. In addition, I showed that increasing ties to the US simultaneously decrease political participation in one's country of origin. Therefore, this provides evidence that first generation immigrants display high levels of commitment to the American polity and as they assimilate both culturally and structurally, political ties to their homeland decrease. Because decreasing ties to one's country of origin implies increasing ties to the US, this variable is taken as an important measure of assimilation.

Turning to the effect of group-based resources, I found very little support for the hypothesis for the ethnic disadvantage or segmented models. Overall, the results sug-

gest that the effect of group consciousness, group identity, sense of common culture and experiences with discrimination on registration and voting all appear to differ by ethnic origin and vary in importance both within and between national origin groups. For example, individuals opting for either a national origin or panethnic identity consistently participated at lower levels in comparison to those who preferred an American identity. Previous research has viewed attachment to one's culture and identification with that culture as an important group based resource, but here I found that these variables had a negative effect or no effect at all. The analysis further suggests that identification as American, in addition to being a measure of assimilation, should also be considered a group based resource in future studies. Not only is claiming membership in the American community directly related to political participation, I have also shown that American identification has a protective effect in the face of perceptions of discrimination. This was demonstrated in the interaction effects between discrimination and identification as an American which suggested that individuals who prefer an American identity and who perceive discrimination to be problematic have a higher probability of voting and registering to vote than those who do not perceive discrimination to be problematic (Tables 6.13 and 6.14). Importantly, the consistent finding of the impact of discrimination on political participation supports the ethnic disadvantage model. Nevertheless, in contrast to previous research, I showed that it is not the adoption of an ethnic identity that mitigates the effect of discrimination, it is actually the preference for an American identity. This result held across several regressions and among all subgroups. Among Cubans, group-based resources tend to suppress political activity whereas the traditional indicators of assimilation

consistently increased political behavior. This is a very important finding that has not been discussed in the literature, despite the acknowledgement that Cubans are distinct from other Latino groups. The perception of a common linked fate, as well as the preference for a panethnic identity, both significantly decreased Cuban political participation. As discussed in the previous chapter, Cubans have a strong preference for participating into American culture almost to the exclusion of their own. Individuals clearly take pride in being American and identifying with other Latinos has a strong negative effect on political assimilation, at least with respect to voting and registration. Finally, there is some evidence that participation in the evangelical church motivates Mexican political behavior.

The latent class analysis supported the results of the logistic regression, and extended those results to characterize Latino voting behavior into clusters of highly responsive and highly nonresponsive individuals. In addition, the latent class analysis revealed significant homogeneity in voting behavior across subgroups. However, the negative binomial response model revealed significant differences in the rate at which Latino subgroups naturalize, with Cubans tending to acquire citizenship at faster rates than Mexicans. This suggests that the participation profile of Mexicans, Cubans and Puerto Ricans may be similar but that differences in naturalization rates create the appearance that Mexicans are not as politically active as Cubans.

While the unadjusted estimates show that context of reception and neighborhood quality effect participation, the importance of those variables disappeared when controlling for other covariates pertaining to assimilation and acculturation. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that as the percent of Hispanics increases, Mexican

participation decreases. In addition, I found that Cubans living in areas characterized by high percentages of citizens tend to vote at higher levels. A more direct test of segmented assimilation theory failed to reveal any significant results.

## **Chapter 7**

### **Group Solidarity, Pan-Ethnic**

### **Identity and Acculturation: A**

### **Resource Model of Latino**

### **Nonelectoral Political Participation**

#### **7.1 Introduction**

Due to the large proportion of noncitizens, nonelectoral political participation assumes a peculiar salience among Latinos. Engagement in nonelectoral types of activities represents one of the few ways in which noncitizens can effect their personal policy preferences (de la Garza, 2004). It also functions “to stimulate the development of local civic institutions that produces social capital, which strengthens neighborhoods

and empowers ethnic groups (de la Garza, 2004, p. 95).”

Nonelectoral behavior among Latinos is highly correlated with electoral involvement. Diaz (1996), for example, found that Puerto Ricans and Mexicans involved with political organizations vote at higher rates than those who are not involved in political organizations. Nonelectoral participation has been further found to be a function of social capital rather than of ethnicity. Nevertheless, nonelectoral involvement among Latinos is lower than it is among other ethnic groups, such as African Americans and Anglos. Significant differences exist, too, between Latino subgroups. Cubans have the lowest rates of nonelectoral participation and, despite having much higher incomes, are the least likely to make contributions to political or social causes. Moreover, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans are more likely than Anglos to attend political rallies or wear campaign buttons but generally speaking they are more active than Cubans.

With limited exception, scholars have not found any significant differences in nonelectoral participation between foreign-born citizens and natives: both groups have been shown to have very low levels of civic engagement. One exception is a qualitative study undertaken by Segura et al. (1999) of four heavily populated Latino communities in California and New Mexico. They found that foreign-born Latinos had lower levels of civic and political engagement than the native-born Latinos, but the results are not generalizable (Segura et al., 1999). More recent studies have found that, irrespective of national origin, both foreign born and native-born Latinos have similarly low rates of participation in activities such as political demonstrations or contributing money to an election campaign (de la Garza, 2004).

## 7.2 Data and Method

The data for this study are derived from the 2004 National Survey of Latinos: Politics and Civic Participation. To explore the effects of group identification, group consciousness, context of reception and acculturation on nonelectoral engagement among Latinos, the following indicators of nonelectoral political engagement were utilized as dependent variables in several regression models:

- Have you attended a public meeting or demonstration in the community in which you live;
- Have you contacted an elected official;
- Have you contributed money to a candidate running for public office;
- Have you attended a political party meeting or function; or
- Have you worked as a volunteer or for pay for a political candidate.

Possible responses included “1 = Yes” and “2 = No.” An ordered set of responses was created to quantify the level of each respondent’s nonelectoral political participation. Responses were recoded to indicate a range of possible participatory activity from no participation to frequent participation. The five participation variables were added together to create an index that ranged from 5 to 10, such that individuals with a score of 5 participated in all five activities and individuals with a score of 10 did not participate in any activity. A score of 10 was recoded as “1 = None of the time.” A score of 9 was recoded as “Rarely.” A score of 8 was recoded as “Often.”

Scores 5, 6, and 7 were recoded as “Very Often.” The distribution of responses is shown in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1. Distribution of Responses of Nonelectoral participation among a sample of  $N = 2154$  Latinos  
Source: 2004 National Political Survey of Latinos

<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent of Sample</b>
None of the time	70%
Rarely	16
Often	8
Very Often	6

Due to the nature of the dependent variable, ordinal logistic regression techniques were used to estimate the model. This has advantages over other techniques because treating these measures as if they were an interval level involves the implicit assumption that the intervals between adjacent categories are equal (Long, 1997). Finally, estimating simultaneous equations using proportional odds models takes advantage of what seems to be the natural ordering of the outcome variable. A test of the proportional odds assumption, while stringent, was met in all models reported.

Table 7.2. Descriptive Statistics on Nonelectoral Engagement Among Latinos

	All		M		PR		C		U.S.		FB		FBNC	
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
C	49	1,512	25	601	100	282	60	353	100	896	37	1,237	0	1258
R	79	1,342	77	637	78	278	87	278	78	886	82	456	0	1258
V	74	1,353	73	643	69	280	82	277	72	894	76	459	0	1258
GO	12	2,152	13	1,109	15	281	13	420	19	895	8	1,257	4	775
CM	9	2,152	8	1,109	8	281	12	420	13	895	6	1,257	2	775
VC	5	2,152	5	1,109	6	281	4	421	7	895	3	1,257	2	775
PM/D	19	2,151	20	1,108	20	280	17	421	25	894	14	1,257	13	775
PM/F	9	2,152	10	1,109	7	281	11	421	13	895	7	1,257	3	775
N/CG	22	2,153	23	1,109	27	281	17	421	31	895	15	1,258	12	776

Notes: M=Mexican; C=Cuban; PR=Puerto Rican; FB=foreign born; NC=non-citizen

C=Citizen; R=Registered; V=Voted; GO=Contacted a government official; CM=Contributed Money to a Candidate

VC= Worked as a volunteer for a candidate; PM/D= Attended a public meeting or demonstration

PM/F=Attended political party meeting or function; N/CG=Volunteered to Neighborhood or Community Group

## 7.3 Results

Compared to registering and voting, fewer Latinos participate in activities such as contacting government officials (12%), contributing money to a candidate (9%), working as a volunteer or for pay for a candidate (5%), attending a public meeting (19%) or a political function (9%) (Table 7.2). In terms of nativity status, 31% of the U.S. born claimed to have volunteered their time to a neighborhood, business or community group versus only 15% of the immigrant sample. Across every measure of political participation beyond voting, the U.S. born report higher levels of involvement than do immigrants. For example, with respect to contacting a government official, 19% of U.S. born Latinos answered affirmatively compared to only 8% of foreign-born Latinos and 4% of foreign born non-citizens. Curiously, and in line with previous research on minority political participation (Wong, et al., 2005) immigrant status appears to matter more for activity beyond voting compared to voting, at least at the bivariate level. Wong et al. (2005) provided, as an explanation, the obstacle of citizenship as opposed to immigrant status itself (Wong et. al, 2005).

Table 7.3 Ordinal Logistic Regression Models of Nonelectoral Political Participation Among Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans

Variable	Mexican		Puerto Rican		Cubans	
	<i>b</i>	<i>p</i> -value	<i>b</i>	<i>p</i> -value	<i>b</i>	<i>p</i> -value
<b>Acculturation and Cultural Assimilation</b>						
Years in US	.014	.406	.315	.608	.027	.046**
Gender Assimilation	-.116	.258	.047	.692	.120	.134
Retain Culture	-.235	.392	-.335	.263	.476	.202
Language	.269	.000***	.074	.406	.202	.056*
<b>Attitudinal/Behavioral Receptional</b>						
Better in US	.090	.191	–	–	-.255	.019**
Personal Disc	.672	.009***	.618	.039**	.709	.094*
Discrimination Problem	-.065	.806	.114	.696	-.549	.138
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>						
Education	.109	.087*	.248	.000***	-.007	.920
Income	-.001	.808	.001	.736	.005	.300
US Citizen	-.191	.574	–	–	.540	.231
<b>Group-Based Resources</b>						
Panethnic Identity	.104	.665	.290	.310	.233	.451
Political Group Consciousness	.218	.373	.428	.141	-.398	.225
<b>Controls</b>						
Age	.005	.694	.006	.514	.010	.386
Female	-.495	.05**	-.422	.149	-.113	.732
Married	.122	.622	-.246	.384	-.267	.401
Model Log Likelihood	-307.92545		-229.86469		-208.9628	
<i>n</i>	436		230		244	
<i>Prob &gt; chi2</i>	.0000		.0267		.0000	

Notes: \*\*\* $p \leq .01$ , \*\*  $p \leq .05$ , \*  $p \leq .10$

Turing now to an examination of several hypotheses regarding the impact of group identity, group consciousness, context of reception and acculturation on nonelectoral political participation, Table 7.3 presents the results of the ordinal logistic regression

for Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans separately. The results suggest that several measures pertaining to context of reception, acculturation and assimilation matter for political engagement but their effect differs slightly across subgroups. Among Cubans, years lived in the US and proficiency with the English language are positively and significantly associated with nonelectoral political activity. In addition, context of reception, as measured by respondent's belief that the relative conditions in the US versus one's country of origin are better, is significantly and positively related to Cuban political behavior. That is, Cubans who perceive relative conditions in the US to be better than they are in Cuba are significantly more likely to engage in nonelectoral types of political activities. Among Cubans, too, the odds of participating increase significantly among individuals with personal experiences with discrimination ( $p = .094$ ). Experience with personal discrimination also seems to motivate political activity among Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans. Moreover, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans who are structurally assimilated are more likely to participate in politics. For example, the odds of participating increase by 28% and 11% for each unit increase in educational attainment among Puerto Ricans and Mexicans, respectively. Acculturation, as measured by linguistic proficiency, is a significant predictor of Mexican American involvement in nonelectoral types of political activity. In addition, among Mexicans, females are significantly less likely to engage in nonelectoral participation than are males. Importantly, one's preference for a panethnic identity and status as a US citizen did not significantly predict participation in any of the models. Including the discrimination variables decreased the  $p$ -value of the variable measuring years lived in the United States, which became statistically insignificant. This implies a

positive differential between Mexican American individuals with similar perceptions of and experiences with discrimination and increasing exposure to American cultural norms.

The presence of multicollinearity created less precise estimators, therefore it became necessary to test for the joint effect of the various measures of discriminatory context. Table 7.4 examines the joint effect of the various contextual measures. As can be seen from the table, there are several statistically significant results. Among Mexicans, for example, the joint effect of having been discriminated against, feeling unwelcome in the US and perceiving conditions to be better in one's country of origin significantly and positively impact nonelectoral engagement. A similar analysis was performed with respect to Cubans. In contrast to Mexicans, the joint effect of discrimination and perceiving conditions to be better in Cuba had a negative impact on Cuban nonelectoral participation.

Table 7.4: Wald Test of relevant Hypotheses of Ethnic Competition

Hypothesis	df	Mexican		Puerto Rican		Cuban	
		W	p	W	p	W	p
$\beta_{discprob} = \beta_{persdisc} = \beta_{welcome} = \beta_{better}$	4	9.06	.059*	-	-	13.46	.009***
$\beta_{discprob} = \beta_{persdisc}$	2	3.69	.158	.36	.837	12.99	.001***
$\beta_{persdisc} = \beta_{welcome}$	2	5.81	.055*	-	-	3.23	.199
$\beta_{persdisc} = \beta_{better}$	2	3.58	.167	3.08	.214	4.62	.0991
$\beta_{discprob} = \beta_{better}$	2	1.74	.418	2.94	.230	10.93	.004***
$\beta_{persdisc} = \beta_{welcome} = \beta_{better}$	3	8.83	.032**	-	-	5.35	.148
$\beta_{persdisc} = \beta_{discprob} = \beta_{better}$	3	3.83	.280	2.94	.230	13.36	.004***

Notes:  $\rho_{better, welcome} = .713$

### 7.3.1 Sustaining Participation Beyond A Single Act

A question that has previously not been addressed in the literature pertains to the factors that sustain political engagement beyond a single act. To address this question, I used continuation logistic regression models of nonelectoral engagement. This approach takes advantage of the sequential nature of decision-making. In what follows below, nonelectoral participation was recoded into the following specification:

- $y_i = 1$  if an individual participated in less than 1 participatory act (i.e. none)
- $y_i = 2$  if an individual participated in at least 1 participatory act (i.e. one or more)
- $y_i = 3$  if an individual participated in more than 1 participatory act (i.e. more than one)

Although the variable can be considered ordinal, proportional odds models are restrictive in not allowing separate structural mechanisms across different categories. If different mechanisms are at work for different levels of participatory transitions (i.e. going from none to one) the process can be broken down into a sequence of transitions. In this case, conditional probabilities model the probability that  $y_i \geq j$  for  $j > 1$ , given that  $y_i = j - 1$ , denoted as  $P_{ij}^+$ . The process of participating in nonelectoral politics can be viewed, then, as a series of binary choices.

The models presented below were estimated by conditioning on the appropriate subsamples of the data. The entire sample was used to model the probability of 1 or more participatory act ( $P_{i2}^+$ ) using a continuation ratio logit model. In the model for

the first transition, the response variable is coded as 1 if the respondent engaged in at least one participatory act, 0 otherwise. Note that  $P_{i1} = 1 - P_{i2}^+$ . The conditional probability of having participated in more than one act  $P_{i3}$  was modeled next using the continuation logit model using only the subset of respondents with at least one participatory act. In a model for the second transition, the response variable is coded 1 if the respondent has more than one participatory act and 0 otherwise such that

$$P_{i2} = P_{i2}^+(1 - P_{i3}^+)$$

and

$$P_{i3} = P_{i2}^+ P_{i3}^+$$

which shows that the sequence of binary logit models completely describe the multinomial process.

### **7.3.2 A Continuation Ratio Logistic Model of Nonelectoral Participation Among Latinos**

Among Mexicans, the results suggest that the odds of completing at least one participatory act are significantly associated with ethnocultural Americanism, panethnic identity, English proficiency, personal discrimination, education, age and gender (Table 7.5).

Table 7.5 Continuation Ratio Logistic Regression of Nonelectoral Political Participation Among Mexicans

Variable	$P \geq 1$			$P > 1   P \geq 1$		
	<i>b</i>	<i>Z</i> -value	<i>p</i> -value	<i>b</i>	<i>Z</i> -value	<i>p</i> -value
<b>Acculturation and Assimilation</b>						
First Generation	-.224	-0.87	.386	.039	.10	.923
Second Generation	.277	1.31	.191	.514	1.57	.117
Language	.113	2.58	.010***	.141	1.85	.064*
Retain Culture	-.157	-0.95	.343	.549	1.96	.050**
<b>Identificational Assimilation</b>						
Ethnocultural Americanism	-.119	-1.89	.059	.284	2.52	.012**
Identification as Latino/Hispanic	.291	1.89	.059*	.018	.07	.944
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>						
Education	.180	4.73	.000***	.136	2.12	.034**
Income	.002	1.00	.318	-.007	-1.32	.187
<b>Group Consciousness</b>						
Personal Discrimination	.435	2.65	.008***	.172	.59	.552
Discrimination Problem	-.070	-0.42	.677	-.478	-1.58	.115
Melting Pot	.233	.95	.342	.748	1.81	.070*
Political Consciousness	.065	.43	.671	.583	2.13	.033**
<b>Control Variables</b>						
Age	.012	2.25	.025**	.028	2.88	.004***

Female	-.544	-3.48	.000***	-.692	-2.54	.011**
Married	.097	.62	.533	.293	1.05	.295
Model Log L			-688.003			
<i>n</i>			915			
<i>Prob &gt; <math>\chi^2</math></i>			.0003			

---

Notes: \*\*\* $p \leq .01$ , \*\* $p \leq .05$ , \* $p \leq .10$

In stage one, Mexicans who believe that in order to claim membership in American society they must be citizens, vote in US elections, speak English and believe in the US Constitution (ethnocultural Americanism) are less likely to engage in at least one participatory act but individuals who identify as a member of a panethnic group are more likely to engage in at least one participatory act. Once again, the measures pertaining to acculturation and structural assimilation are positively related to political activity among Mexican Americans. The odds of participating in at least one act increase as proficiency with English increases and with educational attainment (Table 7.5). Additionally, individuals who have been personally discriminated against are more likely to participate in the types of political activities considered here. Turning to the factors that sustain political participation, the results suggest that among Mexicans, positive attitudes towards ethnocultural Americanism motivates participation beyond a single act. Therefore, while believing in ethnocultural American values does not initially compel Mexicans to participate in politics, these beliefs are significantly related to sustaining political activity over time. Taken together, these findings suggest that Latino political assimilation has two components, attitudinal and behavioral, that are self-reinforcing. It also suggests that political institutions can be responsible for motivating political assimilation and actually sustaining it. Further evidence for this fact is that individuals who believe that Latinos are working together politically are more likely to complete more than one act conditional on having completed at least one. This finding suggests that Mexican Americans will be more likely to participate in the American polity when they perceive group solidarity exists with respect to achieving their political goals. In the second stage, individuals

who do not believe that it is important for Latinos to maintain their distinct cultures are more likely to participate beyond a single act, as are older individuals and individuals with higher educational levels. Importantly, the effect of panethnic identity and personal discrimination are much smaller for later transitions. The analysis pertaining to first generation Mexicans (foreign-born) is substantially similar as indicated by the variables that are significant in the model (Table 7.6). The results suggest that language, political consciousness and age are the most significant predictors of nonelectoral engagement over time (Table 7.6).

Table 7.6 Continuation Ratio Logistic Regression of Nonelectoral Political Participation Among First Generation Mexicans

Variable	$P \geq 1$			$P > 1   P \geq 1$		
	<i>b</i>	Z-value	<i>p</i> -value	<i>b</i>	Z-value	<i>p</i> -value
<b>Acculturation and Cultural Assimilation</b>						
Years in US	.246	.42	.674	-.181	-0.13	.897
Language	.212	2.53	.011**	.519	2.46	.014**
Assimilation	.108	-1.08	.281	.026	.12	.906
Retain Culture	-.214	-0.79	.427	.284	.51	.607
<b>Identificational Assimilation</b>						
Panethnic Identity	.016	.07	.946	.005	.01	.990
<b>Attitudinal Receptional Assimilation</b>						
Better in US	-.098	-1.44	.150	.117	.80	.427
<b>Group-Based Resources</b>						
Political Consciousness	.149	.62	.537	.990	1.97	.049**
Personal Disc.	.696	2.72	.006***	-.445	-0.85	.396
Discrimination Problem	-.045	-0.17	.862	.564	1.00	.320
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>						
Education	.127	2.09	.037**	.121	.96	.336
Income	.001	.18	.857	-.012	-1.04	.300
<b>Control Variables</b>						
Age	.008	.89	.373	.049	2.23	.026**
Female	-.486	-1.96	0.05*	-.421	-0.82	.415
Married	.053	.053	.826	-.051	-0.10	.919
Model Log L						-278.520
<i>n</i>						474
<i>Prob &gt; <math>\chi^2</math></i>						.1857

Notes: \*\*\* $p \leq .01$ , \*\*  $p \leq .05$ , \*  $p \leq .10$

Turning next Cuban participation, the results show that language, age and personal discrimination are significantly and positively related to political activity in the first transition (Table 7.7). On the other hand, panethnic identity is negatively related to participation, a finding that echoes the results of previous chapters. In the

second transition, none of the variables were significant, which is probably related to the small sample size. Among first generation Cubans, years in the US and age are significantly and positively related to participating in at least one participatory act (Table 7.8). On the other hand, context of reception is inversely related to participation. First generation Cubans who feel that relative conditions are better in Cuba are significantly less likely to have participated in at least one act. Factors that are responsible for sustaining nonelectoral engagement beyond a single act among first generation Cubans are years lived in the US and marital status (Table 7.8).

Finally, among Puerto Ricans, experiences with discrimination, perceptions that Latinos are working together politically and structural assimilation are the factors most significantly related to participation. The only factor found to sustain participation is income (Table 7.9).

Table 7.7 Continuation Ratio Logistic Regression of Nonelectoral Political Participation Among Cubans

Variable	$P \geq 1$			$P > 1   P \geq 1$		
	<i>b</i>	Z-value	<i>p</i> -value	<i>b</i>	Z-value	<i>p</i> -value
<b>Acculturation and Cultural Assimilation</b>						
First Gen.	.056	.10	.920	.863	.98	.329
Second Gen.	.542	.91	.364	.762	.84	.401
Assimilation	-.017	-0.15	.878	-.196	-1.00	.317
Retain Culture	.175	.61	.544	.674	1.35	.178
Language	.254	3.34	.001***	.083	.62	.535
<b>Identificational Assimilation</b>						
Panethnic Identity	-.479	1.85	.065*	-.399	.93	.354
<b>Group Consciousness</b>						
Political Consciousness	-.282	-1.10	.273	-.147	-0.34	.738
Personal Disc.	.883	2.80	.005***	.069	.13	.894
Discrimination Problem	-.400	-1.42	.156	-.665	-1.34	.180
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>						
Education	.068	1.23	.218	.089	.13	.894
Income	.002	.49	.621	.003	.53	.594
<b>Control Variables</b>						
Age	.017	2.10	.036**	.005	.36	.721
Female	-.179	-0.70	.485	-.526	-1.21	.225
Married	-.327	-1.28	.202	-.572	-1.24	.216
Model Log L						-266.79858
<i>n</i>						354
<i>Prob &gt; <math>\chi^2</math></i>						.6246

Notes: \*\*\* $p \leq .01$ , \*\*  $p \leq .05$ , \*  $p \leq .10$

Table 7.8 Continuation Ratio Logistic Regression of Nonelectoral Political Participation Among First Generation Cubans

Variable	$P \geq 1$			$P > 1   P \geq 1$		
	<i>b</i>	Z-value	<i>p</i> -value	<i>b</i>	Z-value	<i>p</i> -value
<b>Acculturation and Cultural Assimilation</b>						
Years in US	1.41	2.17	.030**	2.79	1.81	.070*
Assimilation	.124	.91	.365	-.300	-1.10	.270
Retain Culture	.341	.91	.362	.749	1.10	.272
Language	.200	1.92	.055*	-.167	-0.73	.464
<b>Identificational Assimilation</b>						
Panethnic Identity	.331	1.05	.293	-.138	-0.23	.821
<b>Attitudinal Receptional Assimilation</b>						
Better in US	-.247	-2.23	.026**	-.081	-0.37	.709
<b>Group-Based Resources</b>						
Political Consciousness	-.505	-1.54	.124	-.664	1.02	.307
Personal Disc.	.670	1.51	.132	1.43	1.51	.131
Discrimination Problem	-.563	-1.52	.128	-1.38	-1.60	.110
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>						
Education	-.000	-0.00	.999	.063	.46	.647
Income	.002	.61	.543	.004	.50	.620
<b>Control Variables</b>						
Age	.025	2.45	.014**	.008	.44	.662
Female	-.019	-0.06	.952	-.958	-1.52	.130
Married	-.089	-0.28	.777	-1.55	-2.29	.022**
Model Log L	-169.46567					
<i>n</i>	258					
<i>Prob &gt; <math>\chi^2</math></i>	.5771					

Notes: \*\*\* $p \leq .01$ , \*\*  $p \leq .05$ , \*  $p \leq .10$

Table 7.9 Continuation Ratio Logistic Regression of Nonelectoral Political Participation Among Puerto Ricans

Variable	$P \geq 1$			$P > 1   P \geq 1$		
	<i>b</i>	Z-value	<i>p</i> -value	<i>b</i>	Z-value	<i>p</i> -value
<b>Acculturation and Cultural Assimilation</b>						
First Gen.	-.320	-0.85	.397	.956	1.42	.156
Assimilation	.048	.38	.705	.222	.83	.405
Language	-.037	-0.42	1c.675	-.348	-.87	.461
Retain Culture	-.324	-1.01	.310	.422	.61	.543
<b>Identificational Assimilation</b>						
Panethnic Identity	.420	1.34	.180	-.177	-0.27	.784
<b>Group-Related Resources</b>						
Political Consciousness	.518	1.66	.096	-.388	-0.58	.561
Personal Disc.	.631	1.98	.047	.349	-0.49	.627
Discrimination Problem	.125	.40	.686	-.118	-0.18	.856
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>						
Education	.262	3.61	.000	.113	.68	.499
Income	.006	1.00	.320	-.057	-2.33	.020
<b>Control Variables</b>						
Age	.012	1.02	.308	-.044	-1.50	.134
Female	-.318	-1.03	.304	-1.02	-1.59	.113
Married	-.219	-0.71	.476	-.196	-0.35	.729
Model Log L						-181.20919
<i>n</i>						230
<i>Prob &gt; <math>\chi^2</math></i>						.4009

Notes: \*\*\* $p \leq .01$ , \*\*  $p \leq .05$ , \*  $p \leq .10$

### A Latent Class Model of Latino Participation

Is Latino nonelectoral participation heavily influenced by Latino issues, non-Latino issues or both? An important question is whether the decision to participate is based on a strong sense of ethnic awareness and common collective identity or whether it

is broader in scope. In 2004, respondents were asked whether their involvement in nonelectoral politics was related to Latino issues, non-Latino issues, or both? The five dichotomous indicators  $Y_1, Y_2, Y_3, Y_4$  and  $Y_5$  are affirmative statements regarding degree of nonelectoral political participation. Latent class analysis enabled me to identify subgroups by participatory and empowerment status.

Table 7.10: Type III Sums of Squares for Goodness of Fit nonelectoral participation, Mexicans, Cubans and PR

Model	LL	$\chi^2$	AIC	BIC
Independence	-4106.20	1311.18	1383.18	1581.28
2-class	-3689.49	477.74	627.74	1040.45
3-class	-3623.99	346.75	574.75	1202.06
3-class restricted	-3655.79	410.35	494.35	725.47
4-class	-3636.10	370.98	484.98	798.63

Table 7.11: Fit Statistics for Political Participation

# Classes	-2 ll likelihood	$G^2$	$df$	$p$	$E$	$\lambda$
Independence	-3081.33763	22828.7762	26	.000	.000	.000
2	-2684.78124	66.2812	20	.000	.0397	.7533
3	-2661.56207	12.2681	14	.5848	.1069	.5838

A critical part of the analysis is deciding how many latent classes are required. The fit statistics below suggest independence is strongly rejected. The three class model provided the most acceptable fit to the data (Tables 7.10 and 7.11). A hierarchical analysis was performed to restrict conditional probabilities across all model parameters. The resulting restricted 3-class model yielded a  $\chi^2$  value of 410.35 with 3413 degrees of freedom. Since the computed difference was greater than the critical value of  $\chi^2$  at the .05 level, the restricted model was retained.

### 7.3.3 A Latent Class Analysis of Latino Empowerment

The latent class analysis revealed an interpretable solution in terms of high participation/high empowerment, low participation/low empowerment and low participation/high empowerment (Table 7.12).

**Latent Class I: Low participation/high empowerment** Class I is comprised of individuals who are highly non-participatory but highly empowered<sup>1</sup>. For example, the conditional probability of not having contacted a government official given membership in this class is .98 for Mexicans and Puerto Ricans and .97 for Cubans (Table 7.12). The conditional probability of not having contributed money to a political candidate given membership in this class is .99 for Mexicans, 1.00 for Puerto Ricans and .98 for Cubans. The conditional probability of not having participated in other forms of political activity, such as protesting or attending a public meeting or demonstration is similarly high across all subgroups. The respondents who participated in this class were more likely to report that their participation was related exclusively to Latino issues as compared to non-Latino issues or both. For example, 69% of Mexicans, 48% of Puerto Ricans and 43% of Cubans in this class reported that their demonstration was exclusively related to Latino issues. On this basis, this class of respondents is considered the group that is best characterized by low levels of participation but is highly empowered by group-related issues. Puerto Ricans (.45) are less likely than either Mexicans (.78) or Cubans (.71) to belong to this class (Table

---

<sup>1</sup>High participation and high empowerment are relative to the average values reported in Table 7.2.

7.12 in row entitled "Class Prevalence").

**Latent Class II: Low participation/low empowerment** Class II is comprised of respondents who are in a low participation, low empowerment class. For example, the conditional probability of contacting a government official given membership in this class is only .43 for Mexicans, .15 for Puerto Ricans and .27 for Cubans. The conditional probability of having worked for a political candidate given membership in this class is .09 for Mexicans, .03 for Puerto Ricans and .05 for Cubans. Only 31% of Mexicans, 4% of Puerto Ricans and 23% of Cubans in this class reported attending a public party meeting or function. The respondents who claim membership in this class were likely to report that their participation was *not* exclusively related to Latino issues. For example, 61% of Mexicans, 73% of Puerto Ricans and 64% of Cubans in this class reported that their demonstration activity was exclusively related to non-Latino issues. On this basis, this class of respondents is considered the group that is best characterized as non-participatory and not motivated by group-related issues. Puerto Ricans (.40) are more likely than either Mexicans (.14) or Cubans (.25) to belong to this class.

**Latent Class III: High participation/high empowerment** Class III is comprised of respondents who are in a high participation, high empowerment class. For example, the conditional probability of contacting a government official given membership in this class is .61 for Mexicans, .53 for Puerto Ricans and 1.00 for Cubans. The conditional probability of having worked for a political candidate given mem-

bership in this class is .43 for Mexicans, .28 for Puerto Ricans and .64 for Cubans. More than 6 out of 10 Mexicans, 4 out of 10 Puerto Ricans and all of the Cuban respondents in this class reported attending a public meeting or demonstration. The respondents who claim membership in this class were more likely to report that their participation was related to Latino issues as compared to non-Latino issues or both. For example, 62% of Mexicans, 40% of Puerto Ricans and 60% of Cubans in this class reported that their demonstration was exclusively related to Latino issues. Likewise, 59% of Mexicans, 43% of Puerto Ricans and 64% of Cubans in this class reported that their volunteer work was exclusively related to Latino issues. On this basis, this class of respondents is considered the group that is highly participatory and highly empowered by group-related issues. Puerto Ricans (.15) are more likely than either Mexicans (.08) or Cubans (.04) to belong to this class.

Table 7.12: Rho and Gamma Parameter Estimates of nonelectoral political participation among Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans

Variable	Mexican			PR			Cuban		
	HE/LP	LE/LP	HE/HP	HE/LP	LE/LP	HE/HP	HE/LP	LE/LP	HE/HP
<b>Contacted a Government Official</b>									
Yes	.02	.43	.61	.02	.15	.53	.03	.27	1.0
No	.98	.57	.39	.98	.85	.47	.97	.73	.00
<b>Contributed Money to a Candidate</b>									
Yes	.02	.32	.28	.00	.08	.30	.02	.28	.88
No	.98	.68	.72	1.0	.92	.70	.98	.72	.12
<b>Worked as Volunteer for a Candidate</b>									
Yes	.01	.09	.43	.01	.03	.28	.00	.05	.64
No	.99	.91	.57	.99	.97	.72	1.0	.95	.36
<b>Attended a Public Meeting or Demonstration</b>									
Yes	.08	.52	.81	.11	.09	.79	.00	.55	.82
No	.92	.48	.19	.89	.91	.21	1.0	.45	.18
<b>Attended a Political Party Meeting or Function</b>									
Yes	.00	.31	.63	.00	.04	.39	.00	.23	1.0
No	1.0	.69	.37	1.0	.96	.61	1.0	.77	.00
<b>Money contributed to</b>									
Latino	.05	.07	.50	.05	.05	.13	.79	.14	.51
Non-Latino	.62	.61	.00	.26	.73	.09	0.0	.64	.13
Both	.33	.31	.50	.37	.22	.77	.37	.21	.21
<b>Demonstration related to</b>									

Latino	.69	.00	.62	.48	.00	.40	.43	.40	.60
Non-Latino	.31	1.0	.38	.52	1.0	.60	.32	.60	.40
Both	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.25	.00	.00
<b>Volunteering related to</b>									
Latino	.57	.04	.59	.90	.00	.43	.51	.34	.64
Non-Latino	.43	.96	.41	.10	1.0	.57	.49	.66	.36
Both	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Class Prevalence	.78	.14	.08	.45	.40	.15	.71	.25	.04

Finally, a multinomial model was estimated to predict membership in each class (Table 7.13). The following generalizations are shown by the table. The results show that Latinos are more likely to be in class III (high participation/high empowerment) versus class I (low participation/high empowerment) with English proficiency, personal discrimination, income and education. Individuals are less likely to be in class III if they believe that life is relatively better in their country of origin than in the US and if they perceive discrimination against Latinos to be problematic (Mexicans and Cubans). Mexicans and Cubans who believe that Latinos work together politically (political consciousness), who prefer to identify as Latino/Hispanic and who believe that it is important for Latinos to maintain their unique cultures rather than assimilate are more likely to be in an empowered class (e.g. Class I) than in a disempowered class (e.g. Class II).

Table 7.13: Multinomial Logistic Latent Class Analysis of Latino Nonelectoral Participation

	Mexican				Puerto Rican				Cuban				Δ LL	p
	$b_{1v2}$	O.R.	$b_{1v3}$	O.R.	$b_{1v2}$	O.R.	$b_{1v3}$	O.R.	$b_{1v2}$	O.R.	$b_{1v3}$	O.R.		
<b>Acculturation and Cultural Assimilation</b>														
First Gen.	-1.1	.32	-4.5	.01	.78	2.2	.38	.35	-1.2	.30	-2.6	.08	176.2	.00
Second Gen.	.92	2.52	1.3	3.7	-0.78	.46	.84	2.3	.69	2.0	2.8	15.6	68.8	.00
Language	.662	1.9	.90	2.5	.10	1.1	.40	1.5	.69	2.0	.78	2.2		
Retain Culture	.60	1.8	-1.0	.36	.66	1.94	-0.76	.47	.16	1.2	-0.36	.70	25.8	.00
<b>Group Consciousness</b>														
Political Consciousness	.38	1.5	-0.75	.47	1.2	3.3	-.70	.50	-.19	.82	-0.63	.54	15.7	.02
Latino/Hispanic Id.	.28	1.3	-0.05	.95	.38	1.5	.17	1.2	.81	2.2	-1.0	.37	9.3	.16
Personal Disc.	.62	1.9	.16	1.2	.72	2.1	.86	2.4	.87	2.4	.50	1.7	13.1	.04
Disc. Problem	-1.48	.23	-0.02	.98	-0.79	.46	0.42	1.5	-1.6	.19	-0.37	.69	40.6	.00
<b>Attitudinal/Behavioral</b>														
Better in US	-.10	.91	.02	1.0	-0.14	.872	.38	1.5	.08	1.1	.05	1.1	4.1	.67
<b>Structural Assimilation</b>														
Education	.40	1.5	.47	1.6	-0.03	.97	.50	1.7	.17	1.2	.41	1.5	150.7	.00
Income	.09	1.09	.15	1.2	-.04	.97	0.10	1.1	.09	1.1	.14	1.2	154.9	.00
<b>Ethnic Ties</b>														
Politics Imp.*	-.43	.65	-0.33	.72	-0.52	.58	-.21	.81	-0.03	.97	-0.14	.87	8.2	.23
<b>Control Variables</b>														
Age	.03	1.0	.02	1.0	.00	1.0	-0.03	.97	.02	1.0	-0.03	.97	27.9	.00
Female	.13	1.14	-0.70	.50	-0.46	.63	-0.64	.53	-0.52	.59	-0.95	.39	17.9	.01
Married	.012	1.01	.43	1.5	-1.5	.23	.08	1.1	-0.70	.50	-0.05	.95	9.2	.16

## 7.4 Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has explored the relative effects of group identity, consciousness, acculturation and assimilation on Latino nonelectoral political participation. The results tend to support several hypotheses of both the straightline and ethnic disadvantage models of immigrant assimilation as they related to political participation. For example, linguistic proficiency was found to be significantly related to nonelectoral engagement across all models. Years lived in the US was a significant predictor of motivating and sustaining political activity among first generation Cubans. There is also substantial evidence that individuals who prefer cultural retention over assimilation are less likely to engage in politics. Finally, many of the measures of structural assimilation were positively related to nonelectoral engagement.

Several of the group-resource variables were statistically significant. For example, having been the object of discrimination was a consistent predictor of political activity. Context of reception was also significant, thereby lending support for the hypothesis that Latinos with favorable contexts of reception are more likely to participate in politics.

## Chapter 8

### Summary and Conclusion

Some scholars and commentators believe that the recent increase in the Latino population will destroy the fabric of American society and result in linguistic fragmentation and cultural hegemony. In contrast to immigrants of European descent, who accepted their inevitable transformation into American political culture, post-1965 immigrants, they claim, are maintaining political and social ties to their country of origin, segregating themselves into ethnic enclaves and refusing to assimilate into American society. Recently, scholars have challenged classical assimilation theories, suggesting instead that the process of assimilation for America's newcomers is best characterized as "bumpy" and not a straight line. This dissertation has provided an empirical test of the various assimilation theories as they pertain to Latino political incorporation.

More specifically, in this dissertation, I described the pattern of political incorporation among Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban immigrants to determine whether participation increases with exposure, identificational and structural assimilation, context of reception and access to group-related resources. I examined the political

assimilation of Latinos by national origin group. Clearly, assimilation is a multidimensional process, involving structural factors, language acquisition, and identification as American. There is also a political dimension to assimilation that involves naturalization, the acquisition of American values, and participation in the political process. Each chapter generally supports a conclusion that exposure to American cultural norms, context of reception, discriminatory processes and access to group-related resources alter the distribution of Latinos who identify with and participate in the American polity.

I have shown that generally speaking, Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban immigrants do become politically incorporated over time. The longer they live in the United States, the more likely they are to vote, naturalize and engage in nonelectoral types of political behavior. There is no evidence that recent Mexican, Puerto Rican or Cuban immigrants are likely to be permanently disengaged from the electoral process. For example, all three subgroups have a large class of individuals who are highly electorally responsive. In comparing the citizenship rates and turnout of Latinos by national origin group, I considered whether the “straightline” pattern of assimilation applies to voting by comparing the political participation of different immigrant generations within each ethnic group. The results strongly favored the straightline assimilation model but there is more to the story. I demonstrated as well that context of reception alters the landscape of participation by decreasing the likelihood that individuals adopt an American identity versus identification as a member of their country of origin or as a member of their panethnic group.

In Chapter Four, I demonstrated that the structure of beliefs about being Ameri-

can and American values is partially homogeneous across national origin groups with some heterogeneous components. Conditional latent class probabilities revealed that Mexicans are more likely than Cubans or Puerto Ricans to internalize ethnocultural conceptions of Americanism. Nevertheless, this class of respondents comprised the largest prevalence of Latinos across each ethnic group. In other words, the ethnocultural American class comprised the largest percentage of Mexicans, Cubans and Puerto Ricans. The findings also indicated that membership in this class depends on the context of immigrant reception, more specifically notions that Latinos are being discriminated against as a group. Acculturation and exposure to American cultural norms also predicted membership in the ethnocultural American class which suggests that as Latinos assimilate they increasingly identify with American political culture. This chapter also distinguished between Latinos who cluster around American liberalism versus American liberalism coupled with what I called governmental paternalism. Overall, the analysis showed that Latinos do accept the tenets of American liberalism but differences exist regarding the role of government as limited versus expansive and in the role of individual self-reliance versus governmental protection. Another important finding from this chapter is the importance of the context of immigrant reception to shape ethnic identity choices, particularly the preference for opting for an American identity. This is important because American identity is shown to be an important predictor of political behavior, especially among Cubans.

In Chapter Five, I turned to voting, registration and citizenship as important indicators of political assimilation. Among all ethnic groups, age, education, and income were positively associated with the decision to acquire citizenship, register

and vote in US elections. Structural assimilation as measured by degree of economic attachment in addition to education and income clearly affects the level of political assimilation, with the effect being more substantial among Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. The various forms of structural assimilation differ, however, by subgroup. For example, economic attachment is relatively more important in the decision to register and vote among Mexicans than it is for Puerto Ricans and Cubans, who are motivated more by educational attainment. Again, exposure to US cultural norms, American identification and increasing ties to the United States were shown to be significantly related to political behavior among first generation immigrants. The effect of group based resources varied significantly across ethnic origin groups. For example, in contrast to ethnic disadvantage models of assimilation, which suggest that group consciousness facilitates political assimilation, I found that Cubans who believe in a common linked fate between all Latinos are significantly less likely to vote. On the other hand, identification as American was positively related to political participation. Perceptions of linked fate had no effect on either Puerto Rican or Mexican political behavior. These results suggest that Cubans internalize American values and as they assimilate simultaneously shed their identities as Cubans. For example, Cubans are more likely to identify as American versus Latino/Hispanic or as a member of their country of origin over time. They are also more likely to be oriented towards US politics as ties to Cuba decrease. Cubans who identify with their country of origin are significantly less likely to participate in politics while Cubans who identify as American are significantly more likely to do so. Turning to the interaction between context of reception and identity, the results of this chapter showed the protective

effect of identification as American. Among all subgroups, individuals who either perceived discrimination to be a problem or were themselves victims of discrimination were more likely to vote and/or register if they adopted an American identity rather than a panethnic identity or the identity of their ethnic origin group.

There also are differences in the citizenship rates among Cuban and Mexican immigrants. Acculturated Mexicans and Mexicans who abandon their ties to Mexico naturalize more quickly than unacculturated Mexican immigrants. In addition, we saw that perceptions of discrimination significantly decreased waiting time. Interestingly, psychological attachment to one's homeland had differential effects among Mexicans and Cubans. Cubans who believed that Cuba as opposed to the US was their "true homeland" waited longer before seeking citizenship status but the opposite held true among Mexicans. Again, this suggests that Cubans are less conflicted about assimilating than are Mexicans, who prefer to retain some aspects of their culture rather than fully assimilating.

Finally, with respect to nonelectoral participation, several important findings emerged. First, the factors that sustain participation are not necessarily the same factors that instigate it. For example, among Mexicans, ethnocultural Americansim sustains political activity over time. Structural assimilation, acculturation and exposure affect the political incorporation of immigrants. Interestingly, discriminatory context is responsible for motivating participation, not necessarily sustaining it, at least among Mexicans. Again, we saw how Cuban political behavior is suppressed by the notion of a common linked fate as measured by their propensity to identify as a member of a panethnic group. Context of reception was also a significant predictor of

political participation among Cubans, as individuals who believe that conditions in the US are relatively better than in their country of origin were found to be more likely to participate. Again, among Puerto Ricans, political consciousness and structural assimilation were the most important predictors of political assimilation.

The evidence is in favor of the assertion that the process of political incorporation of the current wave of immigrants to the US is similar irrespective of national origin. Second and third generation immigrants and those who have lived in the US the longest are more likely to vote than first-generation immigrants. Among the foreign-born, time spent in the U.S. boosts the level of political participation. Moreover, as socio-economic status improves, participation increases. Although these findings strongly support the straightline model of immigrant assimilation, the role of discrimination in motivating political activity and the psychological aspects that accompany identity transformations as immigrants assimilate must not be overlooked.

Table 8.1 summarizes the theoretical predictions and empirical results with respect to the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 5.

Table 8.1: Theoretical Expectations and Empirical Results from the Analysis of Latino Political Behavior

Hypothesis	Theoretical Prediction	Observed Effects			Conclusion		
		Mexicans	Puerto Ricans	Cubans	Mexicans	Puerto Ricans	Cubans
Cultural Assimilation Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	Support	Support	Support
The Ethnic Resilience Hypothesis	+	-	-	-	Reject	Reject	Reject
The Identificational Assimilation Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	Support	Support	Support
The Reactive Ethnicity Hypothesis	+	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	-	Reject	Reject	Reject
The Structural Barrier Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	Support	Support	Support
The Neighborhood Hypothesis	-	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Reject	Reject	Reject
The Ethnic Competition Hypothesis	-	-	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Support	Reject	Reject
The Ethnic Enclosure Hypothesis	+	-	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Reject	Reject	Reject
The Group Consciousness Hypothesis	+	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	-	Reject	Reject	Reject
The Attitudinal Receptional Hypothesis	+	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Reject	Reject	Reject

The Discrimination Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	Support	Support	Support
The "Better Life" Hypothesis	+	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Reject	Reject	Reject
The Generational Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	Support	Support	Support
The Exposure Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	Support	Support	Support
The Negative Exposure Hypothesis	-	+	+	+	Reject	Reject	Reject
The Cultural Mediation Hypothesis	+	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Inconclusive	Reject	Reject	Reject

## 8.1 Policy Implications

From a policy perspective, the question becomes, what do we do, as a society, to increase/support the probability that immigrants will politically act in a way that supports US ideals concerning democratic processes? According to Schmid (2004), “political participation is often the result of emotion and people feel that their identity is at stake. In this context, they may not calculate individual cost and benefit. When people feel deprivation and injustice, they may bear large costs to reform institutions, a kind of reform utility that differs from ordinary goods.” Group-related resources such as perceived discrimination and group based identification should be considered a political resource that shifts the distribution of costs and benefits and motivates Latino political behavior. The fact that the mere perception of group-based discrimination motivates Latino political behavior suggests that when discriminatory barriers block an individualistic pattern of social or economic mobility (Alba and Nee, 2003), political assimilation depends on collectivist strategies that may or may not be beneficial. Clearly, discrimination acts to encourage Latinos to rectify a perceived wrong and eradicate inequalities in opportunity. Attitudinally, however, discrimination tends to discourage immigrants from adopting American values and attitudes, so to the extent that American society discriminates against Latinos, we “shoot ourselves in the foot.” The controversy concerns the fact that many people believe that immigrants will vote in self serving ways and, that given their increasing numbers that the “American Way” will be compromised. To the extent that I could, in this dissertation, I provided evidence that immigrants are motivated to participate in

self-serving ways. Nevertheless, immigrants are attitudinally oriented to American political life. Since immigrants want to participate, policies should be developed to promote participation in positive ways and discrimination should be discouraged. In the absence of discrimination, immigrants will still participate, but the nature of the participation will change.

The results also suggest that Americans should encourage immigrants to assimilate (Chavez, 1995). For example, immigration policies must be expanded to include how immigrants are incorporated into American society. While the evidence suggests that immigrants are assimilating into American society, measures can be undertaken to facilitate it. For example, if immigrants were given the resources and opportunity to assimilate, one consequence would be the “preservation of American political culture.” For example, speaking English is a key ingredient in forging a sense of national identity. This suggests that in schools, English immersion programs would help Latinos, who appear eager to learn English, learn it at faster rates and this would in turn facilitate American national identity and unity. This would also effectively facilitate structural assimilation, which is clearly related to political attitudes and behavior. Affirmative action policies would also help Latinos assimilate more quickly. Segregated schools tend to reify ethnic based conceptions of identity and hence suppress political activity.

# Appendices

## APPENDIX A

The model and its component parts are as follows:

1. There are five assimilation factors, as indicated by the four circles labeled F1 - F5.
2. The five factors are intercorrelated, as indicated by the two-headed arrows.
3. There are 35 manifest (observed) variables, as indicated by 35 rectangles. They each represent components of scales, subscales or questions derived from the 2002 National Survey of Latinos (see Figures 1.1-1.4).
4. The observed variables load on the factors in the following pattern: structural assimilation loads on F1; Cultural and linguistic retention load on F2; attitudinal behavioral and reception assimilation load on F3; identificational assimilation loads on F4 and political assimilation loads on F5.
5. Each observed variable loads on one and only one factor.
6. Measurement errors associated with each observed variable are uncorrelated.

The primary task with respect to this model is to determine the goodness of fit between the hypothesized dimensions of assimilation and the observed data. The null hypothesis is that the model fits the data. Any discrepancy between the sample covariance matrix and the population matrix is captured by the residual covariance matrix (Byrnes, 2006).

In examining the standardized residual information it is apparent that the average off-diagonal value is .0255, whereas the largest off-diagonal value is .0319, both of which reflect a very good fit to the data. A review of the frequency distribution reveals that all residual values fall between -.1 and .1. The independence model is soundly rejected (2223.222,  $df = 36$ ). From this information, we can conclude that although there may be some minimal discrepancy in fit between the hypothesized model and the sample data, overall the model as a whole appears to fit the data very well. In addition, all three indexes discussed in chapter 3 ( $NFI = .940$ ,  $NNFI = .912$ ,  $CFI = .950$ ) were consistent in suggesting that the hypothesized model represented an adequate fit to the data. Finally, the RMSEA value for the hypothesized model is .048 with a 90% confidence interval ranging from (.041 – .056), which represents a good degree of precision. Given that (a) the RMSEA point estimate is  $< .05$  and (b) the upper bound of the 90% confidence interval is  $< .06$ , we conclude that the estimated model adequately describes the data<sup>1</sup>.

In reviewing the unstandardized solution, it is apparent that the estimates to be reasonable and the majority are statistically significant; all standard errors are fairly small. The R-squared value represents the proportion of the factor variance that is explained by its corresponding measurement. Again, in reviewing the output, it is clear that parameter values are consistent with the literature. For example, language acquisition and retention explains 87.7% of the variance in cultural assimilation while primary mode of identification explains 53.7% of the variance in identificational

---

<sup>1</sup>This is not the final model that was tested, but a pictorial representation of the model. The software I used was not able to provide me with a graphical representation.

assimilation.

# Bibliography

## Bibliography

- Aguirre Jr., A., and Jonathan H. Turner. *American Ethnicity: The Dynamics and Consequences of Discrimination*, 3rd ed. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 2001.
- Aguirre, B.E., Saenz, Rogelio, and Hwang, Sean-Shong. (1989). "Discrimination and the Assimilation and Ethnic Competition Perspectives." *Social Science Quarterly*, 70(3): 595-606.
- Aguirre, A. and Turner J. *American Ethnicity: The Dynamics and Consequences of Discrimination*. Mayfield, 2001.
- Alba, Richard. (2006). "Mexican Americans and the American Dream." *Perspectives on Politics*, 4(1): 289-296.
- Alba, R.D., and Chamlin, M.B. (1983). "A Preliminary Examination of Ethnic Identification Among Whites." *American Sociological Review*, 48, 240-247.
- Alba, R. and Nee, V. 1997 "Rethinking assimilation theory for a new era of immigration", *International Migration Review*, 31(4), p. 826-74.
- Alex-Assensoh, Y., and Assensoh, A. B. (2001). "Inner-city contexts, church attendance, and African-American political participation." *Journal of Politics*, 63, 886-901.
- Alvarez, R. M., and Lisa Garcia Bedolla. (2003). "The Foundations of Latino Voter Partisanship: Evidence from the 2000 Election." *Journal of Politics*, 65(1):31-49.
- Alvarez, R. Michael and John Brehm. (2002). *Hard Choices, Easy Answers*. Princeton.
- Anderson, B., (1983). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Andersen, Kristi and Elizabeth F. Cohen. (2002). "Political Institutions and the Incorporation of Immigrants." Program in American Democracy Working Paper, University of Notre Dame.
- Antunes, G., and Gaitz, C. M. (1975). "Ethnicity and participation: A study of Mexican-Americans, Blacks and Whites." *American Journal of Sociology*, 80(5), 1192-1211.
- Barboza, Gia and Rohan Williams. (2005). "The Effect of Family Structure and Family Capital on the Political Behavior of Latino Immigrants in the United States,"

paper prepared for presentation at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Barretto, Matt. (2004). "The Role of Latino Candidates in Mobilizing Latino Voters: Revisiting Latino Vote Choice." Prepared for Latino Politics: State of the Discipline, Texas A&M University, College Station TX, April 2004.

Barreto, Matt A., and Jose A. Munoz. 2003. "Reexamining the 'Politics of In-Between': Political Participation Among Mexican Immigrants in the United States." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 25, p. 427-47.

Bautista del Demanico, Y., Crawford, I., and DeWolfe, A. S. (1994). "Ethnic identity and self-concept in Mexican-American adolescents: Is bicultural identity related to stress or better adjustment?" *Child and Youth Care Forum*, 23, 197-206.

Bean, Frank, Susan K. Brown, and Ruben G. Rumbaut. (2006). "Mexican Immigrant Political and Economic Incorporation." *Perspectives on Politics*, 4(1): 309-313.

Bean, Frank and Gillian Stevens. (2003). *America's Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity*, Russell Sage Foundation Publications.

Bedolla, L. (2003). "The Identity Paradox: Latino Language, Politics, and Selective Dissociation." *Latino Studies*, 1: 264-283.

Berry, J. W. (1990). "Psychology of acculturation." In J. Berman (Ed.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1989: Cross-cultural perspectives* (pp. 201 - 234). Lincoln: Nebraska University Press.

Berry, J. W. (1997). "Immigration, acculturation and adaptation." *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 46 (1), 5 - 68.

Birman, D., Trickett, E. and Vinokurov, A. (2002). "Acculturation and Adaptation of Soviet Jewish Refugee Adolescents: Predictors of Adjustment Across Life Domains." *Journal of Community Psychology*, 30(5): p. 585-607.

Bobo, Lawrence and Frank Gilliam. (1990). "Race, Sociopolitical Participation and Black Empowerment." *American Political Science Review*, 84(2): 379-393.

Boyd, Monica. (2006). "Educational Attainments of Immigrant Offspring: Success or Segmented Assimilation?" Unpublished Manuscript.

Brant, R. (1990). "Assessing Proportionality in the Proportional Odds Model for Ordinal Logistic Regression." *Biometrical Journal*, 42(6): 677-699.

Browning, Rufus, Dale Rogers Marshall and David Tabb. (1984). *Protest is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Calderon, Jose. (1992). "Hispanic' and 'Latino': The Viability of Categories for Panethnic Unity." *Latin American Perspectives*, 19(4) 37-44.

Calhoun-Brown, A. (1996). African American churches and political mobilization: The psychological impact of organizational resources. *The Journal of Politics*, 58, 935-953.

Cain, Bruce E., D. Roderick Kiewiet, and Carole J. Uhlaner. (1991). "The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans." *American Journal of Political Science*, 35:390-422.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. (1960). *The American Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. (1998). *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Second Edition, London: Macmillan.

Chong, Dennis, and Reuel Rogers. 2005. "Racial Solidarity and Political Participation," *Political Behavior*, 27:4 (December): 347-374.

Chunrong, Ai, and Norton, Edward C., "Interaction Terms in Nonlinear Models" (July 2001). Triangle Health Economics Working Paper No. 2. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=303862> or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.303862

Cisneros, H. Respuesta A Huntington, Financial Times, 24 de Mayo, 2004. Available online at <http://rosas146.blogspot.com/2004/06/respuesta-huntington-financial-times.html>.

Citrin, Jack and Donald. P. Green. (1986). "Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of Political Trust." *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 16.

Citrin, Jack, Beth Reingold, and Donald P. Green. (1990). "American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change." *Journal of Politics*.

Citrin, Jack, Kathryn Pearson, John Sides, and David O. Sears. (2002). "National and Ethnic Identities: Competing or Complementary," paper prepared for presentation at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Citrin Jack and Highton B. (2002). *How Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration Shape the California Electorate*. San Francisco: Public Policy Inst. Calif.

- Citrin, Jack, Kathryn Pearson, Jonathan Cohen. (2003). "Assimilation of the Fourth Wave: Identity, Attitudes, and Participation." paper prepared for presentation at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
- Claassen, Ryan L. (2004). "Political Opinion and Distinctiveness: The Case of Hispanic Ethnicity." *Political Research Quarterly*, 57:609-620.
- Connaughton, S. L. and Jarvis, S. E. (2004). Invitations for partisan identification: Attempts to court Latino voters through televised Latino-oriented political advertisements, 1984-2000. *Journal of Communication*, 54, 38-54.
- Conover, Pamela Johnston. (1984). "The Influence of Group Identification on Political Perception and Evaluation." *Journal of Politics*, 46: 760-785.
- Conover, Pamela Johnston. (1988). "The Role of Social Groups in Political Thinking." *British Journal of Political Science*, 18:51-76.
- Converse, Philip E. and Roy Pierce. (1985). "Measuring Partisanship." *Political Methodology*, 11:143-166.
- Cullar, I., Arnold, B., and Maldonado, R. (1995). "Acculturation rating scale for Mexican Americans-II: A revision of the original ARSMA scale." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 17(3), 275-304.
- Dahl, Robert. *Who Governs?* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.
- Dawson, Michael C. (1994). *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo, Louis DeSipio, F. Chris Garcia, John A. Garcia, and Angelo Falcon. (1992). *Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- de la Garza, R.O., A. Falcon, and F.C. Garcia. (1996). "Will the Real Americans Please Stand Up: Anglo and Mexican-American Support of Core American Political Values." *American Journal of Political Science*, 40: 335-351.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo, Angelo Falcon, F. Chris Garcia, and John A. Garcia. (1998). *Latino National Political Survey, 1989-1990*. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
- DeSipio, Louis. (1995). *Counting on the Latino Vote: Latinos As a New Electorate*. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.

DeSipio, Louis. (2002). *Immigrant Organizing, Civic Outcomes: Civic Engagement, Political Activity, National Attachment and Identity in Latino Communities*. University of California at Irvine, Center for the Study of Democracy. Working Paper 02-08. <http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/02-08>.

DeSipio, Louis. (2006). *Transnational Politics and Civic Engagement: Do Home Country Political Ties Limit Latino Immigrant Pursuit of U.S. Civic Engagement and Citizenship*. In *Transforming Politics, Transforming America: The Political and Civic Incorporation of Immigrants in the United States*, University of Virginia Press.

De Toqueville, Alexis. (1956). *Democracy in America*. New York: New American Library.

Diaz-Cotto, Juanita. (1996). *Gender, Ethnicity and the State: Latina and Latino Prison Politics*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Dominguez, G. (1996). "Do Latinos Exist?," *Contemporary Sociology*, 23(3), p. 354-356.

Dwyer, C. (1991). *The Dominican Americans*, Chelsea House, New York.

Eckstein, Susan. 2006 "Cuban Emigres and the American Dream." *Perspectives on Politics*, 4(1): 289-296.

Edmonston, Barry and Jeffrey S. Passel (eds.). (1994). *Immigration and Ethnicity: The Integration of America's Newest Arrivals*. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.

Finifter, Ada W. and Bernard M. Finifter. (1989) "Party Identification and Political Adaptation of American Migrants in Australia." *The Journal of Politics*, 51(4): 599-630.

Fox, G. (1996). *Hispanic nation: culture, politics, and the constructing of identity*. Secaucus, NJ: Carol Publishing Group.

Fraga, Luis Ricardo and Gary M. Segura. (2006). "Culture Clash? Contesting Notions of American Identity and the Effects of Latin American Immigration." *Perspectives on Politics*, 4(June): 279-287.

Fuchs, Lawrence. (1990). *The American Kaleidoscope*. London: Wesleyan University Press.

Gans, Herbert. (1992). Second generation decline: scenarios for the economic and ethnic futures of the post-1965 American immigrants. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 15 (April): 173-191.

- Gay, Claudine. (2001). "The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political Participation," *American Political Science Review* 95(3): 589-602.
- Glazer, Nathan. (1994). "Immigration and the American Future," *The Public Interest*.
- Glazer, Nathan. (1997). *We are all Multiculturalists Now*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Glazer, Nathan. and Daniel Moynihan. 1963. *Beyond the Melting Pot*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Gleason, Phillip. 1980. "Americanization," in *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, S. Thernstrom ed. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Gordon, Milton M. 1964. *Assimilation in American Life*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gowan, M., and Trevio, M. (1998). "An examination of gender differences in Mexican-American attitudes toward family and career roles." *Sex Roles*, 38(11/12), 1079-1093.
- Graham, P.M. (199). "Reimagining the nation and defining the district: Dominican migration and transnational politics", in P. Pessar (Ed.), *Caribbean Circuits, New Directions in the Study of Caribbean Migration*, Center for Migration Studies, New York, p. 91-125.
- Gurin, Patricia, Arthur Miller, and Gerald Gurin. 1980. "Stratum Identification and Consciousness." *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 43: 30-47.
- Guzmn, Betsy and Eileen Diaz McConnell. (2001). "The Hispanic Population: 1990-2000 Growth and Change." *Population Research and Policy Review*, 21 (1-2): 109-128.
- Hagenaars, Jacques. (1993). *Loglinear Models with Latent Variables*. Sage University Press.
- Hajnal, Zoltan and Taeku Lee. (2003). "The Multidimensionality of African American Party Identification." Paper presented at the 3rd Minnesota Symposium on Political Psychology Perspectives on Race and Politics. Twin Cities, MN.
- Harris, F. (1994). "Something within: Religion as a mobilizer of African American political activism." *The Journal of Politics*, 56, 42-68.
- Haynie, L. (2001). *African American Legislators in the American States*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

- Hernandez, R., and G. Jacobs (2001). "Beyond homeland politics, Dominicans in Massachusetts", in C. Hardy-Fanta and J.N. Gerson (Eds), *Latino Politics in Massachusetts, Struggles, Strategies, and Prospects*, Routledge, New York, p. 277-295.
- Hertel, Bradley R., and Michael G. Hughes. (2001). "The Significance of Color Remains: A Study of Life Chances, Mate Selection, and Ethnic Consciousness Among Black Americans" *Social Forces*, 68(1): 1105 - 1121.
- Hetherington, Marc. (1998). "The Political Relevance of Political Trust." *The American Political Science Review*, 92(4): 791-808.
- Highton, B. and Burris, A. (2002). "New Perspectives on Latino Voter Turnout in the United States." *American Politics Research*, 30(1):285-306.
- Hirschman, Charles. (2003). "The Role of Religion in the Origin and Adaptation of Immigrant Groups." Paper presented at the conference on "Conceptual and Methodological Developments in the Study of International Migration." Center for Migration and Development, Princeton University. May 23-24.
- Hu, L., and Bentler, P. M. (1999). "Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives." *Structural Equation Modeling*, 6, 1-55.
- Huddy, Leonie. (2001). "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory." *Political Psychology*, 22(1): 127-156.
- Huntington SP. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster. 367
- Huntington SP. (1997). "The Erosion of American National Interests." *Foreign Affairs*, 76: 28-49
- Huntington SP. (2000). Reconsidering immigration: Is Mexico a special case? *Cent. Immigration Stud.* <http://www.cis.org/articles/2000/back1100.html>
- Hurtado, Aida. (1994). "Does Similarity Breed Respect? Interviewer Evaluations of Mexican-Descent Respondents in a Bilingual Survey." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 58:77-95.
- Hwang, S. S. and Murdock, S. H. (1991). "Ethnic Enclosure or Ethnic Competition: Ethnic Identification among Hispanics in Texas." *Sociological Quarterly*, 32, 469-476.

Jackman, M. R., and Jackman, R.W. (1973). "An interpretation of the relation between objective and subjective social status." *American Sociological Review*, 38, 569-582.

Jackson, Byran O. (1987). "The Effects of Racial Group Consciousness on Political Mobilization in American Cities" *Western Political Quarterly*, 40(December 1987): 631-647.

Jones-Correa, Michael. (1998). *Between two nations : the political predicament of Latinos in New York City*. Cornell University Press.

Jones-Correa, Michael and David L. Leal. (1996). "Becoming 'Hispanic': Secondary Panethnic Identification among Latin American-Origin Populations in the United States." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 18(2):214-254.

Jones-Correa, Michael and David L. Leal. (2001). "Political Participation: Does Religion Matter?" *Political Research Quarterly*, 54:751-770.

Jones-Correa, Michael. (2001). "Under two flags: dual nationality in Latin America and its consequences for naturalization in the United States", *International Migration Review*, 35(4), p. 997-1029.

Kaufmann, Karen M. (2003). "Cracks in the Rainbow: Perceived Commonality as a Basis for Latino and African-American Political Coalitions." *Political Research Quarterly*, 56:2:199-210.

Keefe, S. and A. M. Padilla. (1987). *Chicano Ethnicity*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Kenski, K. and Tisinger, R. (2006). "Hispanic Voters in the 2000 and 2004 Presidential and General Elections." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36(2):189

King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. (2000). "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation." *American Journal of Political Science*, 44 (2):341-355.

LaFromboise, T., Coleman, H., and Gerton, J. (1993). "Psychological impact of biculturalism: Evidence and theory." *Psychological Bulletin*, 114, p. 395-412.

Lee, T. and Ramakrishnan, S. K. (2002) "What's in a Name? Ethnic Names, Immigrant Acculturation, and Latino Mass Opinion." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston and Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts Online ;PDF; Retrieved 2006-10-05 from <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p66249;index.html>

- Levitt, P. (1998). "Social remittances: migration driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion", *International Migration Review*, 32(4): 926-948. 2001 The Transnational Villagers, University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Liebkind, K. (2001). Acculturation. In R. Brown and S. Gaertner (Eds.), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup Processes*, p. 386-406. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell.
- Lien, Pei-te. (1994). "Ethnicity and political participation: A comparison between Asian and Mexican Americans." *Political Behavior*, 16, 237-264.
- Lien, Pei-te. (2001). *The Making of Asian America through Political Participation*. Temple University Press.
- Lien, Pei-te, M. Margaret Conway, and Janelle Wong. (2003). *Understanding Asian Americans*. Routledge.
- Lipset, Seymour. (1964). *The First New Nation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Long, Scott. (1997). *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*. Advanced Quantitative Techniques in the Social Sciences, Volume 7. Sage Publications.
- Lopez, Alfred. (1973). *The Puerto Rican Papers*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Lubke G. H. and Muthen B. (2005). "Investigating Population Heterogeneity With Factor Mixture Models." *Psychological Methods*, 10 (1): 21-39.
- Markstrom-Adams, C. (1992). A consideration of intervening factors in adolescent identity formation. In G. R. Adams, T. P. Gullota, and R. Montemayor (Eds.), *Adolescent identity formation* (pp. 173-192). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Marschall, Melissa. (2001). "Does the Shoe Fit?: Testing Models of Participation for African-American and Latino Involvement in Local Politics ." *Urban Affairs Review*, 37(2): 227-48.
- Marschall, Melissa. (2004). "Citizen Participation and the Neighborhood Context: A New Look at the Coproduction of Local Public Goods." *Political Research Quarterly*, 57(June, No. 2): 231-44.
- Marquez, Benjamin. (2004). "Latino Identity Politics Research: Problems and Opportunities." Available online at <http://perg.tamu.edu/lpc/Marquez.pdf>.
- Massey, Doug. (2000). *The Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970-1990*. In Gerald D. Jaynes, ed., *Immigration and Race*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Mayo, Y. Q., and Resnick, R. P. (1996). "The Impact of Machismo on Hispanic women." *Journal of Women and Social Work*, 11(3), 257-277.
- McCloskey, H. and John Zaller. (1984). *The American Ethos*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- McCutcheon, Allan. (1987). *Latent Class Analysis*. Sage University Press.
- McClain, Paula D. and John A. Garcia. 1993. "Expanding Disciplinary Boundaries: Black, Latino, and Racial Minority Group Politics in Political Science," In Ada W. Finifter, *Political Science: The State of the Discipline, II*. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.
- Michelson, M. (2001). "Political Trust Among Chicago Latinos." *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 23(3): 323-334.
- Miles, R. (1989). *Racism*. London: Routledge.
- Milligan, S. Hispanic Vote Gains Influence for 2000 Vote. *The Boston Globe*, September, 13 1999.
- Miller, A., Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, and Oksana Malanchuk. (1981). "Group Consciousness and Political Participation." *American Journal of Political Science*, 25(3): 494-511.
- Miller, Arthur H., and Martin P. Wattenberg. (1983). "Measuring Party Identification: Independent or No Partisan Preference?" *American Journal of Political Science*, 27 (1):106-121.
- Miller, Warren E., and National Election Studies. (1994). *American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1948-2000*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies.
- Montoya, L.J., (2002). "Expanding Disciplinary Boundaries: Black, Latino, and Racial Minority Group Politics in Political Science," In Ada W. Finifter, *Political Science: The State of the Discipline, II*. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.
- Moore, J. and H. Panchon. (1985). *Hispanics in the United States*. Englewood Cliff, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Muoz, Carlos. (1989). *Youth, Identity, and Power: The Chicano Movement*. New York: Verso.

- Nguyen, H., Messe, L., and Sollak, G. (1999). "Toward a more complex understanding of acculturation and adjustment: Cultural involvements and psychosocial functioning in Vietnamese youth." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 30, p. 5-31.
- Olsen, Marvin. (1970). Social and Political Participation of Blacks. *American Sociological Review*, 35: 682-696.
- Olzak, Susan (1983). "Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 9: 355-374.
- Ong, N. and David S. Meyer. (2004). "Protest and Political Incorporation: Vietnamese American Protests, 1975-2001." Center for the Study of Democracy. Paper 04-08. <http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/04-08>
- Pachon, Harry, and Louis DeSipio. (1994). *New Americans By Choice: Political Perspectives of Latino Immigrants*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Padilla, Felix M. (1985). *Latino Ethnic Consciousness: The Case of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Pantoja, A. (2005). "Transnational Ties and Immigrant Political Incorporation: The Case of Dominicans in Washington Heights, New York." *International Migration*, 43(4), p. 123-146.
- Pardo, Mary. (1998). *Mexican American Women Activists: Identity and Resistance in Two Los Angeles Communities*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Park, R. E., Burgess, E. W., McKenzie, R. D., and Wirth, L. (1925). *The city*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Pearson, Kathryn and Jack Citrin. (2002). "Identity Choice and Language Politics in the United States," unpublished paper presented at the 2002 Conference of the International Society for Political Psychology, Berlin, Germany.
- Peppas, S. (2001). "Subcultural Similarities and Differences: An Examination of Core U.S. Values." *Cross Cultural Management*, 8(1): 59-70.
- Petrocik, John R. (1974). "An Analysis of Intransitivities in the Index of Party Identification." *Political Methodology*, 1:31-47.
- Phinney, Jean and Rotheram, M. J. (1986). Children's Ethnic Socialization: Themes and Implications. In J.S. Phinney and M.J. Rotheram (Eds.) *Children's Ethnic Socialization: Pluralism and Development* (pp. 274-283). Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

- Phinney, J. S. (1990). "Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults: Review of Research." *Psychological Bulletin*, 108, 499-514.
- Phinney, J. S., and Alipuria, L. (1990). "Ethnic identity in college students from four ethnic groups." *Journal of Adolescence*, 13, 171-184.
- Phinney, J. S. (1992). "The Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure: A new scale for use with adolescents and youth adults from diverse groups." *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 7, p. 156-176.
- Phinney, J. S. (1996). "Understanding Ethnic Diversity: The Role of Ethnic Identity." *American Behavioral Scientist*, 40, p. 143-152.
- Phinney, J. S. and Devich-Navarro, M. (1997). "Variation in bicultural identification among African American and Mexican American adolescents." *Journal of Research on Adolescence*, 7, p. 3-32.
- Phinney, J. S., Cantu, C., and Kurtz, D. (1997). "Ethnic and American identity as predictors of self-esteem among African American, Latino, and White adolescents." *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 26, 165-185.
- Phinney, J. S., Gabriel Horenczyk, Karmela Liebkind, and Paul Vedder. (2001). "Ethnic Identity, Immigration, and Well-Being: An Interaction Perspective." *Journal of Social Issues*, 57(3): 493-510.
- Phinney, J. S., and Juana Flores. (2002). "Unpacking' Acculturation: Aspects of Acculturation as Predictors of Traditional Sex Role Attitudes." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 33(3): 320-331.
- Portes, Alejandro, Robert Nash Parker, and Jose A. Cobas. (1980). "Assimilation or Consciousness: Perceptions of the U.S. Society Among Recent Latin American Immigrants to the United States." *Social Forces*, 59: 201-224.
- Portes, Alejandro and Min Zhou. (1993). "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants." *Annals of American Political and Social Sciences*, vol. 530.
- Portes, Alejandro and Ruben Rumbaut. (1996). (2nd ed.). *Immigrant America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Portes, Alejandro and Ruben Rumbaut. (2001). *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Ramakrishnan, Karthick and Thomas Espenshade. (2001). "Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States." *International Migration Review*, vol. 36.
- Rogers, Reuel. (2000). Afro-Caribbean Immigrants, African Americans, and the Politics of Group Identity. In *Black and Multiracial Politics in America*, edited by Y. M. Alex-Assensoh and L. J. Hanks. New York: New York University Press.
- Rosenstone, Steven J., Roy L. Behr and Edward H. Lazarus. (1984). *Third Parties in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Saito, Leland. 1998. *Race and Politics*. Indiana University Press. Santa Ana, Otto. 2002. *Brown Tide Rising*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Schattschneider, E.E. 1942. *Party government*. New York: Rinehart.
- Rotheram-Borus, M. J., Dopkins, S., Sabate, N., and Lightfoot, M. (1996). Personal and ethnic identity, values, and self-esteem among Black and Latino adolescent girls. In B. J. Ross Leadbeater N. Way (Eds.), *Urban girls* (pp. 35-52). New York: New York University Press.
- Rumbaut, Ruben. (1984). "The Crucible Within: Ethnic Identity, Self-esteem, and Segmented Assimilation Among Children of Immigrants." *International Migration Review*, 28(4), p. 748- 794.
- Sapiro, Virginia. (1981). When Are Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political Representation of Women, *The American Political Science Review*, 75(3), p. 701-716.
- Sapiro, Virginia. (1983). *The Political Integration of Women*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Schildkraut, Deborah J. (2003). "American Identity and Attitudes toward Official-English Policies." *Political Psychology*, 24: 469-99.
- Schmid, A. Allan. (2004). *Conflict and Cooperation: Institutional and Behavioral Economics*. Blackwell Publishers, Malden, MA.
- Segura, Gary M., Dennis Falcon, and Harry Pachon. (1996). Dynamics of Latino Partisanship in California: Immigration, Issue Salience, and Their Implications. *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy* 10:62-80.
- Segura, Gary M. (2006). "Immigration and National Identity." *Perspectives on Politics*, 4(June): 276-278.
- Shaw, D., de la Garza, R. O., and Lee, J. (2000). "Examining Latino turnout in 1996: A three-state, validated survey approach." *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(2), 338-346.

- Shingles, Richard. (1981). "Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing Link." *American Political Science Review*, 75(1): 76-91.
- Shively, W. Phillips. (1979). "The Development of Party Identification among Adults." *American Political Science Review*, 73, 4 (Dec) 1039-1054.
- Simpson, George and J. Milton Yinger. (1972). *Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Smith, R. (1988). "The 'American Creed' and American identity: The limits of liberal citizenship in the United States." *Western Political Quarterly*, 41: 225-51.
- Smith, R. (1993). "Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The multiple traditions in America." *American Political Science Review*, 87: 549-66.
- Smith, R. (1997). *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Smith, R. 2003. *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, R. 2004. "Identities, interests, and the future of political science." *Perspectives on Politics*, 2; 301-312.
- Sniderman, P.M., Brody, R., and Tetlock, P.E. (1991). *Reasoning and choice: explorations in political psychology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sniderman, P. M. and Hagen, M. (1985). *Race and inequality: a study in American values*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Soto, E., and Shaver, P. (1982). "Sex-role traditionalism, assertiveness, and symptoms of Puerto Rican women living in the United States." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 4(1), 1-19.
- Staton, Jeffery K., Damarys Canache and Robert Jackson. (Forthcoming 2007). "Dual Nationality Among Latinos: What Are the Implications for Political Connectedness?" *Journal of Politics*,
- Stokes, Akai. (2003). "Latino Group Consciousness and Political Participation." *American Politics Research*, 31:4 (July):361-378.
- Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. (1979). "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." In William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, eds., *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. (1979). "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." In William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, eds., *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human Groups and Social Categories*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Tate, Katherine. (1993). *From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Torres, Andres. (2001). "Latino Cultural Identity and Political Participation: Scanning the Recent Literature." Available online at <http://www.gaston.umb.edu/publications/gr/8xxnl/torrescornell.html>.

Torres-Saillant, S. (1989). "Dominicans as a New York community: a social appraisal", *A Journal of Marginal Discourse*, 2(1), p. 7-25.

Uhlener, Carole J. (1989). "Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups." *American Journal of Political Science*, 33: 390-422.

Uhlener, Carole J., and F. Chris Garcia. (1998.) *Foundations of Latino Party Identification: Learning, Ethnicity, and Demographic Factors Among Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Anglos in the United States*. Irvine: Center for the Study of Democracy Research Monograph Series.

Uhlener, Carole Jean, Mark M. Gray, and F. Chris Garcia. (2000). *Ideology, Issues, And Partisanship Among Latinos*. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, March 24-26, at San Jose, CA.

Umana-Taylor, Adriana, Marcelo Diversi and Mark A. Fine. (2002). "Ethnic Identity and Self-Esteem of Latino Adolescents: Distinctions Among the Latino Populations." *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 17(3): 303-327.

US Census Bureau, Population Projection Division, March, 2004.

Verba, Sidney and Norman Nie. (1972). *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper and Row.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady. (1995.) *Voice and Equality*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, and Norman H. Nie. (1993). "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Resources: Participation in the United States." *British Journal of Political Science*, 23(4): 453- 497.

- Verba, Sidney, Nancy Burns, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. (1997). "Knowing and Caring about Politics: Gender and Political Engagement." *The Journal of Politics*, 59(4): 1051- 1072.
- Wagenheim, Kal (ed.). (1973). *Puerto Ricans: A Documentary History*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Anchor.
- Warner, W. Lloyd, and Leo Srole (1945). *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
- Waters, Mary. (1994). "Ethnic and Racial Identities of Second-Generation Black Immigrants in New York City." *International Migration Review*, 28 (Winter): 795-820.
- Waters, Mary. (1997). *Immigrant Families at Risk: Factors that Undermine Chances for Success*. Alan Booth, Ann C. Crouter, and Nancy Landale (eds.) *Immigration and the Family: Research and Policy on U.S. Immigrants*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum associates, Inc., Publishers. pp. 79-87.
- Wattenberg, Martin P. (1990). *The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952-1988*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Wilcox, Clyde and Gomez, Leopoldo. (1990). "Religion, Group Identification and Politics Among American Blacks." *Sociological Analysis*, 51: 271-287. 1990.
- Wong, Janelle S. (2000). "The Effects of Age and Political Exposure on the Development of Party Identification Among Asian American and Latino Immigrants in the United States." *Political Behavior*, 22 (4):341-371.
- Wong, Janelle. (2001). "The New Dynamics of Immigrants' Political Incorporation." Doctoral dissertation. Yale University.
- Wong, Janelle, Pei-ti Lien, and M. Margaret Conway. (2005). "Group-Based Resources and the Political Participation of Asian Americans." *American Politics Research*, 33: 545-76.
- Xie, Yu and Emily Greenman. (2005). "Segmented Assimilation Theory: A Reformulation and Empirical Test." PSC Research Report No. 05-581. August 2005.
- Yang, Phillip. (1994). "Explaining Immigrant Naturalization." *International Migration Review*, 28(3): 449-477.
- Zaller, John. (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Zhou, Min and Carl L. Bankston. 1998. *Growing Up American: How Vietnamese Children Adapt to Life in the United States*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Zuo, J., and Tang, S. (2000). "Breadwinner Status and Gender Ideologies of Men and Women Regarding Family Roles." *Sociological Perspectives*, 43(1), 29-43.